Law Commons^™

Judge Posner, Judge Wilkinson, And Judicial Critique Of Constitutional Theory, Marc O. Degirolami, Kevin C. Walsh

Notre Dame Law Review

Judge Richard Posner’s well-known view is that constitutional theory is useless. And Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III has lambasted constitutional theory for the way in which its “cosmic” aspirations threaten democratic self-governance. Many other judges hold similar views. And yet both Posner and Wilkinson—in the popular press, in law review articles, and in books—have advocated what appear to be their own theories of how to judge in constitutional cases. Judicial pragmatism for Posner and judicial restraint for Wilkinson seem to be substitutes for originalism, living constitutionalism, political process theory, and so on. But both Posner and Wilkinson also deny that …

Against Coherence In Statutory Interpretation, John David Ohlendorf

Notre Dame Law Review

A long tradition in legal theory views the judicial role as centrally including the duty to make the entire body of law “speak with one voice.” This coherence ideal permeates much of the law of statutory interpretation, but one body of doctrine that it has particularly influenced is the set of standards that federal courts use to determine when a newly enacted statute overrides preexisting legal rules. Determining whether Congress implicitly intends to preempt state law, repeal previous legislation, or displace federal common law is an increasingly important part of the “ordinary diet of the law.” And although, this Article …

Seeking Common Ground In The Abortion Regulation Debate, Jessica Arden Ettinger

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note argues that requiring abortion clinics to adhere to the same standards as ambulatory surgical centers is unconstitutional, at least in the context of those clinics that provide only medication abortion, because it unduly burdens a woman’s right to choose whether to obtain an abortion. Although there may be a rational basis to require abortion clinics offering surgical abortion procedures to meet surgical facility standards, no such basis attends the imposition of those requirements on clinics that provide nonsurgical services. Given the number of clinics that continue to close in the face of this new regulatory legislation—which significantly reduces …

Respecting Legislators And Rejecting Baselines: Rebalancing Casey, Paul C. Quast

Notre Dame Law Review

Part I of this Note describes the background cases leading to the Supreme Court’s decision in Casey and the resulting undue burden standard. This Part also explains the limited circumstances in which the undue burden standard gives more definitive guidelines for judicial decisionmaking. Part II works through several federal district and appellate court cases to identify some of the underlying baseline presumptions and normative value judgments influencing judicial decisions in this area of the law. These baselines are often dispositive in determining whether a restriction on abortion is due or undue, cutting against the goodwill attempts by legislatures to make …

The Rule Of Law As A Law Of Law, Steven G. Calabresi, Gary Lawson

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia is famous for his strong rule orientation, best articulated in his 1989 article, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules. In this Article, we explore the extent to which that rule orientation in the context of constitutional interpretation is consistent with the Constitution’s original meaning. We conclude that it is far less consistent with the Constitution than is generally recognized. The use of standards rather than rules is prescribed not only by a few provisions in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment but also by key aspects of the 1788 constitutional text. The executive …

Parting The Chevron Sea: An Argument For Chevron's Greater Applicability To Cabinet Than Independent Agencies, Andrew T. Bond

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note argues that cabinet agencies are better suited to receive Chevron deference than independent agencies because voters should desire such policy decisions to be made by those closest to electoral accountability, rather than unelected Article III judges with life-tenure. In other words, the judiciary should accept the countermajoritarian difficulty as fundamentally true and review cabinet agency decisions in light of Chevron deference. Part I examines the revolutionary decision of Chevron and its aftermath. Central to Part I is an inquiry into whether Chevron should be applied on a case-by-case or across-the-board basis, and whether Chevron has usurped the judiciary’s …

Procedural Rights At Sentencing, Carissa Byrne Hessick, F. Andrew Hessick

Notre Dame Law Review

In determining which constitutional procedural rights apply at sentencing, courts have distinguished between mandatory and discretionary sentencing systems. For mandatory systems—systems that limit sentencing factors and specify particular punishments based on particular facts—defendants enjoy important rights including the right to a jury, the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to notice of potential sentencing aggravators, and the right not to be sentenced based on ex post facto laws. By contrast, for discretionary systems—systems that leave the determination of sentencing factors and how much punishment to impose based on particular facts to the judge’s discretion—defendants do not enjoy …

Due Process Disaggregation, Jason Parkin

Notre Dame Law Review

One-size-fits-all procedural safeguards are becoming increasingly suspect under the Due Process Clause. Although the precise requirements of due process vary from context to context, the Supreme Court has held that, within any particular context, the Due Process Clause merely requires one-size-fits-all procedures that are designed according to the needs of the average or typical person using the procedures. As the Court explained when announcing the modern approach to procedural due process in Mathews v. Eldridge, the due process calculus must be focused on “the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.” A more granular approach to due process rules, the …

A House Divided: When State And Lower Federal Courts Disagree On Federal Constitutional Rights, Wayne A. Logan

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article provides the first in-depth examination of state-federal concurrent constitutional authority and does so by focusing on a context in which its consequences are most problematic: within individual states. While a handful of articles over the years have examined state court power vis-a-vis federal constitutional questions more generally, no systematic effort has been undertaken to examine intrastate, state-federal conflict on federal constitutional questions. This Article redresses this deficit, using as its doctrinal locus federal constitutional criminal procedure, with its unique impact on government power and individual liberty and privacy.

