Law Commons^™

Another Bite At The Apple Or The Same Bite? Characterizing Habeas Petitions On Appeal As Pending Instead Of Fully Adjudicated, Gregory Winder

William & Mary Law Review

[...] One of the Act's [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act] most significant aspects is its restriction on the filing of successive habeas corpus petitions. Responding to this restriction, prisoners have attempted to circumvent the AEDPA through a number of different procedural routes with varying degrees of success.

This Note examines the circuit split that has emerged for one of those procedural attempts—motions to amend habeas petitions following adjudication on the merits and while on appeal in a circuit court. This Note argues that allowing amendment of habeas petitions on appeal is both consistent with the history of habeas corpus …

A World Without Roe: The Constitutional Future Of Unwanted Pregnancy, Julie C. Suk

William & Mary Law Review

With the demise of Roe v. Wade, the survival of abortion access in America will depend on new legal paths. In the same moment that Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization has constrained access to abortion in the United States, other constitutional democracies have moved in the opposite direction, expanding access to safe, legal, and free abortions. They have done so without reasoning from Roe’s vision of the private zone of unwanted pregnancy. The development of abortion law outside the United States provides critical insights that can inform future efforts to vindicate the constitutional rights of women facing …

Equal Dignity, Colorblindness, And The Future Of Affirmative Action Beyond Grutter V. Bollinger, Thomas P. Crocker

William & Mary Law Review

In Grutter v. Bollinger the Supreme Court held that diversity was a compelling interest for equal protection purposes that justifies limited consideration of race through affirmative action programs. But there was a catch. The Court predicted that diversity would cease to be a compelling interest within twenty-five years. This Article examines the surprising doctrinal and conceptual implications that would follow if, having both the motive and means, the Court were to overturn Grutter before its predicted 2028 sunset. Exploring internal tensions within existing doctrine, this Article argues that even if the Court were to overturn Grutter, a form of …

Preempting The States And Protecting The Charities: A Case For Nonprofit-Exempting Federal Action In Consumer Data Privacy, Sarah Fisher

William & Mary Law Review

This Note argues that Congress should use its Commerce Clause power to pass a consumer data privacy measure that (1) preempts state law and (2) explicitly exempts 501(c)(3) organizations from compliance. Such preemptive action with a narrow 501(c)(3) carve-out would avoid the potential harm of exempting too broad a group of nonprofit entities while ensuring charitable organizations’ continued existence, would be more protective of both the individual privacy right and 501(c)(3) existence than merely adjusting the revenue dollar threshold at which entities must comply, and would properly balance the individual right to control personal data with the societal good served …

No Child Left Behind Bars: Applying The Principles Of Strict Scrutiny When Sentencing Juveniles Tried As Adults, Max Chu

William & Mary Law Review

The Commonwealth of Virginia was the first in the nation to pass legislation that provides judges with the discretion to veer away from the mandatory minimum sentence and to impose trauma-informed and age-appropriate sentences for juvenile offenders convicted of felonies and tried as adults. Although Virginia’s new law, House Bill 744 (HB 744), is a pioneering step in the right direction, this Note argues that the law may now provide judges with too much discretion. In other words, HB 744 alone, without more guidance, does not go far enough to protect the rights of juvenile offenders.

Therefore, this Note proposes …

Fourth Amendment Infringement Is Afoot: Revitalizing Particularized Reasonable Suspicion For Terry Stops Based On Vague Or Discrepant Suspect Descriptions, Caroline E. Lewis

William & Mary Law Review

In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court granted law enforcement broad power to perform a limited stop and search of someone when an officer has reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity. The resulting “Terry stop” created a way for police officers to investigate a suspicious person without requiring full probable cause for an arrest. The officer need only have “reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts” based on the circumstances and the officer’s policing “experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Reasonable suspicion is—by design—a broad standard, deferential to police officers’ judgment. Law enforcement officers …

The Constitutional Right To Carry Firearms On Campus, Jared A. Tuck

William & Mary Law Review

Do individuals have the fundamental right under the Second Amendment to carry firearms on the campus of a public university? Additionally, can a public university totally ban firearms on its campus without impeding on the constitutional right to keep and bear arms protected by the Second Amendment? This Note will argue that individuals have a narrow, but constitutionally guaranteed, right to carry firearms on the campus of a public university. Therefore, it is beyond the power of states and public universities to totally ban firearms from campus premises.

Recovering The Lost General Welfare Clause, David S. Schwartz

William & Mary Law Review

The General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution enumerates a power to “provide for the common defense and general welfare.” A literal interpretation of this clause (“the general welfare interpretation”) would authorize Congress to legislate for any national purpose, and therefore to address all national problems— for example, the COVID-19 pandemic—in ways that would be precluded under the prevailing understanding of limited enumerated powers. But conventional doctrine rejects the general welfare interpretation and construes the General Welfare Clause to confer the so-called “Spending Power,” a power only to spend, but not to regulate, for …