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2011

Dispute Resolution and Arbitration

Series

Negotiation

Faculty Scholarship

Articles 1 - 1 of 1

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, And Trade Law Enforcement, Rachel Brewster Jan 2011

The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, And Trade Law Enforcement, Rachel Brewster

Faculty Scholarship

One of the major innovations of the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) is the regulation of sanctions in response to violations of trade law. The DSU requires governments to receive multilateral approval before suspending trade concessions and limits the extent of retaliation to prospective damages. In addition, the DSU permits governments to impose only conditional sanctions: sanctions for violations that continue after the dispute resolution process is complete. This enforcement regime creates a remedy gap: governments cannot respond, even to obvious breaches, until the end of the dispute resolution process (and then only to the extent of …