Law Commons^™

Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Implications For Self- Pardons And Non-Delegation, Ethan J. Leib, Jed H. Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The idea that public servants hold their offices in trust for subject-beneficia-ries and that a sovereign’s exercise of its political power must be constrained by fiduciary standards—like the duties of loyalty and care—is not new. But scholars are collecting more and more evidence that the framers of the U.S. Constitution may have sought to constrain public power in ways that we would today call fiduciary. In this article, we explore some important legal conclu-sions that follow from fiduciary constitutionalism.

After developing some historical links between private fiduciary instruments and state and federal constitutions, we opine on what a fiduciary constitution …

A Fiduciary Theory Of Prosecution, Bruce A. Green, Rebecca Roiphe

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars have failed to arrive at a unifying theory of prosecution, one that explains the complex role that prosecutors play in our democratic system. This Article draws on a developing body of legal scholarship on fiduciary theory to offer a new paradigm that grounds prosecutors’ obligations in their historical role as fiduciaries. Casting prosecutors as fiduciaries clarifies the prosecutor’s obligation to seek justice, focuses attention on the duties of care and loyalty, and prioritizes criminal justice considerations over other public policy interests in prosecutorial charging and plea-bargaining decisions. As fiduciaries, prosecutors are required to engage in an explicit deliberative process …