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Full-Text Articles in Law

Taking Systemic Risk Seriously In Financial Regulation, Todd Henderson, James C. Spindler Oct 2017

Taking Systemic Risk Seriously In Financial Regulation, Todd Henderson, James C. Spindler

Indiana Law Journal

Bank regulation failed in the run up to the financial crisis of2008, as it has numerous times in the course of U.S. history. This is despite the existence of traditional prudential regulation, such as capital adequacy mandates, reserve requirements, and bank examination, as well as more common legal remedies, such as tort and contract litigation. Unsurprisingly, in the wake of these failures, many reforms have been proposed, and some adopted, to try to reduce bank risk taking. These reforms include limiting bank size, requiring bank managers to be paid differently, restricting investment in high-risk financial products, and, of course, tightening …


Don't Let The Facts Get In The Way Of The Truth: Revisiting How Buckhannon And Alyeska Pipeline Messed Up The American Rule, Landyn Wm. Rookard Jul 2017

Don't Let The Facts Get In The Way Of The Truth: Revisiting How Buckhannon And Alyeska Pipeline Messed Up The American Rule, Landyn Wm. Rookard

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.


National Protection Of Student-Athlete Mental Health: The Case For Federal Regulation Over The National Collegiate Athletic Association, Jayce Born Jul 2017

National Protection Of Student-Athlete Mental Health: The Case For Federal Regulation Over The National Collegiate Athletic Association, Jayce Born

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Dictation And Delegation In Securities Regulation, Usha Rodrigues Apr 2017

Dictation And Delegation In Securities Regulation, Usha Rodrigues

Indiana Law Journal

When Congress undertakes major financial reform, either it dictates the precise con-tours of the law itself or it delegates the bulk of the rule making to an administrative agency. This choice has critical consequences. Making the law self-executing in federal legislation is swift, not subject to administrative tinkering, and less vulnerable than rule making to judicial second-guessing. Agency action is, in contrast, deliberate, subject to ongoing bureaucratic fiddling, and more vulnerable than statutes to judicial challenge.

This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the extent of congressional delegation in securities law from 1970 to the present day, examining nine …