Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Antitrust

2017

Discipline
Institution
Publication
Publication Type

Articles 1 - 30 of 52

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Antitrusting Of Patentability, Saurabh Vishnubhakat Nov 2017

The Antitrusting Of Patentability, Saurabh Vishnubhakat

Faculty Scholarship

Deciding a patent’s validity is costly, and so is deciding it incorrectly. Judges and juries must expend significant resources in order to reach a patent validity determination that is properly informed by the relevant facts. At the same time, patent validity determinations reached quickly and cheaply may conserve resources today while creating future costs. Wrongly preserving an invalid patent can distort the competitive market and enable abuses, such as nuisance litigation. Meanwhile, wrongly striking down a valid patent can undermine incentives for continued investment and commercialization in knowledge assets. Courts facing patent validity issues have begun to strike this balance …


Trinko: A Kinder, Gentler Approach To Dominant Firms Under The Antitrust Laws?, Edward D. Cavanagh Nov 2017

Trinko: A Kinder, Gentler Approach To Dominant Firms Under The Antitrust Laws?, Edward D. Cavanagh

Maine Law Review

Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize. The § 2 prohibitions are rooted in concerns "that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone." At the same time, courts have recognized that size alone cannot be the basis of condemnation under § 2, for as Learned Hand observed in Alcoa, "[t]he successful competitor, having been urged …


The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro Oct 2017

The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered "reverse payment" settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.This paper is an effort to assist courts and …


Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro Oct 2017

Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”This article is an effort to help courts and counsel …


Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro Oct 2017

Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to confirm …


Uber, Lyft, And Regulating The Sharing Economy, Brett Harris Oct 2017

Uber, Lyft, And Regulating The Sharing Economy, Brett Harris

Seattle University Law Review

The “sharing economy” goes by many names such as the “gig economy,” the “1099 economy,” and the “on-demand economy,” all of which describe the economic system that uses online platforms to connect workers and sellers with clients and consumers, primarily through smartphone applications. Many of the sharing economy companies are also called the “tech disruptors.” They earned this title because they have changed the way that people do business. But in changing the way that people do business, they have also created unique regulatory challenges for governments across the country. The news is rife with stories about when these regulations …


Further Reflections On Antitrust And Wealth Inequality, Daniel A. Crane Oct 2017

Further Reflections On Antitrust And Wealth Inequality, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Since I have already published a lengthy academic article on antitrust and wealth inequality, I have the freedom of using this piece to present the key arguments unvarnished by dense citations or technical details (readers interested in those things should consult my earlier article) and to respond to some of the criticisms of my article that have since been levied. My thesis, before and now, is this: claims that antitrust enforcement advances income or wealth progressivity are overstated and rest on simplistic and unrealistic understandings of how antitrust actually operates. While some enforcement actions may generate progressive results, others will …


The Horizons Of Antitrust, Richard M. Steuer Oct 2017

The Horizons Of Antitrust, Richard M. Steuer

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Critics have been complaining that there are too few jobs in America and too much inequality. They have been calling for broadening the goals of antitrust and, at the very least, for more antitrust enforcement. More enforcement could be expected to have an impact on the concentration of power and on jobs, but even recalibrating the goals of antitrust law cannot, by itself, realistically be considered a panacea for eliminating unemployment or inequality overnight.

At the same time, other countries already have broader goals written into their own laws, including their competition laws, which protect jobs and limit foreign …


Did Expressions Hair Design V. Schneiderman Reconstitute The Bygone Lochner Era: How A New Case About Free Speech Is Like An Old Case About The Right To Contract, Jesse D. H. Snyder, Andrew F. Gann Jr. Oct 2017

Did Expressions Hair Design V. Schneiderman Reconstitute The Bygone Lochner Era: How A New Case About Free Speech Is Like An Old Case About The Right To Contract, Jesse D. H. Snyder, Andrew F. Gann Jr.

South Carolina Law Review

No abstract provided.


