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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
Collective Bargaining And The Coase Theorem, Stewart J. Schwab
Collective Bargaining And The Coase Theorem, Stewart J. Schwab
Stewart J Schwab
No abstract provided.
Coase, Rents, And Opportunity Costs, Stewart J. Schwab
Coase, Rents, And Opportunity Costs, Stewart J. Schwab
Stewart J Schwab
Professor Posin is to be congratulated on his recent article in this Review, "The Coase Theorem: If Pigs Could Fly," for creating a precise example that purports to disprove the Coase Theorem. Legal scholarship should strive more towards verifiable or falsifiable statements about the law. Of course, falsifiable statements are a risky strategy, and in this case the risk has materialized. Posin's claim—that his example shows a flaw in the Coase Theorem—is false. Posin's claim is an especially bold one, for his example deals with a shifting legal entitlement between two producers. Most successful attacks on the Coase Theorem have …
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas
Stewart J Schwab
No abstract provided.
Union Raids, Union Democracy, And The Market For Union Control, Stewart J. Schwab
Union Raids, Union Democracy, And The Market For Union Control, Stewart J. Schwab
Stewart J Schwab
In this article, Professor Schwab compares the union member-leader relationship to the corporate shareholder-manager relationship and examines what can be learned from the voluminous literature regarding corporate control about problems of internal union democracy. Specifically, he questions whether a viable market for union control does or could exist that might induce leaders to act in the interests of their members. He analyzes the structural weaknesses in the market for union control and the legal factors inhibiting a union takeover market. Schwab concludes that a weak market does exist, despite the nonprofit nature of unions that limits the ability of leaders …