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Full-Text Articles in Law
Allocation Rules And The Stability Of Mass Tort Class Actions, Joshua C. Teitelbaum
Allocation Rules And The Stability Of Mass Tort Class Actions, Joshua C. Teitelbaum
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This paper studies the effects of allocation rules on the stability of mass tort class actions. I analyze a two-stage model in which a defendant faces multiple plaintiffs with heterogeneous damage claims. In stage 1, the plaintiffs play a noncooperative coalition formation game. In stage 2, the class action and any individual actions by opt-out plaintiffs are litigated or settled. I examine how the method for allocating the class recovery interacts with other factors---the shape of the damage claims distribution, the scale benefits of the class action, and the plaintiffs' probability of prevailing at trial and bargaining power in settlement …
Different Contexts, Different Risk Preferences?, Levon Barseghyan, Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Lin Xu
Different Contexts, Different Risk Preferences?, Levon Barseghyan, Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Lin Xu
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
We examine the stability of risk preferences across contexts involving different stakes. Using data on households' deductible choices in three property insurance coverages and their limit choices in two liability insurance coverages, we assess the stability across the five contexts in the ordinal ranking of the households' willingness to bear risk. We find evidence of stability across contexts involving stakes of the same magnitude, but not across contexts involving stakes of very different magnitudes. Our results appear to be robust to heterogeneity in wealth and access to credit, complicating seemingly ready explanations.