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Full-Text Articles in Law
Passing The Torch But Sailing Too Close To The Wind: Congress’S Role In Authorizing Administrative Branches To Promulgate Regulations That Contemplate Criminal Sanctions, Reem Sadik
Legislation and Policy Brief
The Supreme Court has stated that Congress must simply “lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle” to which the agency must conform. If this is done, a court will find the delegation of broad authority to the agency to be constitutional. There is, however, an open issue regarding whether the “intelligible principle” standard applies to delegations of authority that allow for the promulgation of both civil and criminal penalties. In Touby v. United States, the Supreme Court was asked whether “something more than an ‘intelligible principle’ is required” when Congress authorizes an agency to issue regulations that contemplate …
Cgmp Violations Should Not Be Used As A Basis For Fca Actions Absent Fraud, Kyle Faget
Cgmp Violations Should Not Be Used As A Basis For Fca Actions Absent Fraud, Kyle Faget
Seattle University Law Review
Since Congress amended the False Claims Act (FCA) in 1986, the statute has evolved into a seemingly boundless weapon for enforcing other statutes and regulations applicable to every industry that accepts any form of government funding. Use of the FCA by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and by private citizens bringing actions on behalf of the U.S. government to enforce other statutes and regulations is particularly evident in the field of health care. The FCA has been utilized in actions where the allegations include off-label promotion of drugs, kickbacks, and violations of current good manufacturing practices (cGMPs) by linking the …
Constitutional Conflict And Congressional Oversight, Andrew Mccanse Wright
Constitutional Conflict And Congressional Oversight, Andrew Mccanse Wright
Marquette Law Review
In matters of oversight, Congress and the President have fundamentally incompatible views of their institutional roles within the constitutional structure. This Article offers an explanation of divergent branch behavior and legal doctrine. Congress, much like a party to litigation, views itself as having fixed substantive rights to obtain desired information from the Executive and private parties. In contrast, the Executive views itself like a party to a business transaction, in which congressional oversight requests are the opening salvo in an iterative negotiation process to resolve competing interests between co-equal branches. In general, legislators want to litigate and executive officers want …