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Antitrust law

Antitrust and Trade Regulation

2005

Vanderbilt University Law School

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Political Bargaining And Judicial Intervention In Constitutional And Antitrust Federalism, Jim Rossi Jan 2005

Political Bargaining And Judicial Intervention In Constitutional And Antitrust Federalism, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Federal judicial deference to state and local regulation is at the center of contentious debates regarding the implementation of competition policy. This Article invokes a political process bargaining framework to develop a principled approach for addressing the appropriate level of judicial intervention under the dormant commerce clause and state action immunity from antitrust enforcement. Using illustrations from network industries, it is argued that, at core, these two independent doctrines share a common concern with political (not only market) failure by focusing on the incentives faced by powerful stakeholders in state and local lawmaking. More important, they share the common purpose …


Upon Further Review: Why The Nfl May Not Be Free After Clarett, And Why Professional Sports May Be Free From Antitrust Law, Darren W. Dummit Jan 2005

Upon Further Review: Why The Nfl May Not Be Free After Clarett, And Why Professional Sports May Be Free From Antitrust Law, Darren W. Dummit

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

This note begins by reviewing the Jewel Tea line of cases that theoretically serve as the starting point for any non-statutory exemption discussion, followed by brief overviews of the contrasting Wood and Mackey lines of cases. The background section then turns to a summary of Brown--the latest Supreme Court decision relating to the collective bargaining process in professional sports--followed by a brief discussion of the NFL eligibility rule and how it differs from the recently-enacted NBA eligibility rule, which is of unquestioned legality. Finally, both the District Court and Court of Appeals decisions in Clarett are summarized.

The analysis begins …


Moving Public Law Out Of The Deference Trap In Regulated Industries, Jim Rossi Jan 2005

Moving Public Law Out Of The Deference Trap In Regulated Industries, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article argues that public law has fallen into what I call a deference trap in addressing conflicts in deregulated industries, such as telecommunications and electric power. The deference trap describes a judicial reluctance to intervene in disputes involving political institutions, such as regulatory agencies and states. By reassessing the deference trap across the legal doctrines that are effecting emerging telecommunications and electric power markets, public law can deliver much more for deregulated markets. The deference trap poses a particular cost as markets are deregulated, one that may not have been present during previous regulatory eras in which public and …