Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Common Law As Statutory Backdrop, Anita S. Krishnakumar
The Common Law As Statutory Backdrop, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Amidst the whirl of commentary about how the U.S. Supreme Court has become increasingly textualist and what precise shape modern textualism should take, the Court’s continued reliance on one decidedly atextual interpretive tool has gone largely unnoticed — the common law. Indeed, the common law has played an underappreciated, often dispositive, gap-filling role in statutory interpretation for decades, even as the textualist revolution has sidelined other non-text-focused interpretive tools. But despite the persistent role that the common law has played in statutory interpretation cases, the use of common law rules and definitions as an interpretive resource is surprisingly understudied and …
Shakespeare And The Supreme Court: How The Justices Reveal Their Ideologies By Referencing His Works, Rachel Anderson
Shakespeare And The Supreme Court: How The Justices Reveal Their Ideologies By Referencing His Works, Rachel Anderson
Honors Projects
The works of William Shakespeare have been referenced many times throughout history, even by Supreme Court justices. Building off of an observation of a mock trial by James Shapiro, this project puts the utilization of Shakespeare from three Court opinions in relation to its context within the play and the opinion to examine what the reference reveals about the authoring justices' ideology. In doing so, this project concludes that the justices utilize Shakespeare's works in their opinions for various reasons, including to infuse their beliefs into their argument. This implies that Supreme Court justices do not base their opinions on …
The Case For A Liberal Communitarian Jurisprudence, Amitai Etzioni
The Case For A Liberal Communitarian Jurisprudence, Amitai Etzioni
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
This article seeks to show that courts face difficulties without a principled, constitutional anchoring for the conception of the common good. Courts could divine the common good from the penumbra of the Fourth Amendment in the same way the Supreme Court created a right to privacy. In addition to creating a “common good” constitutional principle, the judicial branch should establish criteria to determine when this principle should take precedence over individual rights expressly preserved in the Constitution.
Rewriting Whren V. United States, Jonathan Feingold, Devon Carbado
Rewriting Whren V. United States, Jonathan Feingold, Devon Carbado
Faculty Scholarship
In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Whren v. United States—a unanimous opinion in which the Court effectively constitutionalized racial profiling. Despite its enduring consequences, Whren remains good law today. This Article rewrites the opinion. We do so, in part, to demonstrate how one might incorporate racial justice concerns into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a body of law that has long elided and marginalized the racialized dimensions of policing. A separate aim is to reveal the “false necessity” of the Whren outcome. The fact that Whren was unanimous, and that even progressive Justices signed on, might lead one to conclude that …
Deep-State Constitutionalism, Randy E. Barnett
Deep-State Constitutionalism, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this review, I explain how "Common Good Constitutionalism" taps into a deficiency of the conservative legal movement: namely, its exclusive focus on the law "as it is" at the expense of the underlying abstract normative principles that justify the positive law of our written Constitution. Due to this deficiency, the conservative legal movement gives short shrift to the Declaration of Independence and the Ninth Amendment and the natural rights to which both refer. This deficiency is in need of correction. But any such correction does not justify the jettisoning of originalism as Vermeule proposes. Nor does Vermeule defend his …
Nonparty Jurisdiction, Aaron D. Simowitz, Linda J. Silberman
Nonparty Jurisdiction, Aaron D. Simowitz, Linda J. Silberman
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
The Supreme Court's recent decisions on personal jurisdiction, including its 2021 decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, have all focused on the adjudication of plenary claims. In seven years, the Court has decided six major cases on personal jurisdiction in that context. However, these precedents also appear to guide lower courts in areas outside the traditional focus of personal jurisdiction doctrine but where personal jurisdiction is nonetheless necessary. For example, a court must have personal jurisdiction over a nonparty witness in order to compel the witness to testify or to produce documents. A court must …
The Living Rules Of Evidence, G. Alexander Nunn
The Living Rules Of Evidence, G. Alexander Nunn
Faculty Scholarship
The jurisprudential evolution of evidence law is dead. At least, that’s what we’re expected to believe. Ushered in on the wings of a growing positivist movement, the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence purported to quell judicial authority over evidence law. Instead, committees, conferences, and members of Congress would regulate any change to our evidentiary regime, thereby capturing the evolution of evidence law in a single, transparent code.
