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A Comparative View Of Standards Of Proof, Kevin M. Clermont, Emily Sherwin Dec 2014

A Comparative View Of Standards Of Proof, Kevin M. Clermont, Emily Sherwin

Kevin M. Clermont

In common-law systems, the standard of proof for ordinary civil cases requires the party who bears the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the facts alleged are true. In contrast, the prevailing standard of proof for civil cases in civil-law systems is indistinguishable from the standard for criminal cases: the judge must be firmly convinced that the facts alleged are true. This striking difference in common-law and civil-law procedures has received very little attention from either civilian or comparative scholars. The preponderance standard applied in common-law systems is openly probabilistic and produces, on average, …


Standards Of Proof In Japan And The United States, Kevin M. Clermont Dec 2014

Standards Of Proof In Japan And The United States, Kevin M. Clermont

Kevin M. Clermont

This article treats the striking divergence between Japanese and U.S. civil cases as to standards of proof. The civil-law Japan requires proof to a high probability similar to the criminal standard, while the common-law United States requires only that the burdened party prove the fact to be more likely than not. This divergence not only entails great practical consequences, but also suggests a basic difference in attitudes toward the process of trial. As to the historical causation of the difference in standards of proof, civil-law and common-law standards diverged in the late eighteenth century, probably because of one system’s French …


Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases For Standards Of Decision, Kevin M. Clermont Dec 2014

Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases For Standards Of Decision, Kevin M. Clermont

Kevin M. Clermont

So many procedural doctrines appear, after research and teaching, to trifurcate. An obvious example is that kind of standard of decision known as the standard of proof: what in theory might have been a continuum of standards divides in practice into the three distinct standards of preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Other examples suggest both that I am not imagining the prominence of three and that more than coincidence is at work. Part I of this essay describes the role of the number three in procedure, with particular regard to standards …