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Articles 1 - 22 of 22
Full-Text Articles in Law
Crawford V. Washington: Reclaiming The Original Meaning Of The Confrontation Clause, Danielle Dupre
Crawford V. Washington: Reclaiming The Original Meaning Of The Confrontation Clause, Danielle Dupre
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, People V. Cortes, Jennifer Feldman
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, People V. Cortes, Jennifer Feldman
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Crime Labs And Prison Guards: A Comment On Melendez-Diaz And Its Potential Impact On Capital Sentencing Proceedings, John Blume, Emily Paavola
Crime Labs And Prison Guards: A Comment On Melendez-Diaz And Its Potential Impact On Capital Sentencing Proceedings, John Blume, Emily Paavola
John H. Blume
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Four years ago, in Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that this right bars the admission of testimonial hearsay statements against criminal defendants, regardless of whether or not the statements fall within an evidentiary hearsay exception. It was a decision that other courts later described as a "bombshell," a "renaissance," and "a newly shaped lens" through which to view the Confrontation Clause. The case generated an extensive amount of discussion among legal commentators. Since its …
Admissibility Of Co-Conspirator Statements In A Post-Crawford World, Michael L. Seigel, Daniel Weisman
Admissibility Of Co-Conspirator Statements In A Post-Crawford World, Michael L. Seigel, Daniel Weisman
Michael L Seigel
This Article takes the position that co-conspirator statements must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they are testimonial and thus subject to exclusion under the Confrontation Clause. Further, in light of the fact that the author of the majority opinions in Crawford and Davis was Justice Antonin Scalia, this Article examines whether interpreting the Sixth Amendment as a bar to the admission of certain coconspirator statements would violate an originalist interpretation of that provision. The conclusion reached is that it would not. In the current era of ever-narrowing rights for criminal defendants, reaffirming the law's commitment to …
Supreme Court, Bronx County, People V. Paul, Adam D'Antonio
Supreme Court, Bronx County, People V. Paul, Adam D'Antonio
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Appellate Division, First Department, People V. Bradley, Kathleen Egan
Appellate Division, First Department, People V. Bradley, Kathleen Egan
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
You Blew It: The Confrontation Clause & Breathalyzers As Testimonial Evidence, Stephanie Tuorto
You Blew It: The Confrontation Clause & Breathalyzers As Testimonial Evidence, Stephanie Tuorto
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Come Back To The Boat, Justice Breyer!, Richard D. Friedman
Come Back To The Boat, Justice Breyer!, Richard D. Friedman
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
I want to get Justice Breyer back on the right side of Confrontation Clause issues. In 1999, in Lilly v. Virginia, he wrote a farsighted concurrence, making him one of the first members of the Supreme Court to recognize the inadequacy of the then-prevailing doctrine of the Confrontation Clause. That doctrine, first announced in Ohio v. Roberts, was dependent on hearsay law and made judicial assessments of reliability determinative. In Crawford v. Washington, the Court was presented with an alternative approach, making the key inquiry whether the statement in question was testimonial in nature. During the oral …
Case For A Constitutional Definition Of Hearsay: Requiring Confrontation Of Testimonial, Nonassertive Conduct And Statements Admitted To Explain An Unchallenged Investigation, The , James L. Kainen
James L. Kainen
Crawford v. Washington’s historical approach to the confrontation clause establishes that testimonial hearsay inadmissible without confrontation at the founding is similarly inadmissible today, despite whether it fits a subsequently developed hearsay exception. Consequently, the requirement of confrontation depends upon whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay, testimonial, and, if so, whether it was nonetheless admissible without confrontation at the founding. A substantial literature has developed about whether hearsay statements are testimonial or were, like dying declarations, otherwise admissible at the founding. In contrast, this article focuses on the first question – whether statements are hearsay – which scholars have thus far …
An Overview Of The October 2005 Supreme Court Term, Erwin Chemerinsky
An Overview Of The October 2005 Supreme Court Term, Erwin Chemerinsky
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Family Court, Queens County, In Re German F. And Hector R., Angelique Hermanowski
Family Court, Queens County, In Re German F. And Hector R., Angelique Hermanowski
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Supreme Court, Queens County, People V. Tam, Elaine Yang
Supreme Court, Queens County, People V. Tam, Elaine Yang
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, People V. Mcfarley, Erica R. Borgese
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, People V. Mcfarley, Erica R. Borgese
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Court Of Appeals Of New York - People V. Nieves-Andino, Jason Gines
Court Of Appeals Of New York - People V. Nieves-Andino, Jason Gines
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Videoconference Technology And The Confrontation Clause, Russell Kostelak
Videoconference Technology And The Confrontation Clause, Russell Kostelak
Cornell Law School J.D. Student Research Papers
No abstract provided.
