Law Commons^™

The Second Decentralisation Of Competition Law — A Must For An Orderly Administration Of Justice In The Eu, Emanuela Matei, Valentin Mircea

Emanuela A. Matei

The article relies upon the postulate that the European system of competition enforcement could benefit from a transplantation of a lot vaster American experiences in the field of private litigation.

The Lessons From Libor For Detection And Deterrence Of Cartel Wrongdoing, Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

In late June 2012, Barclays entered into a $453 million settlement with UK and U.S. regulators due to its manipulation of Libor between 2005 and 2009. Among the agencies that investigated Barclays is the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (as well as other antitrust authorities and regulatory agencies from around the world). Participation in a price fixing conduct, by its very nature, requires the involvement of more than one firm. We are cautious to draw overly broad conclusions until more facts come out in the public domain. What we note at this time, based on public information, is that the …

Welfare Standards In U.S. And E.U. Antitrust Enforcement, Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

The potential goals of antitrust are numerous. Goals matter to antitrust. We believe that it is total welfare rather than consumer welfare that should drive antitrust analysis. We use this Article as an opportunity to explore both a comparative analysis of welfare standards across E. U. and US. competition systems and the impact of welfare standards on global antitrust systemwide welfare.

In this Article, we analyze two types of situations in which there would be a different outcome based on the goal implemented. One scenario involves resale price maintenance (RPM). For RPM, we argue that even if there were a …

New Powers- New Vulnerabilities? A Critical Analysis Of Market Inquiries Performed By Competition Authorities, Tamar Indig, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

In the past two decades the number of jurisdictions which have empowered their Competition Authorities to engage in market inquiries (MIs) has grown substantially. Although jurisdictions differ in the scope and procedure adopted for such studies, they all share an important common trait: attempting to allocate the roots of limited competition in the studied market. Market studies differ from traditional competition law tools in their triggers, range, object, and the level of pro-activity of the Competition Authority. They are not triggered by a suspicion of anti-competitive conduct of specific firm(s), but rather allow the Authority to use a broad prism …