Law Commons^™

Reverse Nullification And Executive Discretion, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

The President has broad discretion to refrain from enforcing many civil and criminal laws, either in general or under certain circumstances. The Supreme Court has not only affirmed the constitutionality of such under-enforcement, but extolled its virtues. Most recently, in Arizona v. United States, it deployed the judicially created doctrines of obstacle and field preemption to invalidate state restrictions on illegal immigrants that mirrored federal law, in large part to ensure that states do not undermine the effects of the President’s decision to refrain from fully enforcing federal immigration provisions.

Such a broad application of obstacle and field preemption is …

The Foreign Investment Review Agency (Fira) And The General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade (Gatt): Incompatible?, Emily F. Carasco

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Indemnification As An Alternative To Nullification, Robert A. Mikos

Montana Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Jury And Criminal Responsibility In Anglo-American History, Thomas A. Green

Articles

Anglo-American theories of criminal responsibility require scholars to grapple with, inter alia, the relationship between the formal rule of law and the powers of the lay jury as well as two inherent ideas of freedom: freedom of the will and political liberty. Here, by way of canvassing my past work and prefiguring future work, I sketch some elements of the history of the Anglo-American jury and offer some glimpses of commentary on the interplay between the jury—particularly its application of conventional morality to criminal judgments—and the formal rule of law of the state. My central intent is to pose questions …

The Rites Of Dissent: Notes On Nationalist Federalism, Jessica Bulman-Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

Responding to Heather K. Gerken’s Childress Lecture, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?

In this response, I consider how the nationalist school of federalism reconceptualizes nationalism, and not only federalism. Taking as my starting point Gerken’s claim that federalism can be good for nationalism, that nationalists should “believe in giving power to the states,” I first outline two possible understandings of nationalism suggested by this claim — that “national” refers to the federal government, and that “national” refers to a unified American polity — and explain what it would mean for federalism to serve nationalism so understood. After rejecting …