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Full-Text Articles in Law
Delegating Supremacy?, David S. Rubenstein
Delegating Supremacy?, David S. Rubenstein
Vanderbilt Law Review
The Supreme Court has long held that federal agencies may preempt state law in much the same way as Congress: either by issuing binding administrative rules that conflict with state law or by asserting exclusive federal control over a regulatory domain. Under this sweeping conception of the Supremacy Clause, agencies wield an extraordinary power in our federalist system. Specifically, agencies may displace the laws of all fifty states without the political and procedural safeguards inhering in the legislative process. The administrative-preemption power rests on the undertheorized doctrinal assumption that Congress may, in effect, "delegate supremacy" to agencies.
This Article challenges …
Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalsim As A Constraint On The Voting Rights Act, Franita Tolson
Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalsim As A Constraint On The Voting Rights Act, Franita Tolson
Vanderbilt Law Review
The legal landscape has changed significantly since Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA" or "the Act"). Even though Congress amended the Act in 2006, these amendments have done little to address the new obstacles faced by minority communities who seek to expand their electoral opportunities.' Some of these obstacles are political, as partisan forces have often manipulated the Act for electoral gain, but the greatest obstructions have been judicial. The Supreme Court has strongly implied that Congress might violate principles of federalism by requiring states to preclear their redistricting plans with the Department of Justice; has held …