Law Commons^™

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: An Updated Analysis, Kimberlee G. Weatherall

Kimberlee G Weatherall

This paper provides an updated analysis of the issues posed by negotiations for the ACTA, as at November 2009.

Rational Design Rights Ignorance, David Orozco

David Orozco

No abstract provided.

How (Not) To Discourage The Unscrupulous Copyist, Peter L. Ludwig

Peter L. Ludwig

This short article explores how the U.S. and Japanese courts implement the doctrine of equivalence when determining patent infringement. The doctrine of equivalence is a balance of, on one hand, the public’s interest to know the metes and bounds of the patent; and on the other hand, the private interest of the patentee to be granted a sufficient scope for the granted patent. After comparing and contrasting the courts’ implementation of the doctrine, I propose a new method that places the burden on the patent practitioner, before infringement proceedings begin, to determine the proper scope of the patent.

Acts Of Parliament: Privatisation, Promulgation And Crown Copyright – Is There A Need For A Royal Royalty?, Mark Perry

Mark Perry

The road of privatisation of government assets is littered with the debris of mishaps and oversights. One clear illustration is the history and effect of the sale of the Government Printing Office (GPO) in 1990. Within the sale process there was a failure to ensure adequate consideration of the policy implications from an important perspective, namely the effect of privatising the means of promulgation of the normative materials of the State. Furthermore, there was no enquiry into the dubious assumptions made as to Crown Copyright in legislation. Intellectual property rights in primary legal materials create a dilemma for policy makers. …

Open Access Week (Retention Of Author Rights), Mark Perry

Mark Perry

No abstract provided.

Repackaging, Pharmaceuticals, And The European Union: Managing Gray Markets In An Uncertain Legal Environment, Robert Bird

Robert C Bird

One of the most robust gray markets in the world is the parallel importation of pharmaceutical drugs in the European Union (EU). Drug manufacturers have tried to stop parallel importation with over thirty years of litigation. The result has applied. This manuscript examines the forces underlying the EU gray market for drugs, discusses how trademark law and not patent law has become the primary basis for legal challenges, and offers strategies for manufacturers to impede importers in a truly chaotic legal environment.

Stifling Or Stimulating - The Role Of Gene Patents In Research And Genetic Testing, Lawrence M. Sung

Lawrence M. Sung

No abstract provided.

Intellectual Property Protection Or Protectionism? Declaratory Judgment Use By Patent Owners Against Prospective Infringers, Lawrence M. Sung

Lawrence M. Sung

No abstract provided.

Collegiality And Collaboration In The Age Of Exclusivity, Lawrence M. Sung

Lawrence M. Sung

No abstract provided.

Ip And Antitrust: Errands Into The Wilderness, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

IP AND ANTITRUST: ERRANDS INTO THE WILDERNESS

ABSTRACT

Antitrust and intellectual property law both seek to promote economic welfare by facilitating competition and investment in innovation. At various times both antitrust and IP law have wandered off this course and have become more driven by special interests. Today, antitrust and IP are on very different roads to reform. Antitrust began an Errand into the Wilderness in the late 1970s with a series of Supreme Court decisions that linked the plaintiff’s harm and right to obtain a remedy to the competition-furthering goals of antitrust policy. Today, patent law has begun its …

Copyright Infringement And Harmless Speech, Christina Bohannan

Christina Bohannan

Copyright law is a glaring and unjustified exception to the rule that the government may not prohibit speech without a showing that it causes harm. While the First Amendment sometimes protects even harmful speech, it virtually never allows the prohibition of harmless speech. Yet, while other speech-burdening laws, such as defamation and right of publicity laws, require demonstrable evidence that the defendant’s speech causes actual harm, copyright law does not make harm a requirement of infringement. Although copyright law considers harm to the market for the copyrighted work as a factor in fair use analysis, harm is not always required …

Why Typefaces Proliferate Without Copyright Protection, Blake Fry

Blake Fry

Classic economic theory predicts that without copyright protection authors and publishers would not have sufficient incentive to invest the time or money needed to produce or distribute new works, and the public would suffer a shortage. Copyrights are an attempt to solve this problem. By granting a monopoly to the author of an expressive work the government gives him the sole right to copy it. If only the author has this right, authors will get a reasonable rate of return, and thus a sufficient incentive to create new works. However, empirical evidence on whether adequate expressive works would be created …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

