Law Commons^™

Setting Our Feet: The Foundations Of Religious And Conscience Protections, Hanna Torline

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note does not attempt to claim that religion and conscience are not moral equivalents, that they are not equally important, or that they do not require equal legal treatment. Nor does it attempt to claim the converse. Simply put, it argues that a consideration of the different foundations underlying conscience protections and religious protections should give pause to anyone arguing that the two are equivalent. This Note concludes that the rationales behind protecting religion and conscience are different enough to merit consideration in the debate. For if religion and conscience are treated as equivalents under the law, they will …

De Facto State: Social Media Networks And The First Amendment, Paul Domer

Notre Dame Law Review

In Marsh v. Alabama, a Jehovah’s Witness was arrested and convicted of trespassing for proselytizing on a public sidewalk that nonetheless was, like everything else in the “company town,” privately owned. The Court reversed, holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments applied against a private actor if it exercised all the powers and responsibilities traditionally associated with a government—policing, utilities, and traffic control, for example. Writing for the majority, Justice Black declared, “The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the …

Why Section 230 Is Better Than The First Amendment, Eric Goldman

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”) immunizes Internet services from liability for third-party content. This immunity acts as a crucial legal foundation for the modern Internet. However, growing skepticism about the Internet has placed the immunity in regulators’ sights.

If the First Amendment mirrors Section 230’s speech protections, narrowing Section 230 would be inconsequential. This Essay explains why that is not the case. Section 230 provides defendants with more substantive and procedural benefits than the First Amendment does. Because the First Amendment does not backfill these benefits, reductions to Section 230’s scope pose serious risks to Internet speech.

Keynote Address: Staying Afloat And Engaged In Today's Flooded Marketplace Of Speech, Michael Y. Scudder

Notre Dame Law Review

The contributions to this Symposium cover substantial ground, address important issues, and offer much to react to. This Symposium, I submit, also occurs at a time of significance for the First Amendment in the Supreme Court. Perhaps the Court’s most fervent and consequential defender of free speech, Justice Anthony Kennedy, has retired. His impact on American constitutional law was enormous, including, in my view, in the area of free speech. I had the privilege of clerking for Justice Kennedy, admire him deeply as judge and person, and want to offer some reflections on what I see as a few of …

On "Clear And Present Danger", Leslie Kendrick

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissent in United States v. Abrams gave us the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor and the “clear and present danger” test. Too often unremarked is the contradiction between the two. At the same time that Holmes says “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,” he also says that “the present danger of immediate evil” permits Congress to restrict the expression of opinion. When the anticipated harm comes about through acceptance of the speaker’s idea, then the imposition of the clear and present danger …

Marketplace Of Ideas, Privacy, And The Digital Audience, Alexander Tsesis

Notre Dame Law Review

The availability of almost limitless sets of digital information has opened a vast marketplace of ideas. Information service providers like Facebook and Twitter provide users with an array of personal information about products, friends, acquaintances, and strangers. While this data enriches the lives of those who share content on the internet, it comes at the expense of privacy.

Social media companies disseminate news, advertisements, and political messages, while also capitalizing on consumers’ private shopping, surfing, and traveling habits. Companies like Cambridge Analytica, Amazon, and Apple rely on algorithmic programs to mash up and scrape enormous amounts of online and otherwise …

Holmes, Humility, And How Not To Kill Each Other, John Inazu

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States is one of the intellectual anchors of modern First Amendment doctrine. In that opinion, Holmes sets out two core aspects of his free speech jurisprudence: his pragmatic concern about majoritarian control and his quasi-libertarian preference for the “competition of the market.” In the century since Abrams, we have witnessed changes in society, technology, and politics that have shaped and reshaped the contours of our First Amendment landscape. But not everything has changed—some aspects of our human experience remain remarkably similar to the context in which Holmes wrote.

