Law Commons^™

Addressing Gaps In The Dodd-Frank Act: Directors' Risk Management Oversight Obligations, Kristin N. Johnson

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In the years leading to the recent financial crisis, finance theorists introduced innovative methods, including quantitative financial models and derivative instruments, to measure and mitigate risk exposure. During the financial crisis, financial institutions facing insolvency revealed pervasive misunderstandings, misapplications, and mistaken assumptions regarding these complex risk management methods. As losses in financial markets escalated and caused liquidity and solvency crises, commentators sharply criticized directors and executives at large financial institutions for their risk management decisions. By adopting the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress directly and indirectly addresses certain risk management oversight concerns at large, complex financial …

Slides: Risk Management Strategies Of The Upper Basin: Addressing Potential Shortages, Eric Kuhn

Navigating the Future of the Colorado River (Martz Summer Conference, June 8-10)

Presenter: Eric Kuhn, Colorado River Water Conservation District

15 slides

In Making Disaster Plans, We Have To Imagine The Worst Case, Robert R.M. Verchick

Robert R.M. Verchick

No abstract provided.

From Control To Communication: Science, Philosophy, And World Trade Law, Sungjoon Cho

Cornell International Law Journal

Recently, science has become increasingly salient in various fields of international law. In particular, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement stipulates that a regulating state must provide scientific justification for its food safety measures. Paradoxically, however, this ostensibly neutral reference to science often complicates treaty interpretation. It tends to take treaty interpretation beyond the conventional methodology provided by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is primarily concerned with clarifying and articulating the text of treaties. The two decades old transatlantic trade dispute over the safety of hormone-treated beef is a case in point. …

Finding Shelter In A Time Of Crisis: A Process-Oriented Approach To Risk Management, Kristin Johnson

Kristin N Johnson

Success in financial markets rests on the effectiveness of a business’s risk management strategy: manage risks well and profits follow; fail to manage risks and a crisis ensues. It has long been evident that inadequate enterprise risk management policies, or internal risk-reducing strategies, create perilous consequences for a business. The recent financial crisis illustrates that the often disparate regulatory guidance and multiplicity of regulators who influence enterprise risk management policies were ill-suited to address conflicts and weaknesses in risk management accountability and enforcement mechanisms. During the crisis, a chorus of commentators demanded a federal solution to address the devastating economic …

Oversight Liability For Risk Management Failures At Financial Firms, Robert T. Miller

Robert T Miller

Many people believe that excessive risk-taking at large financial firms was an important cause of the financial crisis in 2007-2008 and thus that preventing another crisis requires improving risk-management systems at such institutions. One way to do this would be to use board oversight liability to hold directors personally liable for failing properly to monitor the risks that their firms are running. The purpose of this Article is to determine what role director oversight liability can efficiently play in improving risk-management practices at large financial firms.

A key contention of the Article is that previous treatments of this problem have …

Big Law And Risk Management: Case Studies Of Litigation, Deals, And Diversity, Anthony V. Alfieri

Articles

No abstract provided.

Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards An Analytical Framework, Steven L. Schwarcz, Iman Anabtawi

Faculty Scholarship

The global financial crisis demonstrated the inability and unwillingness of financial market participants to safeguard the stability of the financial system. It also highlighted the enormous direct and indirect costs of addressing systemic crises after they have occurred, as opposed to attempting to prevent them from arising. Governments and international organizations are responding with measures intended to make the financial system more resilient to economic shocks, many of which will be implemented by regulatory bodies over time. These measures suffer, however, from the lack of a theoretical account of how systemic risk propagates within the financial system and why regulatory …

Macro-Risks: The Challenge For Rational Risk Regulation, Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jonathan A. Gilligan

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Drawing on the recent financial crisis, we introduce the concept of macro-risk. We distinguish between micro-risks, which can be managed within conventional economic frameworks, and macro-risks, which threaten to disrupt economic systems so much that a different approach is required. We argue that catastrophic climate change is a prime example of a macro-risk. Research by climate scientists suggests disturbingly high likelihoods of temperature increases and sea level rises that could cause the kinds of systemic failures that almost occurred with the financial system. We suggest that macro-risks should be the principal concern of rational risk assessment and management, but they …

Chapman Dialogue And Law Review Symposium Keynote Address: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches To Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Ideal financial regulation would work ex ante, to prevent financial failures. Once a failure occurs, there may already be economic damage, and it may be difficult to stop the failure from spreading and becoming systemic. The reality, though, is that preventing financial failures should be only one role for regulators. Even an optimal prophylactic regulatory regime cannot anticipate and prevent every failure. This paper, which formed my Chapman Dialogue Address at Chapman University School of Law and the keynote speech at Chapman Law Review’s 2011 Symposium on the Future of Financial Regulation, attempts to contrast fundamental differences between ex ante …

Financial Industry Self-Regulation: Aspiration And Reality, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This essay on financial industry self-regulation responds to Professor Saule Omarova’s recent article on that topic, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011).

Identifying And Managing Systemic Risk: An Assessment Of Our Progress, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Although a chain of bank failures remains an important symbol of systemic risk, the ongoing trend towards disintermediation—or enabling companies to directly access the ultimate source of funds, the capital (i.e., financial) markets, without going through banks or other financial intermediaries—is making these failures less critical than in the past. While banks and other financial institutions remain important sources of capital, companies today are able to obtain most of their financing through financial markets without the use of intermediaries. As a result, financial markets themselves are increasingly central to any examination of systemic risk.

Keynote Address: A Regulatory Framework For Managing Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This accessible analysis of systemic risk regulation was delivered as the keynote speech at an October 20, 2011 European Central Bank conference on regulation of financial services. Many regulatory responses, like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, consist largely of politically motivated reactions to the financial crisis, looking for villains (whether or not they exist). To be most effective, however, the regulation must be situated within a more analytical framework. In this speech, I attempt to build that framework, showing that preventive regulation is insufficient and that regulation also must be designed to limit the transmission of systemic risk …