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Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Law
Competitive Harm From Vertical Mergers, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Competitive Harm From Vertical Mergers, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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The antitrust enforcement Agencies' 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines introduce a nontechnical application of bargaining theory into the assessment of competitive effects from vertical acquisitions. The economics of such bargaining is complex and can produce skepticism among judges, who might regard its mathematics as overly technical, its game theory as excessively theoretical or speculative, or its assumptions as unrealistic.
However, we have been there before. The introduction of concentration indexes, particularly the HHI, in the Merger Guidelines was initially met with skepticism but gradually they were accepted as judges became more comfortable with them. The same thing very largely happened again …
Can Covid-19 Get Congress To Finally Strengthen U.S. Antitrust Law?, Robert H. Lande, Sandeep Vaheesan
Can Covid-19 Get Congress To Finally Strengthen U.S. Antitrust Law?, Robert H. Lande, Sandeep Vaheesan
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The COVID-19 pandemic could cause Congress to strengthen our merger laws. The authors of this short article strongly urge Congress to do this, but to do this in a manner that ignores 5 myths that underpin current merger policy:
Myth 1: Mergers Eliminate Wasteful Redundancies and Produce More Efficient Businesses
Myth 2: Current Merger Enforcement Protects Consumers
Myth 3: Merger Remedies Preserve Competition
Myth 4: The Current Merger Review System Offers Transparency and Guidance to Businesses and the Public
Myth 5: Corporations Need Mergers to Grow
House Judiciary Inquiry Into Competition In Digital Markets: Statement, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
House Judiciary Inquiry Into Competition In Digital Markets: Statement, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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This is a response to a query from the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, requesting my views about the adequacy of existing antitrust policy in digital markets.
The statutory text of the United States antitrust laws is very broad, condemning all anticompetitive restraints on trade, monopolization, and mergers and interbrand contractual exclusion whose effect “may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.” Federal judicial interpretation is much narrower, however, for several reasons. One is the residue of a reaction against excessive antitrust enforcement in the 1970s and earlier. However, since that time antitrust …
Submission Of Robert H. Lande To House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee Investigation Of Digital Platforms, Robert H. Lande
Submission Of Robert H. Lande To House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee Investigation Of Digital Platforms, Robert H. Lande
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The House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee asked me to submit suggestions concerning the adequacy of existing antitrust laws, enforcement policies, and enforcement levels insofar as they impact the state of competition in the digital marketplace. My submission recommends the following nine reforms:
1. A textualist analysis of the Sherman Act shows that Section 2 actually is a no-fault monopolization statute. At a minimum Congress should enact a strong presumption that every firm with a 67% market share has violated Section 2. This would move the Sherman Act an important step in the right direction, the direction Congress intended in 1890. My …
On The Meaning Of Antitrust's Consumer Welfare Principle, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
On The Meaning Of Antitrust's Consumer Welfare Principle, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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This brief essay addresses the ambiguities in the meaning of “consumer welfare” in antitrust, exploring the differences between the Williamson, Bork, and current understanding of that term. After weighing the alternatives it argues that the consumer welfare principle in antitrust should seek out that state of affairs in which output is maximized, consistent with sustainable competition
Justice Department's New Position On Patents, Standard Setting, And Injunctions, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Justice Department's New Position On Patents, Standard Setting, And Injunctions, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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A deep split in American innovation policy has arisen between new economy and old economy innovation. In a recent policy statement, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department takes a position that tilts more toward the old economy. Its December, 2019, policy statement on remedies for Standard Essential Patents issued jointly with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the National Institute of Standards and Technology reflects this movement.
The policy statement as a whole contains two noteworthy problems: one is a glaring omission, and the other is a mischaracterization of the scope of antitrust liability. Both positions are strongly …
Frand And Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Frand And Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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This paper considers when a patentee’s violation of a FRAND commitment also violates the antitrust laws. It warns against two extremes. First, is thinking that any violation of a FRAND obligation is an antitrust violation as well. FRAND obligations are contractual, and most breaches of contract do not violate antitrust law. The other extreme is thinking that, because a FRAND violation is a breach of contract, it cannot also be an antitrust violation.
Every antitrust case must consider the market environment in which conduct is to be evaluated. SSOs operated by multiple firms are joint ventures. Antitrust’s role is to …
Regulatory Malfunctions In The Drug Patent Ecosystem, Ana Santos Rutschman
Regulatory Malfunctions In The Drug Patent Ecosystem, Ana Santos Rutschman
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Patent protection for several of the world’s best-selling and most promising drugs — biologics — has begun waning. Over the next few years, many other drugs in this category will lose critical patent protection. In principle, this should open the United States market to competition, as more manufacturers are now able to produce relatively cheaper versions of these expensive drugs, known as biosimilars. That, however, has not been the case. This Article examines this problem in the context of the articulation between anticompetitive behaviors and regulatory interventions in the biopharmaceutical arena, and argues for a novel solution: a timelier response …
Preventing The Curse Of Bigness Through Conglomerate Merger Legislation, Robert H. Lande, Sandeep Vaheesan
Preventing The Curse Of Bigness Through Conglomerate Merger Legislation, Robert H. Lande, Sandeep Vaheesan
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The antitrust laws, as they are presently interpreted, are incapable of blocking most of the very largest corporate mergers. They successfully blocked only 4 of the 61 largest finalized mergers and acquisitions (defined as the acquired firm being valued at more than $10 billion) that occurred between 2015 and 2018. The antitrust laws also would permit the first trillion-dollar corporation, Apple, to merge with the third largest corporation, Exxon/Mobil. In fact, today every U.S. corporation could merge until just 10 were left – so long as each owned only 10% of every relevant market.
Even though the Congresses that enacted …
The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
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The drafters of the Sherman Act originally designed Section 2 to impose
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, regardless whether the
firm had engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This conclusion emerges from the
first ever textualist analysis of the language in the statute, a form of interpretation
originally performed only by Justice Scalia but now increasingly used by the
Supreme Court, including in its recent Bostock decision.
Following Scalia’s methodology, this Article analyzes contemporaneous
dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases and demonstrates that when the Sherman
Act was passed, the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired
a monopoly. …
What’S In Your Wallet (And What Should The Law Do About It?), Natasha Sarin
What’S In Your Wallet (And What Should The Law Do About It?), Natasha Sarin
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In traditional markets, firms can charge prices that are significantly elevated relative to their costs only if there is a market failure. However, this is not true in a two-sided market (like Amazon, Uber, and Mastercard), where firms often subsidize one side of the market and generate revenue from the other. This means consideration of one side of the market in isolation is problematic. The Court embraced this view in Ohio v. American Express, requiring that anticompetitive harm on one side of a two-sided market be weighed against benefits on the other side.
Legal scholars denounce this decision, which, …