One unchanged …

Costs And Challenges Of The Hostile Audience, Frederick Schauer

Notre Dame Law Review

In my own newly famous city of Charlottesville, Virginia, as well as in Berkeley, Boston, Gainesville, Middlebury, and an increasing number of other locations, individuals and groups engaging in constitutionally protected acts of speaking, marching, parading, protesting, rallying, and demonstrating have become targets for often-large groups of often-disruptive counterprotesters. And although most of the contemporary events have involved neo-Nazi, Ku Klux Klan, and other white supremacist speakers who are met with opposition from audiences on the political left, it has not always been so. Indeed, what we now identify as the problem of the hostile audience has often involved more …

The Missing Marketplace Of Ideas Theory, Mary-Rose Papandrea

Notre Dame Law Review

One hundred years ago, Justice Holmes embraced the marketplace of ideas in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States. The same year as this centennial anniversary, Justice Kennedy, one of the most ardent adherents to this theory, retired from the Supreme Court. The dovetailing of these two events offers the perfect excuse to evaluate the marketplace of ideas in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence today.

The marketplace of ideas drives many of the Court’s First Amendment decisions, from the public forum doctrine to restrictions on offensive expression to campaign finance. Although the theory is not perfect, this Article …

Compelled Commercial Speech And The First Amendment, Martin H. Redish

Notre Dame Law Review

For the most part, the First Amendment is viewed as a means of restricting government’s authority to suppress expression. Both speakers and listeners are assumed to benefit from speech, and, therefore, the more communication of opinion and information, the better it is for both society and the democratic system. However, for a variety of important reasons, the courts have extended First Amendment protection to limit government’s power to compel expression by private individuals and entities. The Court has wisely recognized that governmental compulsion to speak can often bring about many of the very same constitutional and democratic pathologies brought on …

The Marketplace Of Ideas Online, Dawn C. Nunziato

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article surveys the severe problems in today’s online marketplace of ideas and the efforts that regulators—and the online platforms themselves—have recently adopted in an attempt to address such problems. In Part I, this Article examines the historical foundations of the “marketplace of ideas” model, as articulated in Holmes’s early opinions, as well as the Court’s eventual adoption of the marketplace model and, with it, the adoption of counterspeech, instead of censorship, as the default response to harmful speech. Part II then examines the scope and extent of the problems besieging the modern online marketplace of ideas, focusing on problems …

On Public Employees And Judicial Buck-Passing: The Respective Roles Of Statutory And Constitutional Protections For Government Whistleblowers, Heidi Kitrosser

Notre Dame Law Review

In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court held that public employees have no First Amendment protections for speech made “pursuant to their official duties.” Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy assured readers that the holding did not undermine “the potential societal value of employee speech.” Among other things, Kennedy pointed to a “powerful network of legislative enactments—such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes—available to [public employees] who seek to expose wrongdoing.” Yet as Justice Souter pointed out in dissent and as several amici had informed the Court in their briefs, “the combined variants of statutory whistle-blower definitions and …

Antidiscrimination Laws And The Administrative State: A Skeptic's Look At Administrative Constitutionalism, David E. Bernstein

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article discusses why administrative agencies charged with enforcing antidiscrimination legislation while implicitly undertaking administrative constitutionalism tend to be inconsiderate of constitutional limitations on government authority in general, and especially of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression.

To establish the existence and contours of the problem, Part I of this Article provides context by recounting several detailed examples of how federal, state, and local civil rights agencies have favored broad antidiscrimination enforcement over countervailing constitutional doctrines that impose limits on regulatory authority. These examples include the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights’ …

Transborder Speech, Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr.

Notre Dame Law Review

In an increasingly globalized marketplace of ideas, First Amendment law and theory must recognize that the freedom of speech does not end at the water’s edge. Simply put, the locus of expressive activity should not prefigure the government’s ability to engage in censorship. Nevertheless, under current First Amendment law and practice, the accident of geography may serve as a constitutionally acceptable basis for content-based censorship of speech. If, as the Supreme Court argued with such ferocity in Citizens United, the value of speech to an audience does not depend on the speaker’s identity or motive for speaking, then by …

Book Review, Richard Garnett

Journal Articles

Richard Garnett reviews Ellis M. West's The Free Exercise of Religion in America: Its Original Constitutional Meaning

This is a review of Professor Ellis M. West's 2019 study of the original meaning of "free exercise of religion."