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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Presidential Control Of The Elite "Non-Agency", Kimberly L. Wehle
Presidential Control Of The Elite "Non-Agency", Kimberly L. Wehle
All Faculty Scholarship
This article examines the constitutionality of legislation creating a new form of independent agency – in effect, a “non-agency” agency residing in the no-man’s land between Articles I and II of the Constitution. In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) and endowed it with massive governmental powers while insulating it from traditional mechanisms for ensuring accountability. Congress deemed the PCAOB not an agency, rendered it substantially immune from judicial review, empowered Board members to set their own salaries and budget, and gave the embattled Securities and Exchange Commission – not the President …
Auditing The Pcaob: A Test To The Accountability Of The Uniquely Structured Regulator Of Accountants, Michael A. Thomason, Jr.
Auditing The Pcaob: A Test To The Accountability Of The Uniquely Structured Regulator Of Accountants, Michael A. Thomason, Jr.
Vanderbilt Law Review
After a slew of highly publicized corporate accounting scandals during the early 2000s at prominent companies-including Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco-public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting by public companies was undoubtedly shaken. Several major financial reporting frauds demonstrated serious weaknesses with the then self-regulated accounting profession, including the failure of auditors to detect those companies that were "cooking their books." The collapse of several prominent companies not only affected top executives, who often were subjected to civil and criminal charges, but also produced harsh consequences for several other constituencies who relied on the integrity of the accounting firms …
The Duty Of Care And The Data Control Systems In The Wake Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Michael R. Siebecker
The Duty Of Care And The Data Control Systems In The Wake Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Michael R. Siebecker
Chicago-Kent Law Review
The essay examines the wisdom of exempting small public companies from Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which requires companies to provide management assessment and external auditing of a company's internal control systems over financial data. In particular, the essay questions whether a fiduciary duty of care might require officers and directors to adopt internal control systems, perhaps substantially similar to those envisioned by SOX, even if small public companies were exempt from the ambit of the statute.
The Crescent And The Corporation: Analysis And Resolution Of Conflicting Positions Between The Western Corporation And The Islamic Legal System, Craig C. Briess
The Crescent And The Corporation: Analysis And Resolution Of Conflicting Positions Between The Western Corporation And The Islamic Legal System, Craig C. Briess
Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business
No abstract provided.
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
In the United States, state corporate law determines most questions of internal corporate governance - the role of directors; the allocation of authority between directors, managers, and shareholders; etc. - while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders - annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate effect on corporate governance outcomes.
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
Jurisdictional competition in corporate law has long been a staple of academic-and sometimes, political-debate in the United States. State corporate law, by long-standing tradition in the United States, determines most questions of internal corporate governance-the role of boards of directors, the allocation of authority between directors, managers and shareholders, etc.-while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders-annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate impact on corporate governance outcomes.