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An Instrumental Theory Of Market Power And Antitrust Policy, Jeffrey L. Harrison
An Instrumental Theory Of Market Power And Antitrust Policy, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Jeffrey L Harrison
Since Judge Hand's pivotal opinion in United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), the possession of monopoly power has been treated as presumptively legal. The focus of the antitrust laws since then has been on defining when that power is abused. This approach to market power cannot be squared with the prevailing view that antitrust law is grounded in economic theory. To understand why, one must see market power for what it is: the ability of a firm to raise prices above competitive levels and to profitably keep them there. Seen in this light, market power is indistinguishable from …
The Messenger Model: Don't Ask, Don't Tell?, Jeffrey L. Harrison
The Messenger Model: Don't Ask, Don't Tell?, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Jeffrey L Harrison
This article makes the case that the messenger model is either tacitly or inadvertently a "don't ask, don't tell" policy when it comes to competitor cooperation. In addition, this article presents an economic framework that explains how such a policy may benefit health care consumers. Finally, it is suggested that the "don't ask, don't tell" policy has created an area of per se legality that precludes an examination designed to distinguish consumer-benefiting practices from those that provide no benefit.
Reexamining The Role Of Illinois Brick In Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, Jeffrey Harrison
Reexamining The Role Of Illinois Brick In Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, Jeffrey Harrison
Jeffrey L Harrison
This Article argues that it is time for either the Court or Congress to reexamine Illinois Brick for the purpose of reconciling it with more general principles of antitrust standing. The overall goals of such an endeavor would be to ensure consistent treatment of similarly situated potential plaintiffs and to rationalize private antitrust enforcement.