Law Commons^™

Undue Deference To States In The 2020 Election Litigation, Joshua A. Douglas

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on so much of our lives, including how to run our elections. Yet the federal courts have refused to respond appropriately to the dilemma that many voters faced when trying to participate in the 2020 election. Instead, the courts—particularly the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal appellate courts—invoked a narrow test that unduly defers to state election administration and fails to protect adequately the fundamental right to vote.

In constitutional litigation, a law usually must satisfy a two-part test: (1) does the state have an appropriate reason for the law and (2) is the law properly …

Fixing False Truths: Rethinking Truth Assumptions And Free-Expression Rationales In The Networked Era, Jared Schroeder

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The First Amendment makes no mention of truth. Assumptions about truth, however, have become the foundations for free-expression rationales, the very bases for such freedoms in a democratic society. The Supreme Court gradually, over time, wedded Enlightenment assumptions about truth to the marketplace of ideas rationale for free expression. This Article examines, in light of massive, widespread adoption of networked technologies and AI and Supreme Court decisions that have undermined the distinctive role of truth, whether truth should be removed or replaced as a crucial, justifying concept in freedom of expression. The Article examines the marketplace approach’s history and assumptions, …

Unduly Burdening Abortion Jurisprudence, Mark Strasser

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The undue burden standard is the current test to determine whether abortion regulations pass constitutional muster. But the function, meaning, and application of that test have varied over time, which undercuts the test’s usefulness and the ability of legislatures to know which regulations pass constitutional muster. Even more confusing, the Court has refused to apply the test in light of its express terms, which cannot fail to yield surprising conclusions and undercut confidence in the Court. The Court must not only clarify what the test means and how it is to be used, but must also formulate that test so …

Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny And A Better Way To Handle Speech Restrictions, Aaron Pinsoneault

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

When it comes to unprotected speech categories, the Roberts Court has taken an amoral and inaccurate approach. When the Court first created unprotected speech categories-- defined categories of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment-- it was unclear what rendered a category of speech unprotected. One school of thought argued that speech was unprotected if it provided little or no value to society. The other school of thought argued that speech was unprotected if it fell into a certain category of speech that was simply categorically unprotected. Then, in 2010, the Court strongly sided with the latter approach, …

From Civil Rights To Blackmail: How The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act Of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988) Has Perverted One Of America's Most Historic Civil Rights Statutes, Steven W. Fitschen

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

For fourteen years, members of Congress repeatedly introduced legislation directed at a single subject. A key underpinning for the necessity of the legislation was provided by the opinions of two Supreme Court justices. Yet, for the past nine years, Congress has gone silent on the same topic. This Article argues that it is past time for Congress to reconsider this topic, and that if it will not do so, the Supreme Court can rectify the situation without engaging in judicial legislation.

Perhaps the best view of Congress's efforts can be seen by examining the high-water mark of those efforts, which …