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Full-Text Articles in Law
Book Review. Somin, Ilya, Democracy And Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter, Steve Sanders
Book Review. Somin, Ilya, Democracy And Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter, Steve Sanders
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Because I Am, Ann M. Sasala
Because I Am, Ann M. Sasala
SURGE
Why?
“Because I am a Republican!”
Why?
“Because I am a Democrat!”
Why?
“Because I am a Christian!”
Why?
In America, religion and politics are not merely taboo dinner topics; it is strongly advised that you don’t discuss either one in nearly all situations. [excerpt]
Private Enforcement Of Statutory And Administrative Law In The United States (And Other Common Law Countries), Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang, Herbert M. Kritzer
Private Enforcement Of Statutory And Administrative Law In The United States (And Other Common Law Countries), Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang, Herbert M. Kritzer
All Faculty Scholarship
Our aim in this paper, which was prepared for an international conference on comparative procedural law to be held in July 2011, is to advance understanding of private enforcement of statutory and administrative law in the United States, and, to the extent supported by the information that colleagues abroad have provided, of comparable phenomena in other common law countries. Seeking to raise questions that will be useful to those who are concerned with regulatory design, we briefly discuss aspects of American culture, history, and political institutions that reasonably can be thought to have contributed to the growth and subsequent development …
Healthy, Wealthy, And Wise: How Corporate Power Shaped The Affordable Care Act, Kevin Young, Michael Schwartz
Healthy, Wealthy, And Wise: How Corporate Power Shaped The Affordable Care Act, Kevin Young, Michael Schwartz
History Department Faculty Publication Series
No abstract provided.
Corporate Governance And Social Welfare In The Common Law World, David A. Skeel Jr.
Corporate Governance And Social Welfare In The Common Law World, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
The newest addition to the spate of recent theories of comparative corporate governance is Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: The Political Foundations of Shareholder Power, an important new book by Christopher Bruner. Focusing on the U.S., the U.K., Canada and Australia, Bruner argues that the robustness of the country’s social welfare system is the key determinant of the extent to which its corporate governance is shareholder-centered. This explains why corporate governance is so shareholder-oriented in the United Kingdom, which has universal healthcare and generous unemployment benefits, while shareholders’ powers are more attenuated in the United States, with its …
Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
How are we to understand the persistent gap between rhetoric and reality that characterizes so much of corporate governance politics? In this Article, we show that the rhetoric around a variety of high profile corporate governance controversies (including shareholder proposals asking boards to redeem poison pills, proxy access, majority voting in director elections, and shareholder proposals to remove supermajority voting requirements) cannot be justified by the material interests at stake. At the same time, shareholder activists are oddly reluctant to pursue issues that may have a more material impact, such as anti-pill charter provisions or mandatory bylaw amendments. We consider …
Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang
Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang
All Faculty Scholarship
The program of regulation through private litigation that Democratic Congresses purposefully created starting in the late 1960s soon met opposition emanating primarily from the Republican party. In the long campaign for retrenchment that began in the Reagan administration, consequential reform proved difficult and ultimately failed in Congress. Litigation reformers turned to the courts and, in marked contrast to their legislative failure, were well-rewarded, achieving growing rates of voting support from an increasingly conservative Supreme Court on issues curtailing private enforcement under individual statutes. We also demonstrate that the judiciary’s control of procedure has been central to the campaign to retrench …