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Full-Text Articles in Law

Political Bargaining And Judicial Intervention In Constitutional And Antitrust Federalism, Jim Rossi Jan 2005

Political Bargaining And Judicial Intervention In Constitutional And Antitrust Federalism, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Federal judicial deference to state and local regulation is at the center of contentious debates regarding the implementation of competition policy. This Article invokes a political process bargaining framework to develop a principled approach for addressing the appropriate level of judicial intervention under the dormant commerce clause and state action immunity from antitrust enforcement. Using illustrations from network industries, it is argued that, at core, these two independent doctrines share a common concern with political (not only market) failure by focusing on the incentives faced by powerful stakeholders in state and local lawmaking. More important, they share the common purpose …


Moving Public Law Out Of The Deference Trap In Regulated Industries, Jim Rossi Jan 2005

Moving Public Law Out Of The Deference Trap In Regulated Industries, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article argues that public law has fallen into what I call a deference trap in addressing conflicts in deregulated industries, such as telecommunications and electric power. The deference trap describes a judicial reluctance to intervene in disputes involving political institutions, such as regulatory agencies and states. By reassessing the deference trap across the legal doctrines that are effecting emerging telecommunications and electric power markets, public law can deliver much more for deregulated markets. The deference trap poses a particular cost as markets are deregulated, one that may not have been present during previous regulatory eras in which public and …


Anticompetitive Overbuying By Power Buyers, Steven C. Salop Jan 2005

Anticompetitive Overbuying By Power Buyers, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Two types of single-firm overbuying are analyzed in this article. Predatory overbuying consists of overbuying inputs as a predatory strategy to cause buyer-side competitors in the input market to exit from the market or permanently shrink their capacity in order to gain monopsony power in the input market. Raising Rivals' Costs (RRC) overbuying consists of overbuying inputs as an exclusionary strategy to raise rivals' input costs and thereby gain market power in the output market. In most cases, the additional input purchases are used to produce output. However, in unusual cases a firm may engage in naked overbuying, that is, …


Past, Present, And Future Of Antitrust Enforcement At The Federal Trade Commission, Robert Pitofsky Jan 2005

Past, Present, And Future Of Antitrust Enforcement At The Federal Trade Commission, Robert Pitofsky

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The period from 1970 to the present - roughly a third of a century - has witnessed profound changes in the quality of regulation at the Federal Trade Commission and a remarkable convergence of antitrust enforcement policy between left and right, and between primarily legal as opposed to primarily economic approaches. With respect to substantive law, areas of intellectual debate and uncertainty remain, but viewpoint differences that existed between the 1960s and the 1980s are today vastly reduced. In the 1960s, emphasis was on populist values, hostility to "Bigness," protection of competitors (especially small business) as opposed to the competitive …