Making The Right Call For Confrontation At Felony Sentencing, Shaakirrah R. Sanders
Making The Right Call For Confrontation At Felony Sentencing, Shaakirrah R. Sanders
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Felony sentencing courts have discretion to increase punishment based on un-cross-examined testimonial statements about several categories of uncharged, dismissed, or otherwise unproven criminal conduct. Denying defendants an opportunity to cross-examine these categories of sentencing evidence undermines a core principle of natural law as adopted in the Sixth Amendment: those accused of felony crimes have the right to confront adversarial witnesses. This Article contributes to the scholarship surrounding confrontation rights at felony sentencing by cautioning against continued adherence to the most historic Supreme Court case on this issue, Williams v. New York. This Article does so for reasons beyond the unacknowledged …
Confrontation And The Re-Privatization Of Domestic Violence, Deborah Tuerkheimer
Confrontation And The Re-Privatization Of Domestic Violence, Deborah Tuerkheimer
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
When the Supreme Court transformed the right of confrontation in Crawford v. Washington, the prosecution of domestic violence predictably suffered as a result. But commentators at the time did not anticipate how the Court’s subsequent Confrontation Clause cases would utterly misconceive the nature of domestic violence, producing a flawed understanding of what constitutes a “testimonial” statement. Although the Court’s definition was especially problematic in the domestic violence context, its overly rigid approach finally became intolerable in Michigan v. Bryant, a 2011 case that did not involve domestic violence. In Bryant, the Court resurrected a public–private divide that …
The Crawford Debacle, George Fisher
The Crawford Debacle, George Fisher
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
First a toast—to my colleague Jeff Fisher and his Crawford compatriot, Richard Friedman, on the tenth anniversary of their triumph: What they achieved in Crawford is every lawyer’s dream. By dint of sheer vision and lawyerly craft, they toppled what many saw as a flawed confrontation-law regime and put in its place one that promised greater justice. For that, much applause is due. Still there’s no denying their doctrine’s a muddle, if not as conceived, then as realized. Consider the count: Four justices almost agree on Crawford’s contours but patch over the issues that divide them. A fifth justice …
Crawford V. Washington: The Next Ten Years, Jeffrey L. Fisher
Crawford V. Washington: The Next Ten Years, Jeffrey L. Fisher
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Imagine a world . . . in which the Supreme Court got it right the first time. That is, imagine that when the Supreme Court first incorporated the Confrontation Clause against the states, the Court did so by way of the testimonial approach. It’s not that hard to envision. In Douglas v. Alabama—issued in 1965, on the same day the Court ruled that the Confrontation Clause applies to the states—the Court held that a nontestifying witness’s custodial confession could not be introduced against the defendant because, while “not technically testimony,” the confession was “the equivalent in the jury’s mind …
Gender-Conscious Confrontation: The Accuser-Obligation Approach Revisited, Michael El-Zein
Gender-Conscious Confrontation: The Accuser-Obligation Approach Revisited, Michael El-Zein
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law
The Supreme Court’s recent Confrontation Clause decisions have had a dramatic effect on domestic violence prosecution throughout the United States, sparking debate about possible solutions to an increasingly difficult trial process for prosecutors and the survivors they represent. In this Note, I revisit and reinterpret the suggestion by Professor Sherman J. Clark in his article, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause,1 that we should view the Confrontation Clause primarily as an obligation of the accuser rather than a right of the accused. Specifically, I reevaluate Clark’s proposition using a gendered lens, ultimately suggesting a novel solution to the problem …
Autopsy Reports And The Confrontation Clause: A Presumption Of Admissibility, Daniel J. Capra, Joseph Tartakovsky
Autopsy Reports And The Confrontation Clause: A Presumption Of Admissibility, Daniel J. Capra, Joseph Tartakovsky
Faculty Scholarship
Courts nationwide are divided over whether autopsy reports are “testimonial” under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. Resolving that split will affect medical examiners as dramatically as Miranda did police. This article applies the latest Supreme Court jurisprudence to the work of modern medical examiners in a comprehensive inquiry. It argues that autopsy reports should be presumed non-testimonial—a presumption overcome only by a showing that law enforcement involvement materially influenced the examiner’s autopsy report.
The Mold That Shapes Hearsay Law, Richard D. Friedman
The Mold That Shapes Hearsay Law, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In response to an article previously published in the Florida Law Review by Professor Ben Trachtenberg, I argue that the historical thesis of Crawford v. Washington is basically correct: The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment reflects a principle about how witnesses should give testimony, and it does not create any broader constraint on the use of hearsay. I argue that this is an appropriate limit on the Clause, and that in fact for the most part there is no good reason to exclude nontestimonial hearsay if live testimony by the declarant to the same proposition would be admissible. I …