Law Commons^™

Caging The Bored Ape: How The Ftc's Expanded Anti-Monopoly Authority Can Tame "Nfts" For Web 3.0, J. Scott Colesanti

William & Mary Business Law Review

Non-Fungible Tokens, or “NFTs,” ballooned into a 40-billion-dollar industry in under a decade. Their creators include artists, corporations, entrepreneurs, fraudsters—and even Donald Trump. While NFT owners and traders could be any of us, the parties running the marketplaces are hidden. NFT regulators have yet to be identified. Most alarmingly, the dominant NFT marketplaces are dangerously centralized. Accordingly, the publicized tales of exorbitant or manipulated NFT prices and frequent related scams abound. Meanwhile cryptocurrency—the technology enabling the life of an NFT—remains beset with, at best, theoretical models for effective regulation a full generation after its emergence.

To propose a rational start …

No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, Marina Lao

William & Mary Law Review

The power of today’s tech giants has prompted calls for changes in antitrust law and policy which, for decades, has been exceedingly permissive in merger enforcement and in constraining dominant firm conduct. Economically, the fear is that the largest digital platforms are so dominant and its data advantage so substantial that competition is foreclosed, resulting in long-term harm to consumers and to the economy. But the concerns extend beyond economics. Critics worry, too, that the large platforms’ tremendous economic power poses risks of social and political harm and threatens our democracy. These concerns have prompted discussions of ways to reinvigorate …

The Implications Of Daubert For Economic Evidence In Antitrust Cases, Roger D. Blair, Jill Boylston Herndon

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Defining Reliable Forensic Economics In The Post-Daubert/Kumho Tire Era: Case Studies From Antitrust, Andrew I. Gavil

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.