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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Eighteenth Annual Albert A. Destefano Lecture On Corporate, Securities, & Financial Law At The Fordham Corporate Law Center: Corwin V. Kkr Financial Holdings Llc— An “After-Action Report”, The Honorable Joseph R. Slights Iii, Matthew Diller
The Eighteenth Annual Albert A. Destefano Lecture On Corporate, Securities, & Financial Law At The Fordham Corporate Law Center: Corwin V. Kkr Financial Holdings Llc— An “After-Action Report”, The Honorable Joseph R. Slights Iii, Matthew Diller
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
Security For Expense Statutes: Easing Shareholder Hopelessness?, Miriam R. Albert
Security For Expense Statutes: Easing Shareholder Hopelessness?, Miriam R. Albert
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
The quintessential derivative suit is a suit by a shareholder to force the corporation to sue a manager for fraud, which is admittedly an awkward and likely unpleasant endeavor and, according to the Supreme Court, a “remedy born of stockholder helplessness.” Where ownership and control of an enterprise are vested in the same population, the need for a corrective mechanism like a derivative suit is greatly lessened because the owner/managers’ self-interests will arguably guide managerial conduct. But where ownership and control are in separate hands, the incentives change, and managerial conduct may not conform to the owners’ views of the …
List Voting’S Travels: The Importance Of Being Independent In The Boardroom, Maria Lucia Passador
List Voting’S Travels: The Importance Of Being Independent In The Boardroom, Maria Lucia Passador
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
The life of the law, especially with regard to corporations, is strongly influenced by experience and practice. The board, a living element of corporate law, is therefore one of the most noteworthy aspects to be studied, given its relevant implications and role as the lifeblood of scholarly debates.
This Article offers a novel contribution to the assessment of list voting, a fairly unique Italian system that has been increasingly appreciated by institutional investors. A hand-picked dataset that stretches from 2005 to 2015 shows a positive correlation between minority-appointed directors in the boardroom and dividend payouts. Furthermore, the findings shed light …
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: A Novel Agency Design With Familiar Issues, Thomas Arning
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: A Novel Agency Design With Familiar Issues, Thomas Arning
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
This Note examines the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, with a specific focus on its single-director structure. The balance of authority between agencies and the three branches of government has been a point of contention for generations, especially since the early twentieth century. This area of the law became even more contested following the financial crisis in 2008. As part of the response to the perceived abuses that led to the global recession, Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, ultimately opting to give it a single director as opposed to a board structure. Proponents of this regime …
Curb Your Enthusiasm: The Rise Of Hedge Fund Activist Shareholders And The Duty Of Loyalty, Soo Young Hong
Curb Your Enthusiasm: The Rise Of Hedge Fund Activist Shareholders And The Duty Of Loyalty, Soo Young Hong
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Shareholder activism has been a growing problem in the corporate world, creating numerous dilemmas for the board of directors of companies. Activist shareholders can unsettle a company, pressuring the directors to make decisions according to the course of business the activists would prefer, and thus interfering with the traditional role of directors as the decision-makers of a company. With this new development in the business world, legal scholars have been debating if this activism needs to be controlled and, if so, what measures can be taken to reach a balance. This Note examines the traditional corporate principles such as the …