The codification of evidence law, though, has proven problematic. The arrival of the Federal Rules of Evidence has given rise to a historically anomalous era of relative stagnation in the doctrinal …
Reassociating Student Rights: Giving It The Ole College Try, Tyler Mlakar
Reassociating Student Rights: Giving It The Ole College Try, Tyler Mlakar
Arkansas Law Review
At the beginning of 2020, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) declared Coronavirus disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) a “public health emergency of international concern.” Governments around the world began instituting citywide and even nationwide “lockdowns.” In the United States, the approach was far more splintered. While there was no nationwide lockdown, states across the country instituted varying measures ranging from “shelter-in-place” and “stay at home” orders, to school closures, limits on the size of public gatherings, “mask mandates,” and even some states allowing restaurants and bars to remain open. Across the United States, these measures have resulted in the most pervasive governmental …
Slavery And The History Of Congress's Enumerated Powers, Jeffrey Schmitt
Slavery And The History Of Congress's Enumerated Powers, Jeffrey Schmitt
Arkansas Law Review
In his first inaugural address, President Abraham Lincoln declared, “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.” Like virtually all Americans before the Civil War, Lincoln believed in what historians call the “national consensus” on slavery. According to this consensus, Congress’s enumerated powers were not broad enough to justify any regulation of slavery within the states. Legal scholars who support the modern reach of federal powers have thus conventionally argued …
Keeping Our Distinctions Straight: A Response To “Originalism: Standard And Procedure”, Mitchell N. Berman
Keeping Our Distinctions Straight: A Response To “Originalism: Standard And Procedure”, Mitchell N. Berman
All Faculty Scholarship
For half a century, moral philosophers have distinguished between a “standard” that makes acts right and a “decision procedure” by which agents can determine whether any given contemplated act is right, which is to say whether it satisfies the standard. In “Originalism: Standard and Procedure,” Stephen Sachs argues that the same distinction applies to the constitutional domain and that clear grasp of the difference strengthens the case for originalism because theorists who emphasize the infirmities of originalism as a decision procedure frequently but mistakenly infer that those flaws also cast doubt on originalism as a standard. This invited response agrees …
How Practices Make Principles, And How Principles Make Rules, Mitchell N. Berman
How Practices Make Principles, And How Principles Make Rules, Mitchell N. Berman
All Faculty Scholarship
The most fundamental question in general jurisprudence concerns what makes it the case that the law has the content that it does. This article offers a novel answer. According to the theory it christens “principled positivism,” legal practices ground legal principles, and legal principles determine legal rules. This two-level account of the determination of legal content differs from Hart’s celebrated theory in two essential respects: in relaxing Hart’s requirement that fundamental legal notions depend for their existence on judicial consensus; and in assigning weighted contributory legal norms—“principles”—an essential role in the determination of legal rights, duties, powers, and permissions. Drawing …
Compelled Speech And Proportionality, Alexander Tsesis
Compelled Speech And Proportionality, Alexander Tsesis
Faculty Publications & Other Works
This Article argues for a proportional First Amendment approach to compelled speech jurisprudence. It discusses the evolution of doctrine and how it led to recent opinions finding unconstitutional consumer protection, health disclosure, and collective bargaining statutes. In place of the currently formalistic approach, the Article argues for a transparent balancing of interests to avoid litigants’ opportunistic reliance on categorical First Amendment doctrines. Missing from the recent decisions that relied on the compelled speech doctrine is any systematic or contextual weighing of private and public concerns about disclosure regulations. The Roberts Court has been rather formalistic and categorical in its compelled …