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Full-Text Articles in Law

Dubious Delegation: Article Iii Limits On Mental Health Treatment Decisions, Adam Teitelbaum Jun 2012

Dubious Delegation: Article Iii Limits On Mental Health Treatment Decisions, Adam Teitelbaum

Michigan Law Review

A common condition of supervised release requires a defendant, post-incarceration, to participate in a mental health treatment program. Federal district courts often order probation officers to make certain decisions ancillary to these programs. However Article III delegation doctrine places limits on such actions. This Note addresses the constitutionality of delegating the "treatment program" decision, in which a probation officer decides which type of treatment the defendant must undergo; the choice is often between inpatient treatment and other less restrictive alternatives. The resolution of this issue ultimately depends on whether this decision constitutes a "judicial act." Finding support in lower court …


Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under Article Iii Standing Doctrine, Heather Elliott Apr 2012

Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under Article Iii Standing Doctrine, Heather Elliott

Indiana Law Journal

The Supreme Court’s Article III standing doctrine has plagued liberal groups for nearly forty years. Recently, however, the doctrine has blocked a number of conservative lawsuits opposing gay marriage, the 2010 health care law, and the expansion of federal funding for stem cell research.

What can we learn from these cases? Because contemporary criticisms of standing doctrine have usually come from the left and defenses from the right, it is commonplace to associate arguments for broad standing with left-wing political agendas.

But, as some scholars have shown, a version of narrow standing helped liberals protect New Deal legislation in the …


Judge Posner’S 'Practical' Theory Of Standing: Closer To Justice Breyer’S Approach To Standing Than Justice Scalia’S, Bradford Mank Jan 2012

Judge Posner’S 'Practical' Theory Of Standing: Closer To Justice Breyer’S Approach To Standing Than Justice Scalia’S, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

In American Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit questioned three different grounds articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court for the constitutional doctrine of standing in federal courts and instead argued that the “solidest grounds” for the doctrine of standing are “practical.” In part because of his self-described “pragmatic” approach to legal reasoning, Judge Posner’s maverick views may have led Republican presidents to pass him over for being nominated to the Supreme Court in favor of less brilliant but more predictable conservative judges. Judge Posner’s pragmatic or practical approach to standing …


The Law Of Nations As Constitutional Law, Anthony J. Bellia, Bradford R. Clark Jan 2012

The Law Of Nations As Constitutional Law, Anthony J. Bellia, Bradford R. Clark

Journal Articles

Courts and scholars continue to debate the status of customary international law in U.S. courts, but have paid insufficient attention to the role that such law plays in interpreting and upholding several specific provisions of the Constitution. The modern position argues that courts should treat customary international law as federal common law. The revisionist position contends that customary international law applies only to the extent that positive federal or state law has adopted it. Neither approach adequately takes account of the Constitution’s allocation of powers to the federal political branches in Articles I and II or the effect of these …


Advisory Adjudication, Girardeau A. Spann Jan 2012

Advisory Adjudication, Girardeau A. Spann

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Supreme Court decision in Camreta v. Greene is revealing. The Court first issues an opinion authorizing appeals by prevailing parties in qualified immunity cases, even though doing so entails the issuance of an advisory opinion that is not necessary to resolution of the dispute between the parties. And the Court then declines to reach the merits of the underlying constitutional claim in the case, because doing so would entail the issuance of an advisory opinion that was not necessary to the resolution of the dispute between the parties. The Court's decision, therefore, has the paradoxical effect of both honoring …