Our Anchor For 225 Years And Counting: The Enduring Significance Of The Precise Text Of The Constitution, Brett M. Kavanaugh

Notre Dame Law Review

When one comes to Notre Dame, whether for a law review symposium or for a football game or for both, your mind is drawn to fundamentals and history. This is a place that oozes history, and in that vein, I want to take a step back and focus on the text of our Constitution. I want to focus on that text in two dimensions. First, I want to explain how the text of the Constitution creates a structure—a separation of powers—that protects liberty. And in particular, I want to emphasize how that structure tilts toward liberty, how it creates legislative …

The Paths To Griswold, Ryan C. Williams

Notre Dame Law Review

The goal of this Article is to develop a fuller picture of Griswold by situating the case within a series of doctrinal and jurisprudential debates and developments that were prominent at the time of the Court's decision but that have faded in significance over time. This alternative picture of Griswold shifts the focus away from viewing the case as one about birth control, sexual privacy, and women's autonomy and toward viewing the decision as one about interpretive method, constitutional theory, and the Supreme Court's role within the national political system. This alternative perspective on Griswold has by no means gone …

The Decline Of Legal Classicism And The Evolution Of New Deal Constitutionalism, Samuel R. Olken

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article explores how some of the salient characteristics of classical legal thought influenced the evolution of the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence during the New Deal era. It focuses upon the Court’s jurisprudence of economic liberty in the context of substantive due process. Though a similar pattern of evolution occurred in the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, examination of this area of constitutional development is beyond the scope of this Article. Part I provides an overview of legal classicism and its influence upon late nineteenth and early twentieth-century constitutional law. The next Part examines the paradox of legal classicism and its …

The Least Activist Supreme Court In History? The Roberts Court And The Exercise Of Judicial Review, Keith E. Whittington

Notre Dame Law Review

Not too many years ago, scholars could reasonably speak of the U.S. Supreme Court as being among the most activist in American history. Both empirical and normative scholarship was driven by the sense of a Court that was aggressive in the assertion of its own supremacy and active in the exercise of the power of judicial review. The Court under Chief Justice John Roberts cannot be viewed in the same way. The Roberts Court has issued its share of controversial constitutional decisions, but a rarely observed but important feature of the Roberts Court is its unusual restraint in the exercise …

From Progressivism To Modern Liberalism: Louis D. Brandeis As A Transitional Figure In Constitutional Law, David E. Bernstein

Notre Dame Law Review

Part I of this Article discusses Brandeis’s many deviations from civil libertarianism as it came to be understood in the post–New Deal period. These deviations include his acquiescence to coercive eugenics, his general lack of interest in African American rights, his support for protective labor legislation for women and concomitant disregard for women’s legal equality, his toleration of government abuses attendant to Prohibition enforcement, and his desire to repeal the Fourteenth Amendment. Part II shows that despite these deviations, Brandeis had a significantly stronger record on civil liberties as a Supreme Court Justice than one would expect from someone of …

The Former Clerks Who Nearly Killed Judicial Restraint, Brad Snyder

Notre Dame Law Review

This symposium piece explores the rise and fall of legal process theory as well as the scholarship of former Warren Court and early Burger Court clerks who nearly killed it. It also suggests that there could be a revival of a process-based judicial restraint based on a new generation of late Burger Court/early Rehnquist Court clerks-turned-academics who came of age during the mid-1980s. These law clerks rejected judicial supremacy and adopted popular constitutionalism and other democratic approaches to constitutional interpretation. Popular constitutionalism is inspired by the same faith in the democratic political process as the judicial restraint advocated by James …

Suing Foreign Officials In U.S. Courts: Upholding Separation Of Powers By Limiting Judicial Abrogation Of Immunity, Sarah P. Hogarth

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note will propose the constitutional framework courts should implement when suits are brought against individual foreign officials post-Samantar, specifically arguing that the constitutional allocation of foreign affairs powers requires U.S. courts to broadly insulate foreign officials from suit absent authorization from a political branch. Part I examines the law of nations and its incorporation into the specific foreign relations powers delegated by the Constitution to the political branches, highlighting that the power to affect relations with foreign sovereigns resides in the political branches. Part II explains the Supreme Court’s development of foreign sovereign immunity and the act of state …

