Law Commons^™

Lawful Searches Incident To Unlawful Arrests: A Reform Proposal, Mark A. Summers

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Why Robert Mueller’S Appointment As Special Counsel Was Unlawful, Gary S. Lawson, Steven Calabresi

Faculty Scholarship

Since 1999, when the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act expired, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has had in place regulations providing for the appointment of Special Counsels who possess “the full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney.” Appointments under these regulations, such as the May 17,2017 appointment of Robert S. Mueller to investigate the Trump campaign, are patently unlawful, for three distinct reasons.

First, all federal offices must be “established by Law,” and there is no statute authorizing such an office in the DOJ. We conduct …

Murr V. Wisconsin And The Inherent Limits Of Regulatory Takings, Lynda L. Butler

Faculty Publications

This article examines the confusion surrounding constitutional protection of property under the substantive due process and takings clauses, using Murr as a springboard for reconsidering the substantive due process/takings distinction and asking whether the regulatory takings doctrine should remain a viable constitutional concept despite its muddled principles. While powerful reasons support treating as compensable economic regulations that are functionally equivalent to physical takings, important differences between physical and regulatory takings need to be recognized as limits to the degree of equivalence possible and therefore to the regulatory takings doctrine. A look back at the evolutionary paths of substantive due process, …

Nuclear Weapons, The War Powers, And The Constitution: Mutually Assured Destruction?, John M. Dipippa

South Carolina Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Post-Truth First Amendment, Sarah Haan

Indiana Law Journal

Post-truthism is widely viewed as a political problem. This Article explores posttruthism as a constitutional law problem, and argues that, because post-truthism offers a normative framework for regulating information, we should take it seriously as a basis for law.

In its exploration of the influence of post-truth ideas on law, the Article focuses on the compelled speech doctrine. When the State mandates disclosure, it pits the interests of unwilling speakers against the interests of listeners. In the twenty-first century, speakers who are targeted by mandatory disclosure laws are often organizational actors with informational advantages, such as corporations. Listeners who stand …

'Great Variety Of Relevant Conditions, Political, Social And Economic': The Constitutionality Of Congressional Deadlines On Amendment Proposals Under Article V, Danaya C. Wright

UF Law Faculty Publications

Within a year or two, the thirty-eighth state is likely to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), setting up an unprecedented constitutional challenge. The ERA was proposed with a seven-year deadline in the resolving clause, establishing the mode of ratification. That was a shift from earlier precedents in which a deadline had been placed in the text of the amendment proposal itself. Article V is annoyingly silent on the issue of congressional deadlines in amendment proposals, and the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of a deadline that could void an otherwise properly ratified amendment. The practice of placing …

The Law: Defending Congress’S Interests In Court: How Lawmakers And The President Bargain Over Department Of Justice Representation, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

In understanding the willingness of government lawyers to defend the constitutionality of federal statutes, this article will explain why presidents rarely make use of their powers under the Constitution (allowing the president to refuse to defend laws he finds unconstitutional) and under federal law (placing the control of most government litigation with the attorney general). Attention will be paid both to how Department of Justice lawyers enhance their power by defending federal statutes and to how Congress, if need be, can pressure the department to bow to lawmaker preferences. In consequence, when the president refuses to defend a statute, courts …

Where's The Politics?: Introduction To Williams, Eastland, Days, And Rabkin, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Tom Delay: Popular Constitutionalist?, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

The Interactive Constitution: An Essay On Clothing Emperors And Searching For Constitutional Truth, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

The Last Word Debate: How Social And Political Forces Shape Constitutional Values, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

The Indefensible Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash

Neal E. Devins

Modern Justice Department opinions insist that the executive branch must enforce and defend laws. In the first article to systematically examine Department of Justice refusals to defend, we make four points. First, the duties to enforce and defend lack any sound basis in the Constitution. Hence, while President Obama is right to refuse to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, he is wrong to continue to enforce a law he believes is unconstitutional. Second, rather than being grounded in the Constitution, the duties are better explained by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) desire to enhance its independence and status. By …

The Democratic Constitution: Reflections On Abortion, Affirmative Action, And The Independent Counsel, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

The annual St. George Tucker Lecture by Professor Neal Devins presented on October 7, 1998.

The Constitution Between Friends, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations And Lessons From Bill Van Alstyne's Testimony, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Same-Sex Marriage And The New Judicial Federalism: Why State Courts Should Not Consider Out-Of-State Backlash, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Tiers Of Scrutiny In A Hierarchical Judiciary, Tara Leigh Grove

Tara L. Grove

No abstract provided.

The Supreme Court's Legitimacy Dilemma, Tara Leigh Grove

Tara L. Grove

No abstract provided.

Takings Clause, Tara Leigh Grove

Tara L. Grove

No abstract provided.

Supreme Court Preview 2014-2015: Moot Court, Neal Devins, Michael Scodro, Andrew Pincus, Joan Biskupic, Garrett Epps, Irving Gornstein, Tara Leigh Grove, Allison Orr Larsen, Dahlia Lithwick, Erin E. Murphy, David Savage, Richard Wolf

Tara L. Grove

No abstract provided.

Government Standing And The Fallacy Of Institutional Injury, Tara Leigh Grove

Tara L. Grove

A new brand of plaintiff has come to federal court. In cases involving the Affordable Care Act, the Defense of Marriage Act, and partisan gerrymandering, government institutions have brought suit to redress “institutional injuries”—that is, claims of harm to their constitutional powers or duties. Jurists and scholars are increasingly enthusiastic about these lawsuits, arguing (for example) that the Senate should have standing to protect its power to ratify treaties; that the House of Representatives may sue to preserve its role in the appropriations process; and that the President may go to court to vindicate his Article II prerogatives. This Article …

Article Iii In The Political Branches, Tara Leigh Grove

Tara L. Grove

In many separation of powers debates, scholars excavate the practices and constitutional interpretations of Congress and the executive branch in order to discern the scope of various constitutional provisions. I argue that similar attention to political branch practice is warranted in the Article III context. That is true, in large part because much of the constitutional history of the federal courts has been written not by the federal judiciary, but by the legislative and executive branches. To illustrate this point, this Essay focuses on the Exceptions Clause of Article III. The Supreme Court has said little about the meaning of …

Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins

Tara L. Grove

Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …

Trans-Border Exclusion And Execution, Timothy Zick

Timothy Zick

No abstract provided.

The Sanctity Of Polling Places, Timothy Zick

Timothy Zick

No abstract provided.

The First Amendment And The World, Timothy Zick

Timothy Zick

No abstract provided.

Supreme Court Preview 2014-2015: First Amendment, Timothy Zick, Walter E. Dellinger Iii, Paul Smith, Dahlia Lithwick

Timothy Zick

No abstract provided.

Right Of The Occupiers, Jimmy Barrett, Timothy Zick

Timothy Zick

No abstract provided.

Property As/And Constitutional Settlement, Timothy Zick

Timothy Zick

No abstract provided.

Our Exceptional Constitution, Timothy Zick

Timothy Zick

No abstract provided.