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Protecting Liberty And Autonomy: Desert/Disease Jurisprudence, Stephen J. Morse Oct 2011

Protecting Liberty And Autonomy: Desert/Disease Jurisprudence, Stephen J. Morse

All Faculty Scholarship

This contribution to a symposium on the morality of preventive restriction on liberty begins by describing the positive law of preventive detention, which I term "desert/disease jurisprudence." Then it provides a brief excursus about risk prediction (estimation), which is at the heart of all preventive detention practices. Part IV considers whether proposed expansions of desert jurisprudence are consistent with retributive theories of justice, which ground desert jurisprudence. I conclude that this is a circle that cannot be squared. The following Part canvasses expansions of disease jurisprudence, especially the involuntary civil commitment of mentally abnormal, sexually violent predators, and the use …


Sacrifice And Sacred Honor: Why The Constitution Is A Suicide Pact, Peter B. Bayer Mar 2011

Sacrifice And Sacred Honor: Why The Constitution Is A Suicide Pact, Peter B. Bayer

Peter B Bayer

Most legal scholars and elected officials embrace the popular cliché that “the Constitution is not a suicide pact.” Typically, those commentators extol the “Constitution of necessity,” the supposition that Government, essentially the Executive, may take any action -- may abridge or deny any fundamental right -- to alleviate a serious national security threat. The Constitution of necessity is wrong. This article explains that strict devotion to the “fundamental fairness” principles of the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses is America’s utmost legal and moral duty, surpassing all other considerations, even safety, security and survival. Analysis begins with the most basic premises: the …


The Path Of Posner's Pragmatism, Edward Cantu Mar 2011

The Path Of Posner's Pragmatism, Edward Cantu

Edward Cantu

It is no secret that formalist methodologies like originalism are not nearly as scientific as they pretend to be. Banking on this fact, pragmatism offers a prescriptive alternative: instead of expending intellectual energy attempting “fidelity” to antecedent “authority” (precedent, Framers’ intent, etc.) judges should embrace their inevitable roles as de facto policy makers, and focus on producing the best social results they can through the cases they decide. The article discusses the current state of legal pragmatism in the form espoused by its chief proponent Judge Richard Posner, and asks whether it has proven itself capable of contributing anything useful …


The Path Of Posner's Pragmatism, Edward Cantu Feb 2011

The Path Of Posner's Pragmatism, Edward Cantu

Edward Cantu

It is no secret that formalist methodologies like originalism are not nearly as scientific as they pretend to be. Banking on this fact, pragmatism offers a prescriptive alternative: instead of expending intellectual energy attempting “fidelity” to antecedent “authority” (precedent, Framers’ intent, etc.) judges should embrace their inevitable roles as de facto policy makers, and focus on producing the best social results they can through the cases they decide. The article discusses the current state of legal pragmatism in the form espoused by its chief proponent Judge Richard Posner, and asks whether it has proven itself capable of contributing anything useful …


Two Kinds Of Retributivism, Mitchell N. Berman Jan 2011

Two Kinds Of Retributivism, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay, written as a contribution to a forthcoming volume on the philosophical foundations of the criminal law, challenges the longstanding dominant framework for classifying justifications for criminal punishment. The familiar binary distinction between consequentialism and retributivism is no longer most perspicuous, I argue, because many recognizably retributivist theories of punishment employ a consequentialist justificatory structure. However, because not all do, it might prove most illuminating to carve the retributivist field in two – distinguishing what we might term “consequentialist retributivism” (perhaps better labeled “instrumentalist retributivism”) from “non-consequentialist retributivism” (“non-instrumentalist retributivism”).

Whether or not it is ultimately persuasive, consequentialist retributivism …