The Cost Of Judicial Error: Stare Decisis And The Role Of Normative Theory, Kurt T. Lash

Notre Dame Law Review

The Supreme Court of the United States has long embraced the doctrine of stare decisis as an appropriate consideration any time the Court considers overruling past precedent. However, because the Court's actual application of the doctrine has been both sporadic and seemingly inconsistent, some scholars (and Justices) have accused the Court of methodological hypocrisy and bad faith. Much of this criticism assumes that, if members of the Supreme Court find certain rule of law values dispositive in one case, they should find those same considerations dispositive in all cases. Failure to do so suggests either incompetence or insincerity. This Article …

Intragenerational Constitutional Overruling, L.A. Powe Jr.

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article seeks to shed some light on a comparatively rare, but important issue in constitutional jurisprudence: Under what circumstances does the Supreme Court formally overrule one of its own significant constitutional precedents within the same judicial generation as the announcement of the precedent? This phenomenon is one part of the broader role of precedent and stare decisis in fashioning and maintaining constitutional law—albeit in part because of the modifier “significant”—there are a limited number of such cases (some three dozen where the overruled case was decided after the introduction of President Franklin Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan, roughly once every other …

The Jurisprudence Of The Hughes Court: The Recent Literature, Barry Cushman

Notre Dame Law Review

The balance of this Article is devoted, after a fashion, to an exploration of the extent to which the recent literature on the Hughes Court seeks to incorporate the internal point of view. In Part I, I seek to identify the historiographical premises undergirding each author’s treatment of the subject. In Part II, I explore how those historiographical premises are reflected in each author’s treatment of the substantive development of constitutional doctrine during the period. In Part III, I examine the ways in which those historiographical premises inform each author’s analysis of the causal forces driving that doctrinal development. Part …

The "Constitution In Exile" As A Problem For Legal Theory, Stephen E. Sachs

Notre Dame Law Review

How does one defend a constitutional theory that’s out of the mainstream? Critics of originalism, for example, have described it as a nefarious “Constitution in Exile,” a plot to impose abandoned rules on the unsuspecting public. This framing is largely mythical, but it raises a serious objection. If a theory asks us to change our legal practices, leaving important questions to academics or historians, how can it be a theory of our law? If law is a matter of social convention, how can there be conventions that hardly anybody knows about? How is a constitution in exile even possible?

This …

Online Terms Of Service: A Shield For First Amendment Scrutiny Of Government Action, Jacquelyn E. Fradette

Notre Dame Law Review

Part I of this Note will canvas popular opinions and perceptions about First Amendment rights on the Internet using examples of public outcry over recent instances of speech limitation. It will also discuss the state action doctrine generally and how the presence of this doctrine most likely renders certain popular public constitutional intuitions about the First Amendment erroneous.

Part II will provide an overview of how courts have taken an expansive and protective view of private ordering between online parties. It will discuss how courts have developed a robust freedom to contract jurisprudence in the Internet context. Because courts essentially …

The Unitary Executive And The Plural Judiciary: On The Potential Virtues Of Decentralized Judicial Power, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.

Notre Dame Law Review

The federal judiciary features a highly decentralized system of courts. The Supreme Court of the United States reviews only a few dozen cases each year. Meanwhile, regional U.S. courts of appeals operate independently of each other; district courts further divide and separate the exercise of federal judicial power. The role of the state courts in enforcing federal law further subdivides responsibility for the adjudication of federal law claims. Indeed, the Office of Chief Justice itself incorporates and reflects this vesting of the judicial power of the United States exclusively in collegial institutions—literally in a multiplicity of hands—effectively precluding its unilateral …

Tyranny By Proxy: State Action And The Private Use Of Deadly Force, John L. Watts

Notre Dame Law Review

The Article begins in Part I with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s opinion and holding in Tennessee v. Garner. It then describes the continuing application of the fleeing felon rule to private actors despite the Court’s holding in Garner.

Part II describes the state action doctrine, examines its history, and clarifies its purpose. It explains why the Court’s early focus on enhancing individual autonomy and federalism as the purpose of the state action doctrine was only partially correct. In fact, the doctrine enhances many of the familiar constitutional strategies for the prevention of tyranny including: separation of powers, democratic …

Weathering Wal-Mart, Joseph A. Seiner

Notre Dame Law Review

In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2531 (2011), the Supreme Court held that a proposed class of over a million women that had alleged pay and promotion discrimination against the nation’s largest retailer could not be certified. According to the Court, the plaintiffs had failed to establish a common thread in the case sufficient to tie their claims together. The academic response to Wal-Mart was immediate and harsh: the decision will serve as the death knell for mass employment litigation, undermining the workplace protections provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). …