Antitrust Policy And Inequality Of Wealth, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Oct 2017

Antitrust Policy And Inequality Of Wealth, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Why would anyone want to use antitrust law as a wealth distribution device when far more explicit statutory tools are available for that purpose? One feature of antitrust is its open-textured, nonspecific statutes that are interpreted by judges. As a result, using antitrust to redistribute wealth may be a way of invoking the judicial process without having to go to Congress or a state legislature that is likely to be unsympathetic. Of course, a corollary is that someone attempting to use antitrust law to redistribute wealth will have to rely on the existing antitrust statutes rather than obtaining a new …


United States Versus Microsoft: A Case Study, Michael Betts Sep 2017

United States Versus Microsoft: A Case Study, Michael Betts

Oklahoma Journal of Law and Technology

No abstract provided.


Standardization In Information Technology Industries: Emerging Issues Under Section Two Of The Sherman Antitrust Act, Michael Betts Sep 2017

Standardization In Information Technology Industries: Emerging Issues Under Section Two Of The Sherman Antitrust Act, Michael Betts

Oklahoma Journal of Law and Technology

No abstract provided.


Plunging Into The Information Age: The Effect Of Current Competition Policy On United States Science And Technology Policy, Michael Betts Sep 2017

Plunging Into The Information Age: The Effect Of Current Competition Policy On United States Science And Technology Policy, Michael Betts

Oklahoma Journal of Law and Technology

No abstract provided.


Let The State Decide: The Efficient Antitrust Enforcer And The Avoidance Of Anticompetitive Remedies, Andrew J. Fuller Jul 2017

Let The State Decide: The Efficient Antitrust Enforcer And The Avoidance Of Anticompetitive Remedies, Andrew J. Fuller

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

If the antitrust remedy a private party pursues would likely have anticompetitive consequences, would only the government constitute an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws? Imagine that a plaintiff sues for a remedy so large that the award of the remedy would meaningfully increase market concentration by sending the defendants into bankruptcy. Is such a plaintiff an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws? Should courts hold that in this situation only the government should be able to challenge the alleged conduct? These questions have gone unaddressed in academic literature because litigation rarely raises the specter of the anticompetitive remedy. Recently, …


The Ncaa And The Rule Of Reason, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jul 2017

The Ncaa And The Rule Of Reason, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This brief essay considers the use of antitrust’s rule of reason in assessing challenges to rule making by the NCAA. In particular, it looks at the O’Bannon case, which involved challenges to NCAA rules limiting the compensation of student athletes under the NCAA rubric that protects the “amateur” status of collegiate athletes. Within that rubric, the Ninth Circuit got the right answer.

That outcome leads to a broader question, however: should the NCAA’s long held goal, frequently supported by the courts, of preserving athletic amateurism be jettisoned? Given the dual role that colleges play, that is a complex question, raising …


Vol. 8 No. 2, Spring 2017; The Predatory Hiring Standard For Section 2 Violations Of The Sherman Antitrust Act, Nicole Page May 2017

Vol. 8 No. 2, Spring 2017; The Predatory Hiring Standard For Section 2 Violations Of The Sherman Antitrust Act, Nicole Page

Northern Illinois Law Review Supplement

In antitrust claims of predatory hiring, plaintiffs allege that defendants have attempted to monopolize the market by eliminating their business or injuring their ability to compete by hiring away their employees. Universal Analytics, Inc., the principal case deciding this type of antitrust action, determined that unlawful predatory hiring may be established in two ways: (1) by showing the hiring was made with such predatory intent, or (2) by showing a “clear nonuse in fact.” After considering the criticism of the standards by legal scholars and examining key cases following Universal Analytics, Inc., this Note acknowledges the evolution of the application …


Amateurism And The Ncaa: How A Changing Market Has Turned Caps On Athletic Scholarships Into An Antitrust Violation, Daniel Laws May 2017

Amateurism And The Ncaa: How A Changing Market Has Turned Caps On Athletic Scholarships Into An Antitrust Violation, Daniel Laws

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.


