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Full-Text Articles in Law

Master File, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. V. Colo. Civil Rights Comm., __ U.S. __ (2017): Legislative History Of Sb08-200, Matt Simonsen Sep 2017

Master File, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. V. Colo. Civil Rights Comm., __ U.S. __ (2017): Legislative History Of Sb08-200, Matt Simonsen

Research Data

This Master File of the legislative history of a 2008 amendment to the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) was researched and compiled by Matt Simonsen, J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Colorado Law School, and submitted to law professors Craig Konnoth and Melissa Hart. The SB08-200 Master File is cited in Brief of Amici Curiae Colorado Organizations and Individuals in Support of Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, __U.S.__ (2018) (No. 16-111).

449 p.


Open Source: The Enewsletter Of Rwu Law 09-22-2017, Roger Williams University School Of Law Sep 2017

Open Source: The Enewsletter Of Rwu Law 09-22-2017, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.


Amicus Curiae Brief Of Equality Ohio In Support Of Intervenor Urging Reversal, Doron M. Kalir, Kenneth J. Kowalski Apr 2017

Amicus Curiae Brief Of Equality Ohio In Support Of Intervenor Urging Reversal, Doron M. Kalir, Kenneth J. Kowalski

Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents

Title VII’s plain language bars discharge of “any individual”—whether transgender or not—“because of such individual’s . . . sex.” It applies whenever employers take gender into account in making employment decisions. It is undisputed that the employer in this case based his decision to terminate Ms. Stephens solely on sex-based considerations. To be sure, he could have terminated Ms. Stephens for a wide array of reasons—tardiness, failure to perform, disciplinary issues—or for no reason at all. Under those circumstances, such termination—even of a transgender person—would not be “because of such individual’s sex.” But that is not the case here. Here, …