Reconciling Fair Use And Trademark Use, Margreth Barrett

Margreth Barrett

This article looks to early common law, the legislative history of the Lanham Act, and public policy considerations to evaluate the relationship of the Lanham Act’s trademark use requirement to the trademark fair use defense. Although a number of commentators have suggested the contrary, I conclude that requiring infringement plaintiffs to demonstrate the defendant’s “trademark use” as part of its case-in-chief is consistent with the fair use defense, which waives liability if the defendant can demonstrate that its use was “in good faith” and “otherwise than as a trademark” only to describe its goods or services. These two “use” doctrines …

The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine: A Common-Sense Application That Considers The Rights Of Trade Secret Holders And Employees, Eduardo M. Gonzalez

Eduardo M Gonzalez

Under the inevitable disclosure doctrine, a court may enjoin a person accepting employment with a direct competitor of a former employer to protect a trade secret. Most states that have adopted the doctrine do not limit its application. Such broad application of the doctrine can be harsh and unfair if the former employee lacked any intent to disclose a trade secret. Moreover, it encourages frivolous lawsuits by employers and discourages bargained-for non-compete agreements. Some states, notably California, citing these policy concerns, have declined to adopt the doctrine. This extreme approach is equally troublesome because it ignores that the protection of …

Hidden Engines Of Destruction, Andrea Matwyshyn

Andrea Matwyshyn

This article explores whether a duty to warn should exist in the context of digital products. It argues in favor of creating a “reasonable expectation of code safety.” Section I explains the dominant ways that digital products can harm consumers through their code and not their content, focusing on functionality and information security harms. Section II reviews existing regulation of digital products and highlighted their focus on improving information parity and consumer control over digital product relationships. Section II then sets forth the scope of the duty to warn and protect from harms in real space owed by possessors of …

Distinguishing The Right Of Publicity: Property Rights, Free Speech Privilege, And Competition Policy, Steven Semeraro

Steven Semeraro

The right of publicity is an enigmatic property right. Its many critics argue that it should not be a property right at all, because 1) it is unnecessary to stimulate the pursuit of fame; 2) unneeded to manage the value of publicity; and 3) undeserved in any recognized moral sense. Yet, this ostensibly persuasive critique has had little practical impact. The right of publicity today is stronger than ever. This article contends that the prevailing critique of publicity rights has failed to influence the courts in large part because each quiver in its arsenal would be just as fatal were …

Allocating Patent Rights Between Earlier And Later Inventions, Charles Adams

Charles W. Adams

Allocating Patent Rights Between Earlier and Later Inventions By Charles W. Adams Abstract The patent statutes expressly authorize patents for improvements to earlier inventions, but they do not address the allocation of rights between the patents for the original inventions and the after-arising technology. From an economic standpoint, the allocation of patent rights should depend on the relative contribution of the original inventor and the improver and on the effect that the allocation would have on their respective incentives. Improvements on earlier inventions may give rise to blocking patents in which the permission of both the original inventor and the …

Interoperability: Intellectual Property Vs. Anti-Trust, Kevin W. Reckamp

Kevin W Reckamp

In the past few years, the European Union and the United States have taken differing paths in the name of consumer welfare. The European courts recently struck Microsoft with the largest fine ever for violating the EU competition laws, because Microsoft had refused to release proprietary codes to rival companies that would allow the rivals to make their products “interoperable” with Microsoft’s dominate system. The Microsoft decision is the latest in a line of cases that goes down a path of stripping intellectual property rights from an individual or company that becomes too successful. The United States has been much …

Taking The Measure Of Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases, Tonja Jacobi, Matthew Sag

Tonja Jacobi

Empirical legal studies have become increasingly popular and influential, but empirical analysis is only as good as its tools. Until recently, no sophisticated measure of case outcomes existed. Jacobi (2009) developed three possible measures of case outcomes, based on three common theories of how Justices balance the trade-off between outcome optimization and coalition maximization. This Article extends Jacobi’s earlier theoretical work by empirically testing those competing measures of case outcomes.

The competing measures are initially assessed against a dataset of over 8000 Supreme Court cases decided between 1953 and 2006. The measures are also assessed in a more targeted fashion …

Book Review Of "Intellectual Proptery Rights In Eu Law: Free Movement And Competition Law, Mark Perry

Mark Perry

No abstract provided.