Law Commons^™

The Supreme Court's Assault On Litigation: Why (And How) It Might Be A Good Thing For Health Law, Abigail R. Moncrieff

Abigail R. Moncrieff

In recent years, the Supreme Court has narrowed or eliminated private rights of action in many legal regimes, much to the chagrin of the legal academy. That trend has had a significant impact on health law; the Court’s decisions have eliminated the private enforcement mechanism for at least three important healthcare regimes: Medicaid, employer-sponsored insurance, and medical devices. In a similar trend outside the courts, state legislatures have capped noneconomic and punitive damages for medical malpractice litigation, weakening the tort system’s deterrent capacity in those states. This Article points out that the trend of eliminating private rights of action in …

How Do Local-Level Legal Institutions Promote Development?, Varun Gauri

Varun Gauri

This paper develops a framework and some hypotheses regarding the impact of local-level, informal legal institutions on three economic outcomes: aggregate growth, inequality, and human capabilities. It presents a set of stylized differences between formal and informal legal justice systems, identifies the pathways through which formal systems promote economic outcomes, reflects on what the stylized differences mean for the potential impact of informal legal institutions on economic outcomes, and looks at extant case studies to examine the plausibility of the arguments presented. The paper concludes that local-level, informal legal institutions can support social substitutes for the enforcement of contracts, although …

In Search Of An Enforceabe Medical Malpractice Exculpatory Agreement: Introducing Confidential Contracts As A Solution To The Doctor-Patient Relationship Problem, Matthew J.B. Lawrence

Faculty Scholarly Works

Scholars have argued that the malpractice system would be better off if patients had the option of waiving the right to sue for malpractice in exchange for a lower fee. Some doctors have tried to follow this advice by having their patients sign medical malpractice exculpatory agreements, but courts usually have refused to enforce these agreements, invoking a void-for-public-policy rationale. This Note argues that a doctor could maximize the odds that a court would enforce her medical malpractice exculpatory agreement by somehow ensuring that she will never find out whether her patient decided to sign. A case study of the …

How Do Local-Level Legal Institutions Promote Development?, Varun Gauri

Varun Gauri

This paper develops a framework and some hypotheses regarding the impact of local-level, informal legal institutions on three economic outcomes: aggregate growth, inequality, and human capabilities. It presents a set of stylized differences between formal and informal legal justice systems, identifies the pathways through which formal systems promote economic outcomes, reflects on what the stylized differences mean for the potential impact of informal legal institutions on economic outcomes, and looks at extant case studies to examine the plausibility of the arguments presented. The paper concludes that local-level, informal legal institutions can support social substitutes for the enforcement of contracts, though …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

Penalizing Punitive Damages: Why The Supreme Court Needs A Lesson In Law & Economics, Steve P. Calandrillo

Steve P. Calandrillo

Last year’s landmark Supreme Court decision addressing punitive damages in the infamous Exxon Valdez oil spill case has brought the issue of punitive awards back into the legal limelight. This paper critically examines modern punitive damages jurisprudence using a law & economics lens and provides a dramatically different and far more principled approach to the subject.

While traditional Supreme Court jurisprudence requires morally reprehensible conduct before punitive damages may be awarded, I argue that punitives should be imposed (indeed, must for deterrence purposes) even in the absence of egregious behavior when a defendant has escaped liability previously, either intentionally or …

Razing The Citizen: Economic Inequality, Gender, And Marriage Tax Reform, Martha T. Mccluskey

Contributions to Books

Published as Chapter 12 in Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women's Equal Citizenship, Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. Grossman, eds.

This chapter links the failure of U.S. social citizenship ideals to a broader weakness in U.S. ideas citizenship. To better advance policies of economic equality, U.S. law and politics needs a stronger vision not just of economic equality, but of gender equality and of democracy in general. Feminist scholars have analyzed how ideas about gender help shape the common assumption that the costs of raising and sustaining capable, productive citizens are largely private family responsibilities. But ideas about gender also …

Penalizing Punitive Damages: Why The Supreme Court Needs A Lesson In Law & Economics, Steve P. Calandrillo

Steve P. Calandrillo

Last fall’s landmark Supreme Court decision addressing punitive damages in the infamous Exxon Valdez oil spill case has brought the issue of punitive awards back into the legal limelight. Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence, most notably BMW, State Farm, Philip Morris, and now Exxon Valdez in 2008, have concluded that such judgments are justified to punish morally reprehensible behavior and to “send a message” to evildoers. However, the Court has increasingly emphasized that the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause presumptively limits punitive awards, drawing an arbitrary line in the sand of no more than ten times actual damages.

This paper critically …

Custom, Comedy, And The Value Of Dissent, Jennifer E. Rothman

All Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, I comment on Dotan Oliar and Christopher Sprigman's article, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1787 (2008). Their study of the quasi-intellectual property norms in the stand-up comedy world provides yet another compelling example of the phenomenon that I have explored in which the governing intellectual property regime takes a backseat to social norms and other industry customs that dominate the lived experiences of many in creative fields. The microcosm of stand-up comedy reinforces my concern that customs are being used to …

The Relation Between Regulation And Class Actions: Evidence From The Insurance Industry, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick

