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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Tying Arrangements And Lawful Alternatives: Transaction Costs Considerations, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Tying Arrangements And Lawful Alternatives: Transaction Costs Considerations, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Tying arrangements often increase welfare by promoting product quality and protecting the supplier's goodwill in the tying product. When the tying product works effectively only with ancillary materials or accessories or services of a particular kind or quality, its supplier can assure the requisite quality of the ancillary product only by supplying that product itself. The cost savings defense and the defenses of quality control or good will are the most widely recognized and accepted tying defenses.
One characteristic of manufactured products is differentiation among the offerings of various brands. This in turn produces a need for more specialized provision …
Tying Noncompetitive Goods, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Tying Noncompetitive Goods, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Many of the classic tying cases involved tied products that were common staples such as button fasteners, canned ink, dry ice, or salt. These products were sold in competitive markets, presumably at prices very close to cost. For most of them the most likely explanations for the tie were quality control or price discrimination, both with competitively benign results in the great majority of situations. When the tied good is sold in a noncompetitive market, however, an additional consumer welfare enhancing result is likely to obtain – namely, the elimination of double marginalization, which occurs when separate sellers of complementary …
Appropriate Liability Rules For Tying And Bundled Discounting: A Response To Professor Elhauge, Thomas A. Lambert
Appropriate Liability Rules For Tying And Bundled Discounting: A Response To Professor Elhauge, Thomas A. Lambert
Thomas A. Lambert
Professor Einer Elhauge’s highly acclaimed article, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397 (Dec. 2009), contests two propositions on which efficiency-minded antitrust scholars have largely agreed: (1) that there should be no tying liability absent substantial tied market foreclosure (a position contrary to the legal status quo), and (2) that courts should recognize a safe harbor for any bundled discount that results in above-cost pricing that could be matched by an equally efficient, single-product rival. Elhauge maintains that tie-ins that do not cause substantial tied market foreclosure may nonetheless occasion …
Tying And The Rule Of Reason: Understanding Leverage, Foreclosure, And Price Discrimination, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Tying And The Rule Of Reason: Understanding Leverage, Foreclosure, And Price Discrimination, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Many tying arrangements are used by firms that do not have substantial market power in either of the two markets linked together by the tie. Their function must be something other than the enlargement or perpetuation of power. A few ties do involve fairly explicit exercises of market power, but they need not be used for a different purpose than the ties imposed by more competitive firms. This paper considers firms’ use of ties to exploit whatever power they already have over the tying product. The "leverage" theory sees ties as exploiting customers as a group via higher prices, whether …
Is It Time To Revisit Trademark Misuse?, Scott H. Brown
Is It Time To Revisit Trademark Misuse?, Scott H. Brown
Scott H Brown
In the recent cases of Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, L.P. v. Von Drehle Corporation and Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, L.P. v. Myers Supply, Inc. , Georgia-Pacific tried to use its trademarks to establish a tying relationship between its paper towels and its paper towel dispensers. These cases will be reviewed by, first, posing a hypothetical situation, and then giving the reader a review of trademark basics, the doctrine of contributory trademark infringement, antitrust considerations, and IP misuse. The article then offers a revised trademark misuse test, and relooks at the Georgia-Pacific cases using this revised trademark misuse test.
Appropriate Liability Rules For Tying And Bundled Discounting, Thom Lambert
Appropriate Liability Rules For Tying And Bundled Discounting, Thom Lambert
Faculty Publications
This article asserts a comprehensive response to Elhauge’s provocative arguments. With respect to tying, the article shows that governing Supreme Court precedent does not deem the non-foreclosure “power” effects of the practice to be anticompetitive and that those effects are unlikely to reduce social welfare in the long run, especially after accounting for dynamic efficiencies. With respect to bundled discounting, the article shows that Elhauge’s proposed liability rule is both inapposite to consumer harm and inadministrable and that both “linked” market foreclosure and a form of below-cost pricing are necessary for anticompetitive harm and should therefore be prerequisites to antitrust …
Introduction To Creation Without Restraint: Promoting Liberty And Rivalry In Innovation, Christina Bohannan, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Introduction To Creation Without Restraint: Promoting Liberty And Rivalry In Innovation, Christina Bohannan, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This document contains the table of contents, introduction, and a brief description of Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, Creation without Restraint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in Innovation (Oxford 2011).
Promoting rivalry in innovation requires a fusion of legal policies drawn from patent, copyright, and antitrust law, as well as economics and other disciplines. Creation Without Restraint looks first at the relationship between markets and innovation, noting that innovation occurs most in moderately competitive markets and that small actors are more likely to be truly creative innovators. Then we examine the problem of connected and complementary relationships, a dominant feature of …