Law Commons^™

Three Kinds Of Fault: Understanding The Purpose And Function Of Causation In Tort Law, Marin R. Scordato

University of Miami Law Review

Causation is a concept of enormous importance in the law. In just the last two years, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly considered its importance and meaning on at least three occasions, in areas of the law as diverse as specific personal jurisdiction, Title IX, and Section 1981. It has also been the subject of sustained scholarly examination and debate.

In no area of the law is causation as foundational and omni- present as in tort law, and in no sphere within tort law is it more prevalent than in its dominant cause of action, negligence. Unsurprisingly then, the …

Antitrust Liability For False Advertising: A Response To Carrier & Tushnet, Susannah Gagnon, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This reply briefly considers when false advertising can give rise to antitrust liability. The biggest difference between tort and antitrust liability is that the latter requires harm to the market, which is critically dependent on actual consumer response. As a result, the biggest hurdle a private plaintiff faces in turning an act of false advertising into an antitrust offense is proof of causation – to what extent can a decline in purchase volume or other market rejection be specifically attributed to the defendant’s false claims? That requirement dooms the great majority of false advertising claims attacked as violations of the …

Cross-Statute Employment Discrimination Claims And The Need For A "Super Statute", William R. Corbett

Journal Articles

Employment discrimination law is almost sixty years old in the United States. The law has developed under several different statutes enacted by Congress at different times. Congress has amended the statutes over the years, almost always in reaction to Supreme Court decisions with which it disagrees. The Supreme Court and the lower courts then interpret these piecemeal repairs of the law. This approach has produced a body of employment discrimination law in which there are significant asymmetries among the protected characteristics and the several statutes. These asymmetries produce both practical and theoretical problems, creating employment discrimination law that is cumbersome …

Cause For Concern Or Cause For Celebration?: Did Bostock V. Clayton County Establish A New Mixed Motive Theory For Title Vii Cases And Make It Easier For Plaintiffs To Prove Discrimination Claims?, Terrence Cain

Faculty Scholarship

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee “because of” race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. This seems simple enough, but if an employer makes an adverse employment decision partly for an impermissible reason and partly for a permissible reason, i.e., if the employer acts with a mixed motive, has the employer acted “because of” the impermissible reason? According to Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the answer is no. The Courts in Gross and Nassar held that …

What Covid-19 Laid Bare: Adventures In Workers’ Compensation Causation, Michael C. Duff

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay performs a close analysis of workers’ compensation coverage of COVID-19 and arrives at the conclusion that it should not be “impossible” to prove in a legal sense that an employee’s COVID-19 was caused by work. Scientific proof is not the same as legal proof: workers’ compensation law has never required that claims must be supported by irrefutable scientific proof of workplace causation. Yet repeatedly one heard this suggestion during public discussion on workers’ compensation coverage of employees.

Still, there is good evidence that even when workers’ compensation undisputedly covers work-related disease employers seldom pay benefits (and states do …

The Consensus Rule: A New Approach To Scientific Evidence, Edward K. Cheng

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Founded on good intentions but unrealistic expectations, the dominant Daubert framework for handling expert and scientific evidence should be scrapped. Daubert asks judges and jurors to make substantively expert determinations, a task they are epistemically incompetent to perform as laypersons. As an alternative, this Article proposes a new framework for handling expert evidence. It draws from the social and philosophical literature on expertise and begins with a basic question: How can laypersons make intelligent decisions about expert topics? From there, it builds its evidentiary approach, which ultimately results in an inference rule focused on expert communities. Specifically, when dealing with …