Law Commons^™

How (Not) To Discourage The Unscrupulous Copyist, Peter L. Ludwig

Peter L. Ludwig

This short article explores how the U.S. and Japanese courts implement the doctrine of equivalence when determining patent infringement. The doctrine of equivalence is a balance of, on one hand, the public’s interest to know the metes and bounds of the patent; and on the other hand, the private interest of the patentee to be granted a sufficient scope for the granted patent. After comparing and contrasting the courts’ implementation of the doctrine, I propose a new method that places the burden on the patent practitioner, before infringement proceedings begin, to determine the proper scope of the patent.

Why Typefaces Proliferate Without Copyright Protection, Blake Fry

Blake Fry

Classic economic theory predicts that without copyright protection authors and publishers would not have sufficient incentive to invest the time or money needed to produce or distribute new works, and the public would suffer a shortage. Copyrights are an attempt to solve this problem. By granting a monopoly to the author of an expressive work the government gives him the sole right to copy it. If only the author has this right, authors will get a reasonable rate of return, and thus a sufficient incentive to create new works. However, empirical evidence on whether adequate expressive works would be created …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Upside Of Intellectual Property's Downside, James Gibson

James Gibson

Intellectual property law exists because exclusive private rights provide an incentive to innovate. This is the traditional upside of intellectual property: the production of valuable information goods that society would otherwise never see. In turn, too much intellectual property protection is typically viewed as counterproductive, as too much control in the hands of private rightsholders creates more artificial scarcity and imposes more costs on future innovators than the incentive effect warrants. This is the traditional downside of intellectual property: reduced production and impeded innovation. This article turns the traditional discussion on its head and shows that intellectual property's putative costs …

The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine: A Common-Sense Application That Considers The Rights Of Trade Secret Holders And Employees, Eduardo M. Gonzalez

Eduardo M Gonzalez

Under the inevitable disclosure doctrine, a court may enjoin a person accepting employment with a direct competitor of a former employer to protect a trade secret. Most states that have adopted the doctrine do not limit its application. Such broad application of the doctrine can be harsh and unfair if the former employee lacked any intent to disclose a trade secret. Moreover, it encourages frivolous lawsuits by employers and discourages bargained-for non-compete agreements. Some states, notably California, citing these policy concerns, have declined to adopt the doctrine. This extreme approach is equally troublesome because it ignores that the protection of …

Distinguishing The Right Of Publicity: Property Rights, Free Speech Privilege, And Competition Policy, Steven Semeraro

Steven Semeraro

The right of publicity is an enigmatic property right. Its many critics argue that it should not be a property right at all, because 1) it is unnecessary to stimulate the pursuit of fame; 2) unneeded to manage the value of publicity; and 3) undeserved in any recognized moral sense. Yet, this ostensibly persuasive critique has had little practical impact. The right of publicity today is stronger than ever. This article contends that the prevailing critique of publicity rights has failed to influence the courts in large part because each quiver in its arsenal would be just as fatal were …

Allocating Patent Rights Between Earlier And Later Inventions, Charles Adams

Charles W. Adams

Allocating Patent Rights Between Earlier and Later Inventions By Charles W. Adams Abstract The patent statutes expressly authorize patents for improvements to earlier inventions, but they do not address the allocation of rights between the patents for the original inventions and the after-arising technology. From an economic standpoint, the allocation of patent rights should depend on the relative contribution of the original inventor and the improver and on the effect that the allocation would have on their respective incentives. Improvements on earlier inventions may give rise to blocking patents in which the permission of both the original inventor and the …

Interoperability: Intellectual Property Vs. Anti-Trust, Kevin W. Reckamp

Kevin W Reckamp

In the past few years, the European Union and the United States have taken differing paths in the name of consumer welfare. The European courts recently struck Microsoft with the largest fine ever for violating the EU competition laws, because Microsoft had refused to release proprietary codes to rival companies that would allow the rivals to make their products “interoperable” with Microsoft’s dominate system. The Microsoft decision is the latest in a line of cases that goes down a path of stripping intellectual property rights from an individual or company that becomes too successful. The United States has been much …

Taking The Measure Of Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases, Tonja Jacobi, Matthew Sag

Tonja Jacobi

Empirical legal studies have become increasingly popular and influential, but empirical analysis is only as good as its tools. Until recently, no sophisticated measure of case outcomes existed. Jacobi (2009) developed three possible measures of case outcomes, based on three common theories of how Justices balance the trade-off between outcome optimization and coalition maximization. This Article extends Jacobi’s earlier theoretical work by empirically testing those competing measures of case outcomes.

