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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Law
Antitrust's "Jurisdictional" Reach Abroad, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust's "Jurisdictional" Reach Abroad, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In its Arbaugh decision the Supreme Court insisted that a federal statute’s limitation on reach be regarded as “jurisdictional” only if the legislature was clear that this is what it had in mind. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA) presents a puzzle in this regard, because Congress seems to have been quite clear about what it had in mind; it simply failed to use the correct set of buzzwords in the statute itself, and well before Arbaugh assessed this requirement.
Even if the FTAIA is to be regarded as non-jurisdictional, the constitutional extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act is …
Plus Factors And Agreement In Antitrust Law, William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, Halbert L. White
Plus Factors And Agreement In Antitrust Law, William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, Halbert L. White
Michigan Law Review
Plus factors are economic actions and outcomes, above and beyond parallel conduct by oligopolistic firms, that are largely inconsistent with unilateral conduct but largely consistent with explicitly coordinated action. Possible plus factors are typically enumerated without any attempt to distinguish them in terms of a meaningful economic categorization or in terms of their probative strength for inferring collusion. In this Article, we provide a taxonomy for plus factors as well as a methodology for ranking plus factors in terms of their strength for inferring explicit collusion, the strongest of which are referred to as "super plus factors."
Behavioral Antitrust, Maurice Stucke, Amanda P. Reeves
Behavioral Antitrust, Maurice Stucke, Amanda P. Reeves
Scholarly Works
Competition policy is entering a new age. Interest in competition laws has increased world-wide, and the United States no longer holds a monopoly on antitrust policy. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the question for competition authorities is whether and to what extent does bounded rationality, self-interest and willpower matter. This article explores how the behavioral economics literature will advance competition policy. With increasing interest in the United States and abroad in the implications of behavioral economics for competition policy, this Article first provides an overview of behavioral economics. It next discusses how the assumption of rational, self-interested profit …
Am I A Price Fixer? A Behavioural Economics Analysis Of Cartels, Maurice Stucke
Am I A Price Fixer? A Behavioural Economics Analysis Of Cartels, Maurice Stucke
Book Chapters
No abstract provided.
Comparative Deterrence From Private Enforcement And Criminal Enforcement Of The U.S. Antitrust Laws, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
Comparative Deterrence From Private Enforcement And Criminal Enforcement Of The U.S. Antitrust Laws, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
All Faculty Scholarship
This article shows that private enforcement of the U. S. antitrust laws-which usually is derided as essentially worthless-serves as a more important deterrent of anticompetitive behavior than the most esteemed antitrust program in the world, criminal enforcement by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.
The debate over the value of private antitrust enforcement long has been heavy with self-serving assertions by powerful economic interests, but light on factual evidence. To help fill this void we have been conducting research for several years on a variety of empirical topics. This article develops and then explores the implications of …
Plus Factors And Agreement In Antitrust Law, William E. Kovacic
Plus Factors And Agreement In Antitrust Law, William E. Kovacic
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
Despite the crucial role of concerted action to collusion among rival firms, few elements are more perplexing than the design of evidentiary standards to determine whether parallel conduct stems from collective or from unilateral decision making. Courts allow a collusive agreement to be established by circumstantial evidence, but the evidence must show additional evidence — “plus factors” — beyond parallel movement in price. Chief plus factors identified by courts have included actions contrary to each defendant’s self-interest unless pursued as part of a collective plan, phenomena that can be explained rationally only as a result of concerted action, evidence that …
Behavioral Antitrust, Maurice E. Stucke, Amanda P. Reeves
Behavioral Antitrust, Maurice E. Stucke, Amanda P. Reeves
College of Law Faculty Scholarship
Competition policy is entering a new age. Interest in competition laws has increased world-wide, and the United States no longer holds a monopoly on antitrust policy. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the question for competition authorities is whether and to what extent does bounded rationality, self-interest and willpower matter.
This article explores how the behavioral economics literature will advance competition policy. With increasing interest in the United States and abroad in the implications of behavioral economics for competition policy, this Article first provides an overview of behavioral economics. It next discusses how the assumption of rational, self-interested profit-maximizers …
Vertical Relations In Cartel Theory, Martijn Han
Vertical Relations In Cartel Theory, Martijn Han
Martijn A. Han
A cartel is a group of firms collectively attempting to restrict competition among them. Cartel members most commonly do so by illegally fixing prices, sharing markets, or rigging bids. This dissertation explores managerial incentives to cartelize.
Short-Term Managerial Contracts And Cartels, Martijn Han
Short-Term Managerial Contracts And Cartels, Martijn Han
Martijn A. Han
This paper shows how a series of commonly observed short-term CEO employment contracts can improve cartel stability compared to a long-term employment contract. When a manager's short-term appointment is renewed if and only if the firm hits a certain profit target, then (i) defection from collusion results in superior firm performance, thus reducing the chance of being fired, while (ii) future punishment results in inferior firm performance, thus increasing the chance of being fired in the future. The introduction of this re-employment tradeoff intertwines with the usual monetary tradeoff and can improve cartel stability. Studying the impact of fixed versus …