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Full-Text Articles in Law
Autonomy, Residence, And Return, David Lefkowitz
Autonomy, Residence, And Return, David Lefkowitz
Philosophy Faculty Publications
This article argues that those unjustly displaced from a particular territory T cannot involuntarily lose their rights to reside there, or, as a consequence, their rights of return to it, even if they develop territorially grounded conceptions of the good where they now reside. The contrary position fails to accord the unjustly displaced the respect due to them in virtue of their personal autonomy. Facts commonly alleged to justify the supersession of rights of return to T only provide evidence that the unjustly displaced have abandoned their rights to reside there, or would do so if given a just opportunity …
Blame And The Criminal Law, David Lefkowitz
Blame And The Criminal Law, David Lefkowitz
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Many retributivists appear to presume that the concept of blame that figures in their accounts of just punishment is the same one people employ in their interpersonal moral relationships. David Shoemaker contends that this presumption is mistaken. Moral blameworthiness, he maintains, tracks only the meaning of a person's action––his reasons for acting as he did––while criminal blameworthiness, which he equates with liability to punishment, tracks only the impermissibility of an agent's action. I contest the second of these two claims, and in doing so defend the retributivists’ presumption. First, I argue that the purpose of a criminal trial can be …
Giving Up On Moral Truth Shall Set You Free: Walzer On Relativism, Criticism, And Toleration, David Lefkowitz
Giving Up On Moral Truth Shall Set You Free: Walzer On Relativism, Criticism, And Toleration, David Lefkowitz
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Morality, Michael Walzer contends, is plural, subjective, and concrete, a multitude of moralities or moral ways of life created over time by the members of distinct historically situated communities. This entails that we must abandon the familiar notion of moral truth, according to which at least some claims of the form ‘it is wrong to ϕ’ are true in virtue of their tracking or reflecting objective and universal moral principles binding on all moral agents as such. Many of Walzer’s critics take this implication to constitute a reductio ad absurdum refutation of Walzer’s relativist meta-ethics. But what precisely do we …