Tacit Collusion On Steriods - The Tale On Online Price Transparency, Advanced Monitoring And Collusion, Maurice Stucke May 2017

Tacit Collusion On Steriods - The Tale On Online Price Transparency, Advanced Monitoring And Collusion, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.


Tacit Collusion On Steriods - The Tale On Online Price Transparency, Advanced Monitoring And Collusion, Maurice Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi May 2017

Tacit Collusion On Steriods - The Tale On Online Price Transparency, Advanced Monitoring And Collusion, Maurice Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Prescription Drug Pricing Moment: Using Public Health Analysis To Clarify The Fair Competition Debate On Prescription Drug Pricing And Consumer Welfare, Ann Marie Marciarille Apr 2017

The Prescription Drug Pricing Moment: Using Public Health Analysis To Clarify The Fair Competition Debate On Prescription Drug Pricing And Consumer Welfare, Ann Marie Marciarille

Faculty Works

Fair competition law and public health law talk past each other when discussing pharmaceutical pricing and distribution. The former cannot agree on the relevant definition of consumer welfare. The latter does not fully comprehend the highly complex but inherently collective nature of pharmaceutical drug acquisition in the United States. This essay proposes to inject public health discourse into this debate to enrich it, focus it, and render it more accessible to those who must live by its outcome.


Counter-Ip Conspiracies: Patent Alienability And The Sherman Antitrust Act, Hannibal Travis Apr 2017

Counter-Ip Conspiracies: Patent Alienability And The Sherman Antitrust Act, Hannibal Travis

University of Miami Law Review

Anticompetitive collusion by intellectual property owners frequently triggered antitrust enforcement during the twentieth century. An emerging area of litigation and scholarship, however, involves conspiracies by potential licensees of intellectual property to reduce or eliminate opportunities by a property’s holders to profit from it, or even to recoup their investments in creating and protecting it. The danger is that potential licensees will collude with one another to suppress royalties or sale prices. This Article traces the history of such litigation, provides an overview of the scholarly and theoretical arguments against monopsonistic or oligopsonistic collusion against licensors of intellectual property, and summarizes …


Market Power In The U.S. Economy Today, Jonathan Baker Mar 2017

Market Power In The U.S. Economy Today, Jonathan Baker

Presentations

Market concentration measures the extent to which market shares are concentrated between a small number of firms. It is often taken as a proxy for the intensity of competition. Indeed, in recent years changes in concentration have increasingly been used to argue that the intensity of competition is falling, that the growth of large firms with high market shares is driving up profits, damaging innovation and productivity, and increasing inequality. Some have argued that the competition rules need to be rewritten and a crackdown by overly antitrust agencies is required. The simplicity of this framing has found supporters across the …


The Never-Ending Quest For Clarity Amidst Uncertainty: Hospital M&A And Antitrust Scrutiny, Ross E. Bautista Mar 2017

The Never-Ending Quest For Clarity Amidst Uncertainty: Hospital M&A And Antitrust Scrutiny, Ross E. Bautista

San Diego Law Review

Although critics say hospitals justify mergers in the same way as they did during the M&A boom of the 1990s, these critics frequently link the current wave of mergers with the purpose of becoming more integrated and efficient to achieve the level of cost savings and improved quality that the United States and patients currently require. However, the results from hospital consolidation remain uncertain because of the limited and mixed evidence about its impact on quality of care and price. Part I of this Article discusses the recent surge in hospital M&A activity. Part II brings some clarity by discussing …


Rise Of The Digital Regulator, Rory Van Loo Mar 2017

Rise Of The Digital Regulator, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

The administrative state is leveraging algorithms to influence individuals’ private decisions. Agencies have begun to write rules to shape for-profit websites such as Expedia and have launched their own online tools such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s mortgage calculator. These digital intermediaries aim to guide people toward better schools, healthier food, and more savings. But enthusiasm for this regulatory paradigm rests on two questionable assumptions. First, digital intermediaries effectively police consumer markets. Second, they require minimal government involvement. Instead, some for-profit online advisers such as travel websites have become what many mortgage brokers were before the 2008 financial crisis. …


