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Full-Text Articles in Law
Using The Master’S Tool To Dismantle His House: Derrick Bell, Herbert Wechsler, And Critical Legal Process, William Rhee
Using The Master’S Tool To Dismantle His House: Derrick Bell, Herbert Wechsler, And Critical Legal Process, William Rhee
Concordia Law Review
This Article retells the life stories of Derrick Bell, a founder of Critical Race Theory, and Herbert Wechsler, a founder of the Legal Process School, to suggest a synthesis of their often conflicting paradigms—Critical Legal Process. Critical Legal Process’s fundamental question is whether the Master’s tool, the so-called rule of law, can be considered—in the words of Wechsler’s most famous article—a genuine “neutral principle.” Can the Master’s favorite tool be repurposed to dismantle the very house it built? Can the same rule of law that was abused to build the racist Jim Crow system not only dismantle that explicitly racist …
5 1/2 Problems With Legal Positivism And Tax Law, Bret N. Bogenschneider
5 1/2 Problems With Legal Positivism And Tax Law, Bret N. Bogenschneider
Pepperdine Law Review
This essay is a reply to the famous paper by John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 51⁄2 Myths, and the more recent paper by John Prebble, Kelsen, the Principle of Exclusion of Contradictions, and General Anti-Avoidance Rules. The reply is developed from the perspective of tax law where the respective issues are of major significance. The “51⁄2 problems” correspond to Gardner’s arguments and are as follows: (#1) Legal Positivism centers on determining whether a tax law is legally valid based on its source (e.g., the legislature enacted a valid law applying tax at the rate of 25%). However, in the tax context, …
Doctrinal Reasoning As A Disruptive Practice, Jessie Allen
Doctrinal Reasoning As A Disruptive Practice, Jessie Allen
Articles
Legal doctrine is generally thought to contribute to legal decision making only to the extent it determines substantive results. Yet in many cases, the available authorities are indeterminate. I propose a different model for how doctrinal reasoning might contribute to judicial decisions. Drawing on performance theory and psychological studies of readers, I argue that judges’ engagement with formal legal doctrine might have self-disrupting effects like those performers experience when they adopt uncharacteristic behaviors. Such disruptive effects would not explain how judges ultimately select, or should select, legal results. But they might help legal decision makers to set aside subjective biases.