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Conceptual Analysis In Science And Law, Aaron Rappaport

Aaron Rappaport

Ever since H. L. A. Hart’s magisterial work, The Concept of Law, conceptual analysis has been viewed as the dominant method of doing jurisprudence. Far less appreciated is the fact that it is also a central tool in the field of cognitive science. That may be surprising to some, given the differences in these disciplines’ mission: Legal theorists struggle with abstract questions about the “nature” of Law and Justice; cognitive scientists explore the workings of the human mind. If cognitive scientists and legal philosophers are doing different things when they do conceptual analysis, how do they differ? This paper offers …

Law As Referent, Craig G. Bateman

C. G. Bateman

In this article I suggest that “the Law,” (hereinafter the LAW) can be most functionally understood as a conglomeration of referent ideals which emanate from the minds of law creators, and are the source of what we regularly understand as laws. I separate from the concept of the LAW the usual suspects of constitutions, codes, acts, and charters, etc. I separate these from their inceptional ideals and suggest we ascribe a label to these familiar kinds of categories such as “lower order laws,” being careful to confine our discussions of them with the exclusive use of a small “l” (law), …

Why We Don't Understand The Rule Of Law Or Explaining The Rule Of Law: A Practice In Search Of A Theory, Noel B. Reynolds

Noel B Reynolds

This lecture summarizes the main attempts to formulate an understanding of rule of law among legal theorists and explains why they fail to account for the real experience of law. It also explains key characteristics of law that need to be recognized in an adequate account of the rule of law.

The Union Of Legal And Political Theory, Noel B. Reynolds

Noel B Reynolds

This paper explores the social science concept of conventions as a way of understanding law that would bridge the enduring gap between natural law and legal positivist legal theories. It further finds in the conventionalist approach a promising account of the rule of law—both in how it may be characterized and in how it can be assessed in particular legal systems.

The Productive Tension Between Official And Unofficial Stories Of Fault In Contract Law, Martha M. Ertman

Martha M. Ertman

Officially Contract law ignores fault. However, an unofficial story complements the official one, and explains why fault occasionally slips into contract law through doctrines such as willful breach. This chapter of FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porot, eds, Cambridge U. Press, forthcoming 2010) argues that the official and unofficial stories operate in productive tension to both facilitate ex ante planning and, when necessary, look backward at reasons for breach to reach a just result. The occasional presence of fault in contract law, in this view, represents merely one more instance of the common doctrinal pattern of …

How Lawyers (Come To See) The World.Pdf, Randy D. Gordon

Randy D. Gordon