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Conviction And Punishment: Free Press And Competitive Election As Deterrents To Corruption, Xiaowen Tian, Vai Lo
Conviction And Punishment: Free Press And Competitive Election As Deterrents To Corruption, Xiaowen Tian, Vai Lo
Xiaowen Tian
Democratic institutions are not equally effective in curbing corruption. Using a criminal behavior model, this study formulates the hypothesis that corruption offenders, being risk-inclined, are deterred more by conviction-reinforcing democratic institutions than by punishment-reinforcing democratic institutions. Evidence based on cross-country regressions strongly supports this hypothesis, indicating that compared with competitive election, free press is a more effective deterrent to corruption. While shedding light on why corruption remains rampant in some electoral democracies - particularly the illiberal democracies - this study identifies a key to corruption control.
Collective Discursive Democracy And International Law Personality For Transnational Enterprises, Russell Miller
Collective Discursive Democracy And International Law Personality For Transnational Enterprises, Russell Miller
Russell A. Miller
No abstract provided.