Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

2020

Administrative Law

BYU Law Review

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Big Agriculture And Harm To Minority Communities: How Administrative Civil Rights Complaints Are The Solution, Morgan Drake Aug 2020

Big Agriculture And Harm To Minority Communities: How Administrative Civil Rights Complaints Are The Solution, Morgan Drake

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.


Stakeholder Collaboration As An Alternative To Cost-Benefit Analysis, Karen Bradshaw May 2020

Stakeholder Collaboration As An Alternative To Cost-Benefit Analysis, Karen Bradshaw

BYU Law Review

This Article compares and contrasts cost-benefit analysis with “collaborative analysis” in agency decision-making. While mathematical models drive cost-benefit analysis, ongoing stakeholder negotiations drive collaborative analysis. Cost-benefit analysis relies on economists inputting numerical values into a model, whereas collaborative analysis relies on the diverse perspectives of groups and individuals affected by an agency’s decision. Administrative law scholars have exhaustively researched cost-benefit analysis while overlooking widespread agency reliance on collaborative analysis. This Article advances the novel observation that legislatures and courts sometimes treat collaborative analysis and cost-benefit analysis as interchangeable.

Administrative law scholars might find it unorthodox, even irresponsible, to equate the …


Enforcement Piggybacking And Multistate Actions, Elysa M. Dishman Feb 2020

Enforcement Piggybacking And Multistate Actions, Elysa M. Dishman

BYU Law Review

Civil enforcement in the United States is uniquely “multienforcer.” Numerous public and private enforcers including federal agencies, state attorneys general (AGs), and private litigants have overlapping authority to enforce myriad federal and state laws. Ideally, enforcers would complement one another’s efforts and use their comparative enforcement advantages to broaden the scope of enforcement and act as a check on underenforcement. But in reality, enforcers are often attracted to the same targets—large, public, deep-pocketed corporations. This means that multiple enforcers may pursue essentially the same enforcement action, arising from the same series of events and against the same target. Redundant enforcement …