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Full-Text Articles in Law
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop, Fiona Scott Morton
Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop, Fiona Scott Morton
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not reflect either modern theoretical and empirical economic analysis or current agency enforcement policy. Yet widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies have been expressed among agency enforcers and commentators. Based on our review of the relevant economic literature and our experience analyzing vertical mergers, we recommend that the enforcement agencies adopt five principles: (i) The agencies should consider and investigate the full range of potential anticompetitive harms when evaluating vertical mergers; (ii) The agencies should decline to presume that vertical mergers benefit competition on …
Analyzing Vertical Mergers To Avoid False Negatives: Three Recent Case Studies, Steven C. Salop
Analyzing Vertical Mergers To Avoid False Negatives: Three Recent Case Studies, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article analyzes three recent vertical mergers: a private antitrust case attacking the consummated merger of Jeld-Wen and Craftmaster Manufacturing Inc. (“CMI”) that was cleared by the DOJ in 2012 but subsequently litigated and won by the plaintiff, Steves & Sons in 2018; and two recent vertical merger matters investigated and cleared (with limited remedies) by 3-2 votes by the Federal Trade Commission in early 2019 -- Staples/Essendant and Fresenius/NxStage. There are some factual parallels among these three matters that make it interesting to analyze them together. First, the DOJ’s decision to clear Jeld-Wen/CMI merger appears to be a clear …
The At&T/Time Warner Merger: How Judge Leon Garbled Professor Nash, Steven C. Salop
The At&T/Time Warner Merger: How Judge Leon Garbled Professor Nash, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The US District Court in the AT&T/Time Warner vertical merger case has issued its opinion permitting the merger. At of this writing in August 2018, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has appealed to the DC Circuit and filed its brief, as have several Amici. I was disappointed that the DOJ was unable to prove its case to the satisfaction of Judge Leon, the trial judge. Notwithstanding the court’s confidence that the merger is procompetitive, I remain concerned that it will have anti- competitive effects, both on its own and following the subsequent vertical mergers in the TV industry, which this …
The Evolution And Vitality Of Merger Presumptions: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, Steven C. Salop
The Evolution And Vitality Of Merger Presumptions: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article reviews the formulation and evolution of the Philadelphia National Bank anticompetitive presumption through the lens of decision theory and Bayes Law. It explains how the economic theory, empirical evidence and experience are used to determine a presumption and how that presumption interacts with the reliability of relevant evidence to rationally set the appropriate burden of production and burden of persuasion to rebut the presumption. The article applies this reasoning to merger presumptions. It also sketches out a number of non-market share structural factors that might be used to supplement or replace the current legal and enforcement presumptions for …
The Appropriate Legal Standard And Sufficient Economic Evidence For Exclusive Dealing Under Section 2: The Ftc’S Mcwane Case, Steven C. Salop, Sharis A. Pozen, John R. Seward
The Appropriate Legal Standard And Sufficient Economic Evidence For Exclusive Dealing Under Section 2: The Ftc’S Mcwane Case, Steven C. Salop, Sharis A. Pozen, John R. Seward
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The FTC recently found McWane, Inc. liable for unlawful monopoly maintenance by a 3-1 majority. The dispute among the FTC Commissioners raises important and interesting issues regarding the law and economics of exclusive dealing and the proper evaluation of the competitive effects of exclusionary conduct. Commissioner Wright’s Dissent proposes and utilizes a new legal standard that requires the plaintiff to show “clear evidence” of harm to competition before shifting the burden to the defendant to show procompetitive efficiency benefits. This burden of proof and production on the plaintiff is much higher than showing “probable effect” based on a preponderance of …
Exclusionary Conduct, Effect On Consumers, And The Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, Steven C. Salop
Exclusionary Conduct, Effect On Consumers, And The Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The central thesis of this article is that the use of the profit-sacrifice test as the sole liability standard for exclusionary conduct, or as a required prong of a multi-pronged liability standard is fundamentally flawed. The profit-sacrifice test may be useful, for example, as one type of evidence of anticompetitive purpose. In unilateral refusal to deal cases, it can be useful in determining the non-exclusionary benchmark. However, the test is not generally a reliable indicator of the impact of allegedly exclusionary conduct on consumer welfare - the primary focus of the antitrust laws. The profit-sacrifice test also is prone to …
Past, Present, And Future Of Antitrust Enforcement At The Federal Trade Commission, Robert Pitofsky
Past, Present, And Future Of Antitrust Enforcement At The Federal Trade Commission, Robert Pitofsky
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The period from 1970 to the present - roughly a third of a century - has witnessed profound changes in the quality of regulation at the Federal Trade Commission and a remarkable convergence of antitrust enforcement policy between left and right, and between primarily legal as opposed to primarily economic approaches. With respect to substantive law, areas of intellectual debate and uncertainty remain, but viewpoint differences that existed between the 1960s and the 1980s are today vastly reduced. In the 1960s, emphasis was on populist values, hostility to "Bigness," protection of competitors (especially small business) as opposed to the competitive …
Anticompetitive Overbuying By Power Buyers, Steven C. Salop
Anticompetitive Overbuying By Power Buyers, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Two types of single-firm overbuying are analyzed in this article. Predatory overbuying consists of overbuying inputs as a predatory strategy to cause buyer-side competitors in the input market to exit from the market or permanently shrink their capacity in order to gain monopsony power in the input market. Raising Rivals' Costs (RRC) overbuying consists of overbuying inputs as an exclusionary strategy to raise rivals' input costs and thereby gain market power in the output market. In most cases, the additional input purchases are used to produce output. However, in unusual cases a firm may engage in naked overbuying, that is, …
Comments On Warren Grimes: Transparency In Federal Antitrust Enforcement, Robert Pitofsky
Comments On Warren Grimes: Transparency In Federal Antitrust Enforcement, Robert Pitofsky
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this review, I will concentrate on the policies and experiences of the Federal Trade Commission - an agency with which I am more familiar than the Department of Justice. Professor Grimes appreciates that FTC disclosure policies provide more information than the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. I will leave it to others to explain why Department of Justice policies, particularly in the area of criminal enforcement, deserve to be different.
