Law Commons^™

Solving The Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Manadatory Summary Judgment, David Rosenberg, Randy J. Kozel

Randy J Kozel

The nuisance-value settlement problem arises whenever a litigant can profitably initiate a meritless claim or defense and offer to settle it for less than it would cost the opposing litigant to have a court dismiss the claim or defense on a standard motion for merits review like summary judgment. The opposing litigant confronted with such a nuisance-value claim or defense rationally would agree to settle for any amount up to the cost of litigating to have it dismissed. These settlement payoffs skew litigation outcomes away from socially appropriate levels, undermining the deterrence and compensation objectives of civil liability. Yet current …

Partial Final Judgment And Decree Of The Water Rights Of The Navajo Nation, 11th Judicial District Court, San Juan County, New Mexico

Native American Water Rights Settlement Project

Partial Final Decree of the Water Rights of the Navajo Nation: Parties: Navajo Nation, NM, New Mexico, USA, United States.

Contents:

1. Jurisdiction, p.2; 2. Reserved Rights to the Use of Water p.2; 3. Reserved Rights for Specified Surface Water Diversions p.2, including a) Navajo Indian Irrigation Project, p.3, b) Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project, p.3; c) Animas-La Plata Project, p.4; d) Municipal and Domestic Uses, p.4; e) Hogback-Cudei Irrigation Project, p.4; f) Fruitland-Cambridge Irrigation Project p.5; 4. Supplemental Carriage Water, p.6; 5. Conditions, p.7; 6. Diversions for Navajo-Gallup Project Uses in Arizona, p.17; 7. Groundwater Rights, p.18; 8. Hydrographic Survey …

Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”

This article is an effort to help courts and …

Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights Settlement Agreement, Taos Pueblo, New Mexico, United States, Taos Valley Acequia Assn & Its 54 Member Acequias, Town Of Taos, El Prado Water & Sanitation District, 12 Taos Area Mutual Domestic Water Consumers’ Assns.

Native American Water Rights Settlement Project

Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights Settlement. Abeyta Water Rights Adjudication Settlement Agreement among the US, Taos Pueblo, NM, Taos Valley Acequia Assn & it s 55 Member Acequias, Town of Taos, El Prado Water & Sanitation District & 12 Taos Area Mutual Domestic Water Consumers’ Assns. (Dec. 12, 2012) (final signatures Dec. 21, 2012) The Settlement Agreement goals are to resolve the water right claims of the Taos Pueblo; protect the non-Pueblos irrigation uses; restore and protect Buffalo Pasture; and foster cooperation among Taos Valley residents regarding the allocation and use of water resources. The agreement addresses ground and surface …

A Return To First Principles: Rethinking Alj Compromises, Jeffrey A. Wertkin

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Some Important Causes For Settlement In American Civil Litigation, Felipe Forte Cobo

LLM Theses and Essays

This paper focuses on pure economic disputes such as contract, real property and tort conflicts, in which the economic efficiency model is very accepted. In this limited scenario, the consensual resolution of disputes is always more efficient than decisions made by a third-party decision-maker, whether from a post-trial or pre-trial perspective.

Considering that lower transaction costs drive parties towards settlement, part II of this essay provides an overview of the American costs of legal disputes, framing several issues that might be determinative to settlements. Part III explores how two specific American procedural institutes – discovery and civil jury trial – …

California Code Of Civil Procedure Sections 877, 877.5 And 877.6: The Settlement Game In The Ballpark That Tech-Bilt, Emery J. Mishky, Robert Tessier, Patrick G. Vastano

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Federal Trade Commission V. Actavis, Inc. And Reverse-Payment Or Pay-For-Delay Settlements, Jacob S. Sherkow

Articles & Chapters

An imminent US Supreme Court ruling should resolve one of the thorniest legal issues facing pharmaceutical companies today.

Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French

Journal Articles

In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …

The Litigation Privilege In Texas., Sam Johnson

St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics

Certain Texas cases have arisen where one party in litigation sues the attorney representing an opposing party. In response to such cases, Texas courts promulgated a judicial doctrine generally referred to as the litigation privilege or qualified immunity in order to protect litigants’ right to zealous representation from their attorney. The general rule is that one party to a lawsuit cannot sue the other party’s attorney. However, exceptions to this doctrine exist. This article explores the contours of the litigation privilege in Texas by analyzing the primary Texas cases where one party’s claim against the opposing party’s attorney was dismissed …

Litigating Toward Settlement, Christina L. Boyd, David A. Hoffman

All Faculty Scholarship

Civil litigation typically ends when the parties compromise. While existing theories of settlement primarily focus on information exchange, we instead examine how motion practice, especially non-discovery motions, can substantially shape parties’ knowledge about their cases and thereby influence the timing of settlement. Using docket-level federal district court data, we find a number of strong effects regarding how motions can influence this process, including that the filing of a motion significantly speeds case settlement, that granted motions are more immediately critical to settlement timing than motions denied, and that plaintiff victories have a stronger effect than defendant victories. These results provide …

Trial By Preview, Bert I. Huang

Faculty Scholarship

It has been an obsession of modern civil procedure to design ways to reveal more before trial about what will happen during trial. Litigants today, as a matter of course, are made to preview the evidence they will use. This practice is celebrated because standard theory says it should induce the parties to settle; why incur the expenses of trial, if everyone knows what will happen? Rarely noted, however, is one complication: The impact of previewing the evidence is intertwined with how well the parties know their future audience-that is, the judge or the jury who will be the finder …

The Patent Litigation Explosion, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

This Article provides the first look at patent litigation hazards for public firms during the 1980s and 1990s. Litigation is more likely when prospective plaintiffs acquire more patents, when firms are larger and technologically close and when prospective defendants spend more on research and development ("R&D"). The latter suggests inadvertent infringement may be more important than piracy. Public firms face dramatically increased hazards of litigation as plaintiffs and even more rapidly increasing hazards as defendants, especially for small public firms. The increase cannot be explained by patenting rates, R&D, firm value or industry composition. Legal changes are the most likely …

Future Conduct And The Limits Of Class-Action Settlements, James Grimmelmann

James Grimmelmann

This Article identifies a new and previously unrecognized trend in class-action settlements: releases for the defendant’s future conduct. Such releases, which hold the defendant harmless for wrongs it will commit in the future, are unusually dangerous to class members and to the public. Even more than the “future claims” familiar to class-action scholars, future-conduct releases pose severe informational problems for class members and for courts. Worse, they create moral hazard for the defendant, give it concentrated power, and thrust courts into a prospective planning role they are ill-equipped to handle.

Courts should guard against the dangers of future-conduct releases with …

Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French

Christopher C. French

In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …