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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Corporate Governance Gaming: The Collective Power Of Retail Investors, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Christina M. Sautter
Corporate Governance Gaming: The Collective Power Of Retail Investors, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Christina M. Sautter
Faculty Works
The GameStop saga and meme stock frenzy have shown the pathway to the most disruptive revolution in corporate governance of the millennium. New generations of retail investors use technologies, online forums, and gaming dynamics to coordinate their actions and obtain unprecedented results. Signals indicate that these investors, whom we can dub wireless investors, are currently expanding their actions to corporate governance. Wireless investors’ generational characteristics suggest that they will use corporate governance to pursue social and environmental causes. In fact, wireless investors can set in motion a social movement able to bring business corporations to serve their original partly-private-partly-public purpose. …
The “Value” Of A Public Benefit Corporation, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon
The “Value” Of A Public Benefit Corporation, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon
All Faculty Scholarship
We examine the “value” a PBC form provides for publicly-traded corporations. We analyze the structure of the PBC form and find that other than requiring a designated social purpose it does not differ significantly in siting control and direction with shareholders. We also examine the purpose statements in the charters of the most economically significant PBCs. We find that, independent of structural limitations on accountability, these purpose statements are, in most cases, too vague and aspirational to be legally significant, or even to serve as a reliable checks on PBC behavior. We theorize, and provide evidence, that without a legal …
Business As Usual: Hobby Lobby And The Purpose Of Corporate Rights, Dalia Tsuk Mitchell
Business As Usual: Hobby Lobby And The Purpose Of Corporate Rights, Dalia Tsuk Mitchell
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
This article explores the interdependence of the discourse of corporate rights and the law of corporate purpose. I argue that the history of corporate rights reflects changing reactions of the U.S. Supreme Court to social, political, and cultural concerns, each reaction offering a different purpose for corporations in our modern society. At the turn of the twentieth century, in response to fears about the advance of socialism, the Court used liberal assumptions to justify protecting the publicly held corporation’s property rights as derived from the rights of individual shareholders. In so doing, the Court helped turn the corporation, with its …
The History And Revival Of The Corporate Purpose Clause, Elizabeth Pollman
The History And Revival Of The Corporate Purpose Clause, Elizabeth Pollman
All Faculty Scholarship
The corporate purpose debate is experiencing a renaissance. The contours of the modern debate are relatively well developed and typically focus on whether corporations should pursue shareholder value maximization or broader social aims. A related subject that has received much less scholarly attention, however, is the formal legal mechanism by which a corporation expresses its purpose—the purpose clause of the corporate charter. This Article examines corporate purpose through the evolution of corporate charters. Starting with historic examples ranging from the Dutch East India Company to early American corporations and their modern 21st century parallels, the discussion illuminates how corporate purpose …
The Corporate Governance Machine, Dorothy S. Lund, Elizabeth Pollman
The Corporate Governance Machine, Dorothy S. Lund, Elizabeth Pollman
All Faculty Scholarship
The conventional view of corporate governance is that it is a neutral set of processes and practices that govern how a company is managed. We demonstrate that this view is profoundly mistaken: in the United States, corporate governance has become a “system” composed of an array of institutional players, with a powerful shareholderist orientation. Our original account of this “corporate governance machine” generates insights about the past, present, and future of corporate governance. As for the past, we show how the concept of corporate governance developed alongside the shareholder primacy movement. This relationship is reflected in the common refrain of …
The Corporate Governance Machine, Dorothy S. Lund, Elizabeth Pollman
The Corporate Governance Machine, Dorothy S. Lund, Elizabeth Pollman
Faculty Scholarship
The conventional view of corporate governance is that it is a neutral set of processes and practices that govern how a company is managed. We demonstrate that this view is profoundly mistaken: For public companies in the United States, corporate governance has become a “system” composed of an array of institutional players, with a powerful shareholderist orientation. Our original account of this “corporate governance machine” generates insights about the past, present, and future of corporate governance. As for the past, we show how the concept of corporate governance developed alongside the shareholder primacy movement. This relationship is reflected in the …
Corporate Finance For Social Good, Dorothy S. Lund
Corporate Finance For Social Good, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
Corporations are under pressure to use their outsized power to benefit society, but this advocacy is unlikely to result in meaningful change because corporate law’s incentive structure rewards fiduciaries who maximize shareholder wealth. Therefore, this Essay proposes a way forward that works within the wealth-maximization framework and yet could result in dramatic social change. The idea is simple: Use private debt markets to provide incentives for public-interested corporate action. Specifically, individuals who value prosocial corporate decisions could finance them by contributing to corporate social responsibility (CSR) bonds that would offset the corporation’s implementation costs. To provide an incentive to depart …