Law Commons^™

Let History Repeat Itself: Solving Originalism's History Problem In Interpreting The Establishment Clause, Neil Joseph

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is all over the place. The current justices have widely divergent views on the Establishment Clause's meaning, and the Lemon test has been widely panned by several justices. Originalist judges, however, have had a fairly consistent approach to interpreting the Establishment Clause. This largely stems from their reliance on history. This Note argues that their use of history in analyzing the Establishment Clause is flawed. Originalist Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been and is criticized for being unprincipled. And those criticisms are correct. Originalists encounter such criticism because the justices struggle to reconcile historical practice …

Chevron Deference In The States: Lessons From Three States, Carrie Townsend Ingram

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

The appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court of the United States has left many wondering if a change to the Chevron doctrine is impending. Justice Gorsuch’s colleague on the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas, shares similar views on Chevron. This article will compare the federal rule to three different states: Indiana, Delaware, and Arizona. Each state has taken a different path in determining that the judiciary should not give deference to an agency’s interpretation of the statutes that it is charged with enforcing. Delaware has affirmatively declared that the Chevron doctrine is not applicable in its state. A …

Deference To Agency Interpretations Of Regulations: A Post-Chevron Assessment, Thomas A. Schweitzer, Russell L. Weaver

Russell L. Weaver

No abstract provided.

Grounding Originalism, William Baude, Stephen E. Sachs

Northwestern University Law Review

How should we interpret the Constitution? The “positive turn” in legal scholarship treats constitutional interpretation, like the interpretation of statutes or contracts, as governed by legal rules grounded in actual practice. In our legal system, that practice requires a certain form of originalism: our system’s official story is that we follow the law of the Founding, plus all lawful changes made since.

Or so we’ve argued. Yet this answer produces its own set of questions. How can practice solve our problems, when there are so many theories of law, each giving practice a different role? Why look to an official …

Making Meaning: Towards A Narrative Theory Of Statutory Interpretation And Judicial Justification, Randy D. Gordon

Randy D. Gordon

The act of judging is complex involving finding facts, interpreting law, and then deciding a particular dispute. But these are not discreet functions: they bleed into one another and are thus interdependent. This article aims to reveal-at least in part-how judges approach this process. To do so, I look at three sets of civil RICO cases that align and diverge from civil antitrust precedents. I then posit that the judges in these cases base their decisions on assumptions about RICO's purpose. These assumptions, though often tacit and therefore not subject to direct observation, are nonetheless sometimes revealed when a judge …

Contract Interpretation Enforcement Costs: An Empirical Study Of Textualism Versus Contextualism Conducted Via The West Key Number System, Joshua M. Silverstein

Hofstra Law Review

This Article sets forth an empirical study of a central issue in the judicial and academic debate over the optimal method of contract interpretation: Whether "textualism" or "contextualism" best minimizes contract enforcement costs. The study measured enforcement costs in twelve ways. Under each of those measures, there was no statistically significant difference in the level of interpretation litigation between textualist and contextualist regimes. Accordingly, the study finds no support for either the textualist hypothesis that contextualism has higher enforcement costs or the contextualist counter-hypothesis that textualism has higher enforcement costs.

The study herein was conducted via the West Key Number …

Auer Deference Should Be Dead; Long Live Seminole Rock Deference, John B. Meisel

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

Deference doctrines should be understood in light of the Administrative Procedures Act’s distinction between legislative rules and interpretive rules and should be based on a solid theoretical foundation. Modern Auer deference calls for categorical deference for an agency’s regulatory interpretation of an ambiguous regulation. This is inconsistent with the APA’s characterization of the purpose of an interpretive rule. Properly construed, interpretive rules clarify the meaning of a legal text which should be justified by use of expository reasoning. These rules deserve a lesser form of deference (Skidmore deference), based on an agency’s unique understanding of its own regulations which …

Considerations Of History And Purpose In Constitutional Borrowing, Robert Tsai

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This essay is part of a symposium issue dedicated to "Constitutional Rights: Intersections, Synergies, and Conflicts" at William and Mary School of Law. I make four points. First, perfect harmony among rights might not always be normatively desirable. In fact, in some instances, such as when First Amendment and Second Amendment rights clash, we might wish to have expressive rights consistently trump gun rights. Second, we can't resolve clashes between rights in the abstract but instead must consult history in a broadly relevant rather than a narrowly "originalist" fashion. When we do so, we learn that armed expression and white …

Donor Intent, Disaster Relief, Education, And Policy, Marian Conway Ph.D.

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Contract Interpretation Enforcement Costs: An Empirical Study Of Textualism Versus Contextualism Conducted Via The West Key Number System, Joshua M. Silverstein

Faculty Scholarship

This Article sets forth an empirical study of a central issue in the judicial and academic debate over the optimal method of contract interpretation: Whether “textualism” or “contextualism” best minimizes contract enforcement costs. The study measured enforcement costs in twelve ways. Under each of those measures, there was no statistically significant difference in the level of interpretation litigation between textualist and contextualist regimes. Accordingly, the study finds no support for either the textualist hypothesis that contextualism has higher enforcement costs or the contextualist counter-hypothesis that textualism has higher enforcement costs.

The study herein was conducted via the West Key Number …

The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’S Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agen­cies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doc­trine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-com­ment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is neces­sary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doc­trine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of pow­ers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial defer­ence—has helped …

Introduction To Justice Robert D. Rucker's Article, "The Right To Ignore The Law: Constitutional Entitlement Versus Judicial Interpretation", Robert F. Blomquist

Valparaiso University Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference's Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters

All Faculty Scholarship

Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agencies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doctrine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-comment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is necessary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doctrine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of powers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial deference—has helped …

Boilerplate And Party Intent, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

It is commonly recognized that parties often do not read or understand contract boilerplate they agree to, and that such parties might not intend all the terms in it. Less often noticed are decisions that favor boilerplate over evidence of the parties’ contrary intent for the very reason that it is boilerplate. This article discusses that phenomenon. It identifies decisions in which courts favor boilerplate terms over other evidence the parties’ intent because it is boilerplate, discusses the rules that explain those outcomes, and examines the reasons behind the rules.

A contractual writing, whether individually negotiated and drafted or boilerplate, …

Considerations Of History And Purpose In Constitutional Borrowing, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This essay is part of a symposium issue dedicated to "Constitutional Rights: Intersections, Synergies, and Conflicts" at William and Mary School of Law. I make four points. First, perfect harmony among rights might not always be normatively desirable. In fact, in some instances, such as when First Amendment and Second Amendment rights clash, we might wish to have expressive rights consistently trump gun rights. Second, we can't resolve clashes between rights in the abstract but instead must consult history in a broadly relevant rather than a narrowly "originalist" fashion. When we do so, we learn that armed expression and white …