The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under United States Antitrust Law, Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson, Jonathan Hooks
The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under United States Antitrust Law, Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson, Jonathan Hooks
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The issue of essential facilities has attracted renewed attention in Europe in recent years because of the controversy between IMS Health Inc. and NDC Health Corporation, two competitors in pharmaceutical data services in Germany . . . After an extensive investigation, the European Commission (EC) ordered that IMS grant access to the 1860 brick structure on commercially reasonable terms, and the EC decision is now on appeal in the Court of First Instance in Luxembourg. One issue that emerged in that litigation is whether a decision by European authorities to grant access to the alleged essential facility, especially one whose …
Challenges Of The New Economy: Issues At The Intersection Of Antitrust And Intellectual Property, Robert Pitofsky
Challenges Of The New Economy: Issues At The Intersection Of Antitrust And Intellectual Property, Robert Pitofsky
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
There is wide agreement that the last decade or so has presented an unusually lively and challenging period for antitrust analysis. Among many reasons we can point to are deregulation and problems of transition to a free market (telecommunications and electricity production offer leading examples), developments in procedural cooperation and possible substantive convergence in response to the increasing globalization of competition and enforcement approaches, and priorities in addressing an unprecedented merger wave. An additional challenge involves the application of established antitrust principles to the growing high-tech sector of the economy. It is that application of antitrust law to the new …
Antitrust And Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues At The Heart Of The New Economy, Robert Pitofsky
Antitrust And Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues At The Heart Of The New Economy, Robert Pitofsky
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The New Economy differs in degree rather than kind from the "old" economy. Part II of this discussion examines the key differences that define the New Economy. Part Ill turns to several implications of those differences as they pertain to antitrust enforcement. I argue that the differences do not justify sweeping generalizations that antitrust enforcement has no place in the New Economy, but do require antitrust enforcement to make adjustments and exercise sensitivity towards intellectual property issues on a case-by-case basis. The goal of a coherent overall competition policy, in deciding both what conduct to enforce against and what remedies …
Tribute To Norman Dorsen, Robert Pitofsky
Tribute To Norman Dorsen, Robert Pitofsky
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
It is an enormous delight for me to contribute to this dedication ceremony honoring Norman Dorsen. It did require, however, that I go back and note the fact that I wrote for the Annual Survey thirty-seven years ago. Not only did I discuss antitrust, I made some confident predictions. I noted with alarm that there had been five hundred corporate mergers in the previous year, but pointed out that that would level off as time went on. Well, five hundred would be a quiet month at the Federal Trade Commission these days. I am delighted with the Annual Survey's decision …
The Competitive Effects Of Passive Minority Equity Interests: Reply, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. O'Brien
The Competitive Effects Of Passive Minority Equity Interests: Reply, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. O'Brien
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In a recent article published in this journal, Jon Dubrow examines the acquisitions of passive minority equity interests. The focus of his article is the treatment of these transactions by the courts and the federal antitrust agencies, including their treatment of the investment-only exemption from Section 7 of the Clayton Act. One section of the article discusses the economic foundation for the competitive effects analysis of these acquisitions, focusing mainly on our article recently published in this journal. Dubrow accepts the basic economic framework set out in our earlier article, and the analysis of factors that affect the acquiring firm's …
The First Principles Approach To Antitrust, Kodak, And Antitrust At The Millenium, Steven C. Salop
The First Principles Approach To Antitrust, Kodak, And Antitrust At The Millenium, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this essay, I reflect on an important contribution to the development of antitrust reasoning and law that arises out of the Supreme Court's decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Technical Services, Inc. In particular, I discuss the decision's relationship to what I have termed the "first principles" approach to market power and antitrust. In my view, one reason that Kodak is important is that it does not take a wooden approach in its economic reasoning. Instead, the opinion nimbly applies the basic principles of competitive analysis to a difficult dynamic context. This enables the majority to avoid rigid adherence …
Competitive Effects Of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest And Corporate Control, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. O'Brien
Competitive Effects Of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest And Corporate Control, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. O'Brien
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this article, we set up an economic framework for analyzing the competitive effects of partial ownership interests. We have three main goals. First, we conceptually derive and explain the competitive effects of partial ownership, explaining its key elements and drawing analogies to the key ideas behind the analysis of horizontal mergers. Second, we present a general framework for evaluating the competitive effects of partial ownership that is analogous to, but at the same time recognizes key differences in the standard analysis for evaluating horizontal mergers. Third, we examine several methods of quantifying these competitive effects.