The Ieee-Sa Revised Patent Policy And Its Definition Of “Reasonable” Rates: A Transatlantic Antitrust Divide?, Nicolas Petit Feb 2017

The Ieee-Sa Revised Patent Policy And Its Definition Of “Reasonable” Rates: A Transatlantic Antitrust Divide?, Nicolas Petit

Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association’s (“IEEE-SA”) updated patent policy and a business review letter issued by the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have caused much discussion in the United States. The purpose of this Article is to assess whether a similarly lenient antitrust approach to Standard Setting Organizations’ (“SSOs”) rate-setting policies would prevail under the European Union’s (“EU”) competition rules. Recent EU competition case law has promoted a very hard line in the area of coordinated conduct. Cases such as Dole Food Company, Inc. v. European Commission, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van …


Capitalism And Unfreedom: Louis D. Brandeis And A Liberty Of The Left, Eric L. Apar Feb 2017

Capitalism And Unfreedom: Louis D. Brandeis And A Liberty Of The Left, Eric L. Apar

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

The American Right features a well-developed—and well-heeled—infrastructure for promoting a conception of freedom as inextricable from capitalism. The American Left, by contrast, has seemed content to cede the territory, abandoning the ground of freedom for the terrain of “equality,” “justice,” “fairness,” and “prosperity.” This paper is an effort to address this asymmetry in the public discourse over the meaning of freedom. Its principal objective is to capture the vision of freedom embodied in the political and economic thought of Louis D. Brandeis, one of the American Left’s ablest expositors of freedom.

In addition, the paper has three subsidiary objectives. The …


Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement In Health Care, Anne Marie Helm Jan 2017

Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement In Health Care, Anne Marie Helm

Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy

Americans are paying too much for health care services and insurance, in large part due to insufficiently competitive markets. Waves of consolidation have fortified providers and insurers with market power, resulting in higher prices and lower quality for consumers. As antidotes, advocates have proposed various legislative, regulatory, and enforcement solutions. Yet, unlike public antitrust enforcement, private antitrust enforcement is either not mentioned or criticized as sour grapes from competitors or a money grab by consumers. Instead of ignoring or bashing private litigation, those looking to address the health care pricing crisis in the United States should be looking to optimize …


Competition As Policy Reform: The Use Of Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement, Market-Governance Rules, And Incentives In Health Care, Emilio Varanini Jan 2017

Competition As Policy Reform: The Use Of Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement, Market-Governance Rules, And Incentives In Health Care, Emilio Varanini

Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy

In health care, the increase in market concentration on both the insurer side and the provider side has led to insurers and providers acquiring market power. Insurers and providers, in turn, have used that market power to charge higher prices to employers providing employees with medical care without corresponding increases in the quality of that care. Responding more generally to the increase in market concentration in many industries in the United States with a range of inimical effects for the nation’s economy, the Obama Administration suggested a range of policy solutions that this article groups under the term “Competition as …


Comment On “The Empirical Basis For Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers, And Remedies”, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande Jan 2017

Comment On “The Empirical Basis For Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers, And Remedies”, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

In this journal, James Langenfeld critically reviewed four of the present authors’ articles that analyze the size of cartel overcharges and their antitrust policy implications. In this comment, we explain why we believe Langenfeld errs in his criticism of our work. In particular, this comment discusses the variation in research quality of the sources used to compile a large sample of historical cartel overcharges; the advisability of trimming outliers or large estimates from the sample; alleged publication bias; why our 25% median estimate is much more likely to be correct than the US Sentencing Guideline’s 10% presumption; and the implications …


Big Pharma Monopoly: Why Consumers Keep Landing On "Park Place" And How The Game Is Rigged, Mark S. Levy Jan 2017

Big Pharma Monopoly: Why Consumers Keep Landing On "Park Place" And How The Game Is Rigged, Mark S. Levy

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.