The competing measures are initially assessed against a dataset of over 8000 Supreme Court cases decided between 1953 and 2006. The measures are also assessed in a more targeted fashion …

Dubai's New Intellectual Property-Based Economy: Prospects For Development Without Dependency, Amir Khoury

Amir Khoury

The Emirate of Dubai has, as a result of deliberate policy actions, been able to reinvigorate, indeed to reinvent, its Intellectual Property Potential. That is to say Dubai has boosted its ability to be the originator (and creator) of intellectual property subject-matter, rather than merely a consumer thereof. Dubai has achieved the two conditions through which an intellectual property régime becomes a valuable national asset for a country with an initially low Intellectual Property Potential; namely a structured regulatory framework coupled with effective infrastructure-related action. Dubai's undertakings in the intellectual property sphere go to show that even a country that …

Securitization Of Patents And Its Continued Viability In Light Of The Current Economic Conditions, Aleksandar Nikolic

Aleksandar Nikolic

No abstract provided.

Four Reasons To Enact A Federal Trade Secrets Act, David S. Almeling

David S. Almeling

Trade secrets stand alone as the only major type of intellectual property governed primarily by state law. Patents, trademarks, and copyrights are all governed primarily by federal statutes. Trade secrets, in contrast, are governed by fifty state statutes and common laws. The result is that trade secret law differs from state to state. Almeling argues it is time to eliminate these differences—and the significant problems they cause—by enacting a Federal Trade Secrets Act. In particular, Almeling argues that enacting a FTSA achieves four aims: (1) solving the interstate conflicts caused by having fifty different trade secret laws; (2) making the …

Looking For Fair Use In The Dmca's Safety Dance, Ira Nathenson

Ira Steven Nathenson

Like a ballet, the notice-and-take-down provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") provide complex procedures to obtain take-downs of online infringement. Copyright owners send notices of infringement to service providers, who in turn remove claimed infringement in exchange for a statutory safe harbor from copyright liability. But like a dance meant for two, the DMCA is less effective in protecting the "third wheel," the users of internet services. Even Senator John McCain - who in 1998 voted for the DMCA - wrote in exasperation to YouTube after some of his presidential campaign videos were removed due to take-downs. McCain …

You Can't Take It With You When You Die... Or Can You?: A Comparative Study Of Post-Mortem Moral Rights Statutes From Israel, France, And The United States, Galia Aharoni

galia aharoni

Moral rights – including the rights to attribution, integrity, and dissemination – is a sticky, controversial subject even standing on its own. Questions concerning the duration of these rights seem to compound the issue even further: If moral rights protection stems from a desire to protect the author’s intrinsic relationship with the work, when should the protection stop? Upon his death? Upon the expiration of the work’s copyright? …Never? Such questions become even more pressing when a country – especially a self-acknowledged “developing” country such as Israel – enacts a moral rights law of its own, and when consequently no …

User Innovator Community Norms At The Boundary Between Academic And Industrial Research, Katherine J. Strandburg

Katherine J. Strandburg

In this essay, I consider norms of sharing research tools and materials in what has been called Pasteur’s Quadrant, in which basic science and applied research overlap. I employ a user innovation paradigm, along with a rational choice approach to social norms, to address the issue. The convergence of academic research with commercial interests has two different types of consequences for sharing norms. First, a research tool or material developed in a nonprofit research context may be a dual-purpose innovation with both research and nonresearch uses. Thus, for example, a genetic assay may be useful in research and as a …

The University As Constructed Cultural Commons, Katherine J. Strandburg, Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann

Katherine J. Strandburg

This paper examines commons as socially constructed environments built via and alongside intellectual property rights systems. We sketch a theoretical framework for examining cultural commons across a broad variety of institutional and disciplinary contexts, and we apply that framework to the university and associated practices and institutions.

Evolving Innovation Paradigms And The Global Intellectual Property Regime, Katherine J. Strandburg

Katherine J. Strandburg

Since the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) in 1994, the innovative landscape has undergone dramatic changes due to technological advances in fields such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and digital communications and computation. The increasing potential for user innovation and open and collaborative innovation has brought an explosion of innovative activity that does not fit into the sales-oriented, mass market model which underlies the global intellectual property regime. In this Article, I argue that the debate over global governance of innovation should be expanded to account more fully for the implications of these changes. For the …