All Faculty Scholarship

Standard law and economics models imply that regulation and litigation serve as substitutes. We test this by looking at the incidence of insurance class actions as a function of measures of regulatory enforcement. We also look specifically at whether states with clear regulatory standards regarding the use of OEM parts experience less litigation over this issue. We find no evidence of substitution between regulation and litigation. We also examine the possibility that litigation is more frequent in states where regulators are more likely to be captured by industry interests, finding no support for this hypothesis either. Instead, litigation is more …

The Intersection Of Judicial Attitudes And Litigant Selection Theories: Explaining U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, Jeff L. Yates, Elizabeth Coggins

Jeff L Yates

Two prominent theories of legal decision making provide seemingly contradictory explanations for judicial outcomes. In political science, the Attitudinal Model suggests that judicial outcomes are driven by judges' sincere policy preferences -- judges bring their ideological inclinations to the decision making process and their case outcome choices largely reflect these policy preferences. In contrast, in the law and economics literature, Priest and Klein's well-known Selection Hypothesis posits that court outcomes are largely driven by the litigants' strategic choices in the selection of cases for formal dispute or adjudication -- forward thinking litigants settle cases where potential judicial outcomes are readily …

Comparative Law As A Bridge Between The Nation-State And The Global Economy: An Essay For Herbert Bernstein, Richard M. Buxbaum

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Richard M. Buxbaum delivered the Fourth Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law in 2005 and this article is based on his remarks. The article is included in the inaugural volume of CICLOPs that collects the first six Bernstein lectures. In this paper, Richard Buxbaum is primarily concerned with the potential of comparative law as a method to bridge the disparities between the laws of nation-states and the needs of the globalized economy. Buxbaum investigates three separate roles for comparative law in closing this gap: First, he discusses the potential uses of comparative law with regard to …

Comparative Law By Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, And The Silence Of Traditional Comparative Law, Ralf Michaels

Faculty Scholarship

The legal origins thesis -- the thesis that legal origin impacts economic growth and the common law is better for economic growth than the civil law -- has created hundreds of papers and citation numbers unheard of among comparative lawyers. The Doing Business reports -- cross-country comparisons including rankings on the attractiveness of different legal systems for doing business -- have the highest circulation numbers of all World Bank Publications; even critics admit that they have been successful at inciting legal reform in many countries in the world. Yet, traditional comparative lawyers have all but ignored these developments.

The first …

How Queer Theory Makes Neoliberalism Sexy, Martha T. Mccluskey

Contributions to Books

Published in Feminist and Queer Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable Conversations, Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson & Adam P. Romero, eds.

Some strands of queer theory have echoed conservative law-and-economics (neoliberalism) in criticizing feminism's turn to the state and to moral principle to solve problems of dependency and dominance. But on closer analysis, queer anti-statism and anti-moralism itself relies on and reinforces the identity conventions and regulatory constraints it claims to unsettle. The meaningful question for queer theory, for feminism, and for legal economics, is what kind of state and morality to pursue, not whether individual choice and private …

Of Coase And Comics, Or, The Comedy Of Copyright, Michael J. Madison

Articles

This Essay responds to There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, by Dotan Oliar and Christopher Sprigman. It argues that case studies of disciplines and domains that may be governed by intellectual property regimes are invaluable tools for comparative analysis of the respective roles of law and other forms of social order. The Essay examines the case of stand-up comedy under a lens that is somewhat broader than the one used by the authors of the original study, one that takes into account not only the social norms of individual …

Is Law An Economic Contest? French Reactions To The Doing Business World Bank Reports And Economic Analysis Of The Law, Anne-Julie Kerhuel, Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The economic analysis of law has provoked strong reactions among French academics, in particular since 2004 when the first of the Doing Business reports was published. French jurists have joined forces to expose the methodological limits inherent to these reports, which rated France a long way behind other legal systems allegedly more able to facilitate business. In its first part, this article examines the various reactions to these reports, almost all of which were published in French only. In the second part, the focus is on the position of economic analysis in French law, its role, and, in particular, the …

Public Use, Public Choice And The Urban Growth Machine: Competing Political Economies Of Takings Law, Daniel Lyons

Daniel Lyons

The Kelo decision has unleashed a tidal wave of legislative reforms ostensibly seeking to control eminent domain abuse. But as a policy matter, it is impossible to determine what limits should be placed upon local government without understanding how cities grow and develop, and how local governments make decisions to shape the communities over which they preside. This article examines takings through two very different models of urban political economy: public choice theory and the quasi-Marxist Urban Growth Machine model. These models approach takings from diametrically opposite perspectives, and offer differing perspectives at the margin regarding proper and improper condemnations. …

The Discourse Of "Contract" And The Law Of Marriage, Thomas W. Joo

Thomas W Joo

Marriage is often compared to a "contract." While this analogy bases the law of marriage on a presumed settled concept called "contract," it rests in fact on a contested view of "contract": that legitimate obligation must derive from consent. This focus on consent ignores another, contradictory, strand of contract law that imposes obligations without consent. The pervasiveness of the consent-centered "contract" analogy affects our understanding of "contract" as much as it affects our understanding of marriage.

Flying Passports Of Convenience, Karl T. Muth

Karl T Muth

This paper proposes an economic alternative to the legal construct of citizenship that currently dominates international law.

Análise Econômica Do Direito E A Agu, Ivo T. Gico

Ivo Teixeira Gico Jr.

No abstract provided.

In Search Of An Enforceable Medical Malpractice Exculpatory Agreement: Introducing Confidential Contracts As A Solution To The Doctor-Patient Relationship Problem, Matthew Lawrence

Matthew B. Lawrence