Law Commons^™

Trinko: A Kinder, Gentler Approach To Dominant Firms Under The Antitrust Laws?, Edward D. Cavanagh

Maine Law Review

Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize. The § 2 prohibitions are rooted in concerns "that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone." At the same time, courts have recognized that size alone cannot be the basis of condemnation under § 2, for as Learned Hand observed in Alcoa, "[t]he successful competitor, having been urged …

The Horizons Of Antitrust, Richard M. Steuer

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Critics have been complaining that there are too few jobs in America and too much inequality. They have been calling for broadening the goals of antitrust and, at the very least, for more antitrust enforcement. More enforcement could be expected to have an impact on the concentration of power and on jobs, but even recalibrating the goals of antitrust law cannot, by itself, realistically be considered a panacea for eliminating unemployment or inequality overnight.

At the same time, other countries already have broader goals written into their own laws, including their competition laws, which protect jobs and limit foreign …

Foreword: Competition’S Achilles Heel, Thomas L. Greaney

Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy

No abstract provided.

Competition As Policy Reform: The Use Of Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement, Market-Governance Rules, And Incentives In Health Care, Emilio Varanini

Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy

In health care, the increase in market concentration on both the insurer side and the provider side has led to insurers and providers acquiring market power. Insurers and providers, in turn, have used that market power to charge higher prices to employers providing employees with medical care without corresponding increases in the quality of that care. Responding more generally to the increase in market concentration in many industries in the United States with a range of inimical effects for the nation’s economy, the Obama Administration suggested a range of policy solutions that this article groups under the term “Competition as …

When Is Competition Not Competition: The Curious Case Of Medicare Advantage, Robert A. Berenson

Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy

Policymakers routinely assume that Medicare Advantage plans and the traditional Medicare program compete for beneficiaries. Yet the District of Columbia federal district court blocked the proposed Aetna and Humana merger, finding that for purposes of antitrust analysis Medicare Advantage plans and traditional Medicare are effectively in different product markets. That is, they do not compete. This article reviews the basis for the court decision, which relied to a large extent on information that Medicare beneficiaries select their insurance coverage based on durable preferences either for the Medicare Advantage or the traditional Medicare option.

The article explores whether the apparently durable …

Using Data Exclusivity Grants To Incentivize Cumulative Innovation Of Biologics' Manufacturing Processes, Eric Lawrence Levi

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Louis Brandeis And Contemporary Antitrust Enforcement, Kenneth G. Elzinga, Micah Webber

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Uniform Rules: Addressing The Disparate Rules That Deny Student-Athletes The Opportunity To Participate In Sports According To Gender Identity, Chelsea Shrader

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.