Law Commons^™

Do Legal Origins Predict Legal Substance?, Anu Bradford, Yun-Chien Chang, Adam S. Chilton, Nuno Garoupa

Faculty Scholarship

There is a large body of research in economics and law suggesting that the legal origin of a country – that is, whether its legal regime is based on English common law or French, German, or Nordic civil law – profoundly impacts a range of outcomes. However, the exact relationship between legal origin and legal substance has been disputed in the literature and not fully explored with nuanced legal coding. We revisit this debate while leveraging novel cross-country data sets that provide detailed coding of two areas of laws: property and antitrust. We find that having shared legal origins strongly …

The Curse Of Bigness: New Deal Supplement, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

This is a supplement to the book, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age. It covers the years between 1920 - 1945, with a focus on the New Deal, and represents material left out of the original book.

It is meant to be read together with the larger volume, but can also be read separately.

Trade Openness And Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton

Faculty Scholarship

Openness to international trade and adoption of antitrust laws can both curb anti-competitive behavior. But scholars have long debated the relationship between the two. Some argue that greater trade openness makes antitrust unnecessary, while others contend that antitrust laws are still needed to realize the benefits of trade liberalization. Data limitations have made this debate largely theoretical to date. We study the relationship between trade and antitrust empirically using new data on antitrust laws and enforcement activities. We find that trade openness and stringency of antitrust laws are positively correlated from 1950 to 2010 overall, but the positive correlation disappears …

The “Protection Of The Competitive Process” Standard, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

The antitrust law should return to a standard more realistic and suited to the legal system – the “protection of the competitive process.” It posits a basic question for law enforcement and judges. Given complained-of conduct, is that conduct actually part of the competitive process, or is it a sufficient deviation as to be unlawful? In this view, antitrust law aims to create a body of common-law rules that punish and therefore deter such disruptions – hence “protecting the competitive process.”

After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The "Protection Of Competition" Standard In Practice, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

The consumer welfare standard in antitrust has been heavily criticized. But would, in fact, abandoning the “consumer welfare” standard make the antitrust law too unworkable and indeterminate?

I argue that there is such a thing as a post-consumer welfare antitrust that is practicable and arguably as predictable as the consumer welfare standard. In practice, the consumer welfare standard has not set a high bar. The leading alternative standard, the “protection of competition” is at least as predictable, and arguably more determinate than the exceeding abstract abstract consumer welfare test, while being much truer the legislative intent underlying the antitrust laws. …

Arbitration As Wealth Transfer, Deepak Gupta, Lina M. Khan

Faculty Scholarship

Over the last few decades, the Supreme Court has steadily expanded the reach of forced arbitration clauses – clauses that companies embed in the fine print of standard-form contracts to deny consumers and workers the right to band together to sue those corporations in court. While the Court’s decisions that set this trend in motion trace back to the 1980s, the real game changers have been more recent: 2010’s Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, holding that arbitration clauses must be enforced even when they are part of an illegal contract; 2011’s AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, granting companies the unfettered right …

Suppressing Bid Rigging: Lessons From Japan, Takaki Soto

Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity (Inactive)

Bid rigging is a form of procurement fraud that occurs when participants in a bidding process for public contracts conspire to undermine the integrity or transparency of the process, sometimes with the complicity of public officials. Common examples of violations include collusion among bidders to fix a common price, requests for proposals deliberately and unnecessarily tailored so that only select bidders can meet their requirements, and lowballed bids with hidden costs and fees.

In Japan, where corruption is generally perceived to be relatively rare, bid rigging—nyusatsu dango—is a persistent and problematic form of public corruption. In many cases, …

Network Neutrality And The False Promise Of Zero-Price Regulation, C. Scott Hemphill

Center for Contract and Economic Organization

This Article examines zero-price regulation, the major distinguishing feature of many modern "network neutrality" proposals. A zero-price rule prohibits a broadband Internet access provider from charging an application or content provider (collectively, "content provider") to send information to consumers. The Article differentiates two access provider strategies thought to justify a zero-price rule. Exclusion is anticompetitive behavior that harms a content provider to favor its rival. Extraction is a toll imposed upon content providers to raise revenue. Neither strategy raises policy concerns that justify implementation of a broad zero-price rule. First, there is no economic exclusion argument that justifies the zero-price …