Law Commons^™

The Common Law As Statutory Backdrop, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Amidst the whirl of commentary about how the U.S. Supreme Court has become increasingly textualist and what precise shape modern textualism should take, the Court’s continued reliance on one decidedly atextual interpretive tool has gone largely unnoticed — the common law. Indeed, the common law has played an underappreciated, often dispositive, gap-filling role in statutory interpretation for decades, even as the textualist revolution has sidelined other non-text-focused interpretive tools. But despite the persistent role that the common law has played in statutory interpretation cases, the use of common law rules and definitions as an interpretive resource is surprisingly understudied and …

The End Of Roe V Wade And New Legal Frontiers On The Constitutional Right To Abortion, I. Glenn Cohen, Melissa Murray, Lawrence O. Gostin

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

On June 24, 2002, the US Supreme Court ended the constitutional right to abortion in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization. The Court’s majority decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito was substantially the same as a draft opinion leaked a month earlier. The regulation of abortion will now be decided by the states, with about half currently or will soon ban or severely restrict abortion access. In this Viewpoint, we explain the Dobbs ruling and what it means for physicians, public health, and society.

We focus on new legal frontiers in the constitutional right to abortion, including medication abortion …

The Constitutional (And Political) Safeguards Against Impeachment, Victoria Frances Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Will the Trump impeachments inspire a flurry of future presidential impeachments? Will the second Trump impeachment, which occurred after the President left office, spur impeachments of lesser, former government officials? These and other questions emerged during the 2022 Missouri Law Review Symposium and on the Senate floor during the Trump impeachment trials. I have argued that we can make an educated prognosis about these possibilities based on constitutional structure. I called this argument the “political safeguards” of impeachment in my recent book, The Impeachments of Donald Trump: An Introduction to Constitutional Argument. What I called political safeguards, invoking the …

Deep-State Constitutionalism, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this review, I explain how "Common Good Constitutionalism" taps into a deficiency of the conservative legal movement: namely, its exclusive focus on the law "as it is" at the expense of the underlying abstract normative principles that justify the positive law of our written Constitution. Due to this deficiency, the conservative legal movement gives short shrift to the Declaration of Independence and the Ninth Amendment and the natural rights to which both refer. This deficiency is in need of correction. But any such correction does not justify the jettisoning of originalism as Vermeule proposes. Nor does Vermeule defend his …

Random Justice, Girardeau A. Spann

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

As recent Senate confirmation practices suggest, the Supreme Court is best understood as the head of a political branch of government, whose Justices are chosen in a process that makes their ideological views dispositive. Throughout the nation’s history, the Supreme Court has exercised its governing political ideology in ways that sacrifice the interests of nonwhites in order to advance the interests of Whites. In the present moment of heightened cultural sensitivity to structural discrimination and implicit bias, it would make sense to use affirmative action to help remedy the racially disparate distribution of societal resources that has been produced by …

America’S Racial Stain: The Taint Argument And The Limits Of Constitutional Law And Rhetoric, Louis Michael Seidman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

How should reformers respond to America’s racial stain? The problem is more complex than many imagine. Political activists usually attempt to promote change by taking advantage of a gap between current reality and a touchstone they use to measure the normative desirability of that reality. But what if the touchstone itself is infected by the reality that activists want to change?

Questions raised by this problem do not lend themselves to definitive answers, and this essay does not offer them. Instead, I suggest a variety of responses that attempt to grapple with the difficulty. I also offer tentative assessments of …

Remapping Constitutional Theory, Louis Michael Seidman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The time has come for constitutional theory to move beyond the stale argument between originalists and living constitutionalists. The declining significance of that debate provides a motivating backdrop for this Article, but it is not the main point of the discussion. Instead, this Article focuses on the possibility of remapping constitutional disagreement in a fresher, more generative, and more descriptively accurate fashion.

The discussion begins with another familiar dichotomy – the distinction between “judicial activism” and “judicial restraint.” Unfortunately, as employed in popular discussion and in some academic literature, this distinction is also confused and unhelpful. However, we can begin …

House Rules: Congress And The Attorney-Client Privilege, David Rapallo

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In 2020, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision in Trump v. Mazars establishing four factors for determining the validity of congressional subpoenas for a sitting president’s personal papers. In an unanticipated move, Chief Justice John Roberts added that recipients of congressional subpoenas have “long been understood” to retain not only constitutional privileges, but common law privileges developed by judges, including the attorney-client privilege. This was particularly surprising since Trump was not relying on the attorney-client privilege and the Court had never treated this common law privilege as overriding Congress’s Article I power to set its own procedures for conducting …