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Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Law
Playing Politics With Executions Abuse Of Executive Discretion, Joanmarie Davoli
Playing Politics With Executions Abuse Of Executive Discretion, Joanmarie Davoli
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
A Typology Of Justice Department Lawyers' Roles And Responsibilities, Rebecca Roiphe
A Typology Of Justice Department Lawyers' Roles And Responsibilities, Rebecca Roiphe
Articles & Chapters
President Trump’s administration has persistently challenged the legitimacy of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). In the past, DOJ, like other governmental institutions, has been fairly resilient. Informal norms and practices have served to preserve its proper functioning, even under pressure. The strain of the past three years, however, has been different in kind and scale. This Article offers a typology of different roles for DOJ lawyers and argues that over time the institution has evolved by allocating different functions and responsibilities to different positions within DOJ. By doing so, it has for the most part maintained the proper balance between …
The Life Of Administrative Democracy, Joshua Ulan Galperin
The Life Of Administrative Democracy, Joshua Ulan Galperin
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
Imagine if Congress, the President, and the industries they hoped to regulate all decided that neither politically isolated bureaucrats nor a popularly sanctioned President should wield the power to administer Congress’ laws, to make legislative-type policy, to enforce that policy, and to adjudicate disputes under it. Imagine if there were another experiment, one that has persisted, but few have noticed.
Imagine no longer. Overlooked by most, there is a model for federal administration that does not rely on isolated administrators or Presidential control, but instead on elected bureaucrats. Today, the United States Department of Agriculture houses over 7,500 elected farmer-bureaucrats …
Administrative Law: Whose Job Is It Anyway?, Allison Mather
Administrative Law: Whose Job Is It Anyway?, Allison Mather
Pepperdine Law Review
This Note examines the current state of judicial deference to administrative agencies and suggests modifying the doctrine to better comport with the Constitution. It examines the history of administrative agencies and the rise of judicial deference. The Note explores the present-day applications of judicial deference and analyzes whether the current doctrine is consistent with both its initial underlying policies and the Constitution. Ultimately, judicial deference to administrative agencies raises serious separation of powers concerns and should be modified to remain faithful to the nation’s founding principles.
The Death Of Administrative Democracy, Joshua Ulan Galperin
The Death Of Administrative Democracy, Joshua Ulan Galperin
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
Everybody agrees. Everybody is certain. There are no elected bureaucrats.
That pervasive certainty must come as quite a surprise to elected bureaucrats.
The federal bureaucracy presents examples of administrative elections, but the most significant is the United States Department of Agriculture’s elected farmer committees. There are over 7,500 elected farmers sitting on over 2,000 committees, and these committees carry out paradigmatic administrative duties including policymaking and adjudication.
Taking for granted that administrators are unelected, judges have shaped an ascendant doctrine of Presidentialism. This doctrine presumes that the administrative state is only legitimate insofar as it is under the direct control …
Administrative Law And Process, 4th Edition, Alfred C. Aman, William Penniman, Landyn Wm. Rookard
Administrative Law And Process, 4th Edition, Alfred C. Aman, William Penniman, Landyn Wm. Rookard
Books & Book Chapters by Maurer Faculty
Administrative law processes enhance participation, transparency, fairness, and access to information in administrative agencies and the government generally. The fourth edition of Administrative Law and Process highlights these issues in a timely manner through both classic and current cases. In Part I, how agencies exercise their powers is explored.
In Part II, the structural and constitutional issues that flow from legislative, executive, and judicial oversight is explored. Key doctrines of administrative law are thoroughly addressed throughout this book, to which Part III adds a new dimension. It focuses directly on how lawyers actually practice administrative law through a series of …
Disabling Fascism: A Struggle For The Last Laugh In Trump’S America, Madeleine M. Plasencia
Disabling Fascism: A Struggle For The Last Laugh In Trump’S America, Madeleine M. Plasencia
Articles
Six years before the start of the Second World War and seven months after Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor of Germany, the German government instituted the “Law for the Prevention of Progeny with Hereditary Diseases.” The moral depravity that started as a sterilization program targeting “useless eaters” and lives “unworthy of life” degenerated into a “euthanasia” program that murdered at least 250,000 people with mental and physical dis/abilities as an “open secret” until 1941, when the Bishop of Munster, Clemens August Count von Galen, delivered a sermon protesting the killing of “unproductive people.”2 Although the Trump Administration has not yet driven …
The Life Of Administrative Democracy, Joshua Galperin
The Life Of Administrative Democracy, Joshua Galperin
Articles
Imagine if Congress, the President, and the industries they hoped to regulate all decided that neither politically isolated bureaucrats nor a popularly sanctioned President should wield the power to administer Congress’ laws, to make legislative-type policy, to enforce that policy, and to adjudicate disputes under it. Imagine if there were another experiment, one that has persisted, but few have noticed.
Imagine no longer. Overlooked by most, there is a model for federal administration that does not rely on isolated administrators or Presidential control, but instead on elected bureaucrats. Today, the United States Department of Agriculture houses over 7,500 elected farmer-bureaucrats …
Reckoning With Adjudication's Exceptionalism Norm, Emily S. Bremer
Reckoning With Adjudication's Exceptionalism Norm, Emily S. Bremer
Journal Articles
Unlike rulemaking and judicial review, administrative adjudication is governed by a norm of exceptionalism. Agencies rarely adjudicate according to the Administrative Procedure Act’s formal adjudication provisions, and the statute has little role in defining informal adjudication or specifying its minimum procedural requirements. Due process has almost nothing to say about the matter.
The result is that there are few uniform, cross-cutting procedural requirements in adjudication, and most hearings are conducted using procedures tailored for individual agencies or programs. This Article explores the benefits and costs of adjudication’s exceptionalism norm, an analysis that implicates the familiar tension between uniformity and specialization …
Judicial Credibility, Bert I. Huang
Judicial Credibility, Bert I. Huang
Faculty Scholarship
Do people believe a federal court when it rules against the government? And does such judicial credibility depend on the perceived political affiliation of the judge? This study presents a survey experiment addressing these questions, based on a set of recent cases in which both a judge appointed by President George W. Bush and a judge appointed by President Bill Clinton declared the same Trump Administration action to be unlawful. The findings offer evidence that, in a politically salient case, the partisan identification of the judge – here, as a “Bush judge” or “Clinton judge” – can influence the credibility …
Delegating Or Divesting?, Philip A. Hamburger
Delegating Or Divesting?, Philip A. Hamburger
Faculty Scholarship
A gratifying feature of recent scholarship on administrative power is the resurgence of interest in the Founding. Even the defenders of administrative power hark back to the Constitution’s early history – most frequently to justify delegations of legislative power. But the past offers cold comfort for such delegation.
A case in point is Delegation at the Founding by Professors Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley. Not content to defend the Supreme Court’s current nondelegation doctrine, the article employs history to challenge the doctrine – arguing that the Constitution does not limit Congress’s delegation of legislative power. But the article’s most …