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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing The Agency Paradigm To Reflect How And Why A Majority Of Americans Invest In The Market, Anne Tucker Oct 2014

The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing The Agency Paradigm To Reflect How And Why A Majority Of Americans Invest In The Market, Anne Tucker

Anne Tucker

This Article examines corporate law from the perspective of personal investment and discusses the economic realities of modern investments in order to understand the role of shareholders within the agency paradigm. Corporate law, its scholars, and suggested reforms traditionally focus on the internal organization of the corporation. For example, agency principles inform corporate law by acknowledging a potential conflict of interest between the managers and shareholders of a corporation. Reforms such as increased shareholder voting rights and proxy access, which seek to give shareholders a more direct means to make their interests known to managers, illustrate corporate law’s focus on …


Limits Of Disclosure, Steven M. Davidoff, Claire A. Hill Jul 2014

Limits Of Disclosure, Steven M. Davidoff, Claire A. Hill

Steven Davidoff Solomon

One big focus of attention, criticism, and proposals for reform in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has been securities disclosure. Many commentators have emphasized the complexity of the securities being sold, arguing that no one could understand the disclosure. Some observers have noted that disclosures were sometimes false or incomplete. What follows these issues, to some commentators, is that, whatever other lessons we may learn from the crisis, we need to improve disclosure. How should it be improved? Commentators often lament the frailties of human understanding, notably including those of everyday retail investors—people who do not understand or …


Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle And Other Transactional Curiosities, Jonathan Barnett May 2014

Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle And Other Transactional Curiosities, Jonathan Barnett

Jonathan M Barnett

The law-and-economics literature typically depicts certification intermediaries, such as law firms, auditors, underwriters, investment banks and rating agencies, as socially valuable market participants who ameliorate informational asymmetries that would otherwise distort pricing or transaction structures. This standard view is incomplete. Using the example of the “closing opinion”, a third-party legal opinion commonly delivered at the consummation of a variety of business transactions, I argue that intermediaries, even when operating under substantially competitive conditions and in sophisticated market settings, may supply widely consumed certification products that fail to mitigate informational asymmetries while increasing transaction costs. Based on the highly qualified language …


Interfaces Between Csr, Corporate Law And The Problem Of Social Costs, Benedict Sheehy Feb 2014

Interfaces Between Csr, Corporate Law And The Problem Of Social Costs, Benedict Sheehy

Benedict Sheehy

Abstract: CSR is an increasingly seen as the preferred approach to addressing the social impacts of industrial production. These social impacts, however, come in the first instance from production and not the corporation. The legal corporation facilitates social costs secondarily. Much of the thinking about CSR fails to adequately take account of the systemic nature of social costs, the legal nature of the corporation and social costs and the so the systemic failure of law to deal with them. This article addresses the interface between the three concepts and related issues of CSR, social costs and corporate law.


Crossing The Fault Line In Corporate Criminal Law, Amy Sepinwall Dec 2013

Crossing The Fault Line In Corporate Criminal Law, Amy Sepinwall

Amy J. Sepinwall

Why is it that so few bankers have been prosecuted and punished in the wake of the financial meltdown? Pundits are quick to point to inadequate funding for addressing financial crime or, more cynically, the revolving door between government regulatory agencies and Wall Street. But the ultimate answer may be at once more banal and more dispiriting, lying as it does at the very foundations of our criminal law.

The conception of responsibility underpinning much of our criminal law contemplates the individual in isolation from others. As a result, our criminal law has tremendous difficulty tracking culpability in organizational contexts. …